联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	4109
作者编号：	2120102349
上传时间：	2012/5/25 9:49:54
中文题目：	创业投资对创业企业绩效的影响研究——信息不对称的视角
英文题目：	The effect of Venture Capital on the Performance of Venture Enterprises——From the Perspective of Asymmetric Information
指导老师：	李亚
中文关键字：	创业投资；市场化程度； IPO抑价；成长性；逐名行为
英文关键字：	venture capital；maketization；IPO underpricing；growth; grandstanding
中文摘要：	创业投资企业在解决创业企业资金需求的同时，积极影响公司治理结构，介入企业重要管理决策，能够对企业成长产生影响。创业投资企业所具备的行业经验、专业管理知识和网络资源能够提升企业的管理水平和决策科学性；但其短期性行为也可能损害企业的长期绩效。本文从信息不对称的视角出发，以创业投资企业为行为主体，分析其为了缓解创投主要参与者间的信息不对称程度所可能采取的行为及其对创业企业绩效的影响。在此基础上，考察在不同的市场化程度背景下，创业投资企业行为对创业企业绩效影响的差异性。本文选取2004-2008年在深圳中小企业板上市的公司作为样本，考察了创投支持对企业IPO表现和上市后长期绩效的影响。结果表明，有创投支持企业的IPO抑价程度显著高于没有创投支持的企业；有创投支持企业的成长性显著优于没有创投支持的企业。进一步考察创投的不同行为对企业IPO表现和长期绩效的影响。实证结果显示，我国的创业投资企业有明显的风险规避倾向。为了降低所投资企业首发失败可能对自身退出收益带来的风险，创业投资企业会选择在企业经营状况较好的阶段将企业推上市，通过IPO抑价的方式向二级市场投资者让渡部分利益以提高企业首发成功的可能性，同时还会利用自身在被投资企业中所占有的监事席位保证风险规避和利益让渡行为的顺利实施。这些行为导致有创投支持的企业IPO抑价程度高于其他企业。另一方面，由于上市时机选择、IPO抑价及监督权使用是以降低创投机构的风险而非最大化企业IPO收益和促进企业发展为目的，这些行为也损害了企业的成长性和长期绩效。但实证结果同时显示，创投机构占有董事席位并参与重大决策能够在一定程度上提高企业决策的科学性进而提高企业的长期成长性。在此基础上，本文将市场化程度的调节作用纳入分析。结果显示，较高的市场化程度能够降低创投的风险规避行为和短期性行为对企业IPO表现的负向影响，从而在创投支持影响IPO抑价的过程中起负的协同作用。但在长期绩效方面，市场化程度的调节效应只在一定程度上发挥作用：在市场化程度的调节作用下，创投占有董事席位的比例与企业成长性呈正U型关系，表明虽然我国创投机构会采取谋求自身利益的行为，影响企业IPO表现和长期绩效，但当其对企业重大管理决策的参与度和话语权较大时，就能够利用自身优势帮助企业科学决策并促进企业长期发展。同时，针对中小板的实证结果显示，与已有研究成果不同，我国创投机构的逐名行为更多地体现在对已有声誉的保持和进一步建立上，成立时间较长、具备较高声誉的创投机构表现出更强的逐名动机是这一观点的经验证据。
英文摘要：	Venture capital can meet enterprises' funding needs of start-ups. At the same time, it can also provide enterprises with social resources, management consulting and other value-added services, which can effectively promote the growth of enterprises. From the perspective of information asymmetry, this article groups the major players in the process of venture capital investment into three groups. Venture capital may take several actions in order to alleviate information asymmetry between different subjects. This paper analyses venture capital's different behaviors' affection on enterprises' performance. This article selects 2004-2008’s companies listed on the Shenzhen SME board as the samples, investigates the impact of VC-backed enterprises’ IPO performance and long-term performance after the listing. The results show that VC backing increases the degree of IPO underpricing. At the same time, the growth of VC backed enterprises is significantly better than non-VC backed enterprises. In order to examine which behavior of venture capital caused the differences in enterprises’ IPO performance and long-term performance, we selected a subsample of VC backed companies from the whole sample. The empirical results show that venture capital in China have obvious risk aversion tendency. In order to reduce the risks of income, venture capital will push the enterprise going public when it’s in better stage, transferring part of the IPO interests to the secondary market investors through the IPO underpricing, and also use their own share of the invested enterprise’s director and supervisor seats to ensure the smooth implementation of risk aversion and discount behavior of interest. These behaviors lead to higher IPO underpricing for VC backed enterprise than other companies. On the other hand, the choice of market opportunity, the assignment of the IPO proceeds and improper use of supervisory authority also undermines the company's growth and long-term performance. However, empirical process, the venture capital institutions occupy board seats and participate in major policy decisions to improve business decision-making to some extent, scientific and thus improve the long-term growth. On the basis of the above study, the degree of market regulation into the analysis, study, venture capital support and its behavior in different market level company IPO performance and long-term performance impact of differences. The results showed that the degree of market able to inhibit the risk of venture capital to avoid the negative impact of the behavior and short-term behavior of the performance of the IPO, and then play a negative synergistic impact on IPO underpricing of VC-backed. But in the long-term performance, the effect of the degree of market regulation only to a certain extent play a role: the degree of market regulation, venture capital occupies the proportion of board seats in the board of directors showed positive U-shaped impact on business growth relationship. This relationship shows that, although China's venture capital sector from its own interests, and may take short-term sexual behavior, and have decision-making and supervisory powers for their own personal interests, the company IPO performance and long-term performance, but when the record investment and a larger participation of the major management decisions and the right to speak when the institutions, venture capital institutions to take advantage of their own industry experience, management capabilities and other advantages to help businesses make scientific decisions and promote long-term development.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)