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论文编号：	4110
作者编号：	2120102348
上传时间：	2012/5/25 10:26:40
中文题目：	机构投资者类型对自愿性信息披露水平的影响研究——基于股东治理机制互补性的视角
英文题目：	The influence of Institutional Investor Division to Voluntary Disclosure—based on Shareholders’ Governance Complementary Mechanism
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	自愿性信息披露；机构投资者；股权治理；治理角色
英文关键字：	Voluntary Disclosure; Institutional Investor; Shareholder Governance Characteristic; Governance Role
中文摘要：	目前关于自愿性信息披露的研究目前主要集中公司董事会决策方面，股东治理机制对其影响目前考察的较少。特定股东类型对自愿性信息披露的影响也并没有形成系统性的研究。机构投资者对公司治理和信息透明度的作用日益受到重视，但机构投资者在自愿性信息披露方面的作用还值得探索。同时，机构投资者的作用研究缺乏类型的细分，在细分基础上考察机构投资者具体作用的研究还值得开展。此外，机构投资者影响自愿性信息披露的路径仍需进一步细化，从股权结构视角切入分析两者的互补性效应的研究有待深入。 本文运用2007-2010沪、深两地上市公司公开数据，根据机构投资者持股比例与连续三年持股比例标准差的比较，控制行业和年度因素，将机构投资者区分为稳定型和交易型。在此基础上分析了机构投资者对自愿性信息披露的作用，率先比较研究了稳定型和交易型机构投资者的不同作用机理。为探讨股权结构对机构投资者类型影响的互补性效应，具体分析不同治理环境下机构投资者对自愿性信息披露的作用，文章运用互补效应分析，通过股权集中程度、控制人性质的分类，进一步探索了股东治理机制的重要调节作用。 研究发现，机构投资者整体对自愿性信息披露呈显著负向影响，但稳定型机构投资者能显著提升自愿性信息披露水平。在股权较为集中时，自愿性信息披露水平较高，并且稳定型机构投资者对其正面影响得到强化；在股权分散时，交易型机构投资者对自愿性信息披露产生负面影响。进一步地，当引入控制人性质作为控制变量时，研究表明股权分散且机构投资者为交易型时机构投资者对自愿性信息披露的负向影响得到强化。因此，股权集中程度对稳定型机构投资者加强自愿性信息披露水平的作用具有一定的互补性。 论文在以下两个方面具有一定的重要性：首先是在自愿性信息披露研究中细分了机构投资者类型，这一尝试使我们能具体研究不同类型机构投资者的行为动机。其次是进一步把机构投资者类型与股东治理机制相结合，这种结合有助于更具体地考察机构投资者与其所处治理环境的交互作用，更细致地研究自愿性信息披露水平的披露动因。同时，本文检验了在对自愿性信息披露的影响过程中，股东治理机制和机构投资者类型之间是否存在互补效应。本研究主要存在以下三个方面的不足：首先是在股东治理机制方面还未考察全面，关于股东现金流权与控制权分离的影响还缺乏深入的研究；其次仅考虑了公司的内部决策过程，而忽略了公司外部环境的影响，而公司自愿性信息披露的重要目标是缩减外部市场信息成本，这一方面的研究我们未深入探讨；最后仅考察了股东治理结构，而缺乏管理层影响的考察，管理层的作用可能是股权结构影响自愿性信息披露的中介变量。这三个方面，也正是我们试图进一步开拓深化的方向。
英文摘要：	The study of voluntary disclosure mainly focuses on the behavior of corporate’s decision-making. For the influence of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure, there are fewer papers currently. For a further view, the study of a certain kind of stockholder’s effect has not formed a systematic scale. There is a focus on the effect of institutional investors on corporate governance and information disclosure, but the influence of institutional investors on voluntary disclosure still remains exploration. At the same time, the category division of institutional investors also needs studying. There is also space on the influence mechanism of institutional investors on voluntary disclosure. We also explored the complementary effect between institutional investors and stockholder governance on voluntary disclosure. By examining the listed company data in 2007-2010, we divided the institutional investors into two different categories: the strategy institutional investor and information the institutional investor, which is based on the year-industry mean level of the institutional investor rate and standard deviation. Our essay analyzes the effect of different institutional investors on voluntary disclosure, and discusses the effect mechanism in particular shareholder governance environment. This paper adopted the complementary method to explore the effect of shareholder concentration and the biggest shareholder character. We find that the higher institutional investor rate is, the lower voluntary disclosure will be. But strategic institutional investors can strengthen the level of voluntary disclosure, as it is stronger when the stockholders’ governance characteristic tends to be state-holding enterprise or the ownership is concentrated. On the other side, information institutional investors have a negative effect on voluntary disclosure, which is consolidated when the stockholders tend to be decentralized. In conclusion, shareholder concentration makes a complementary contribution in the influence of institutional investors on voluntary disclosure. This paper makes sense in two aspects. First, the essay divided the institutional investors into two different categories: strategy institutional investors and information institutional investors. The division explains the debate on institutional investors’ effect on corporate governance, and at the same time goes on the study of different shareholders’ ability to express their idea in corporate decision-making. Second, we combined institutional investors and stockholder governance mechanism, which is conductive to observe the influence mechanism in certain governance environment. Our study goes further on the cause discussion of voluntary disclosure. The complementary effect between institutional investors and stockholders’ governance mechanism will also be tested in the study of voluntary disclosure. The study mainly exposes three aspects of shortcomings. Firstly, the category of shareholder governance is rough, and the study of the influence of principle-agency problem also remains further study. Secondly, the outside stakeholders’ benefit is ignored in the paper, which may cause a reduction of market information cost. Last but not least, the paper lacks of the review of management influence, which may play a medium role on our study. The three aspects rely on our further endeavor to solve.
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