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论文编号：	4102
作者编号：	2120102342
上传时间：	2012/5/22 14:46:54
中文题目：	知识产权与社会福利——基于网络外部性的实验研究
英文题目：	Intellectual Property and Social Welfare: Experimental Study Based on Network Externalities
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	网络外部性,知识产权保护,社会福利,协调博弈,歧视定价,实验
英文关键字：	Network Externalities, Intellectual Property Protection, Social Welfare, Coordination Game, Discriminatory Pricing, Experiment
中文摘要：	学术界对于知识产权保护问题有一个较为一致的看法：知识产权不应当受到绝对的保护，也不应当完全不受保护。尤其是随着网络外部性越来越多的出现在人们生活中，传统的知识产权保护制度可能不再适用于新兴的产业组织形式。本研究用协调博弈理论和实验经济学方法，考察了存在网络外部性的条件下知识产权的保护与否对于社会福利的影响。对社会福利的考察标准是公平和效率。在实验中，厂商对商品进行歧视定价，消费者面对不同的定价会做出不同选择。在存在知识产权保护的条件下，随着商品价格的增加，协调博弈的临界值更难达到，选择消费商品的消费者的数量逐渐减少，从大多数选择消费商品变化为大多数选择不消费商品。而随着选择购买商品的消费者数量减少，厂商福利、消费者福利、社会总福利急剧降低，社会福利效率降低。就社会福利的公平而言，随着厂商定价的提高，消费者所享有的社会福利所占比例下降，社会福利的相对公平被削弱。厂商的提价行为，削弱了社会福利的效率和公平。在不存在知识产权保护的实验中，消费者有三种选择：购买正品、盗版商品或者不消费商品。随着厂商定价的提高，选择消费商品的消费者数量减少；具体而言，随着价格的增加，选择不消费商品的人数增加，选择购买正版商品的人数减少，选择盗版商品的人数增加。但与存在知识产权保护的设置相比，消费者更倾向于选择消费商品。另外，厂商净收益、组A中消费者总净收益均随着价格的增加而小幅减少，组B中消费者总净收益随着价格的增加减幅相对较大，社会总福利减少，社会福利效率降低。另外，厂商的提价行为，使消费者所享有的社会福利所占比例下降，削弱了社会福利的公平。最后，我们分析了知识产权与否对于社会福利的影响。在不同的价格下影响不同。当价格较低时，保护知识产权会增加厂商收益，而消费者福利基本不变，社会总福利增加；当价格在中间水平时，保护知识产权能增加厂商收益，而消费者福利减少，但社会总福利增加；当价格较高时，保护知识产权会降低厂商收益，而消费者福利大幅降低，社会总福利也大幅降低。并且知识产权保护削弱了消费者所享有的社会福利的比例，降低了社会福利的公平。
英文摘要：	There is not a unified point of the the protection of intellectual property in the academic circles, but there is an accepted view: intellectual property should not be absolutely protection or completely unprotected. With a growing number of network externalities in people’s lives, the traditional intellectual property protection system may no longer apply to new forms of industrial organization. In this article, we use the coordination game theory and experimental economics methods to study the influence of intellectual property on social welfare under the conditions of existence of network externalities. We consider the social welfare’s equity and efficiency. In the experiment, the manufacturer prices discriminatorily. Consumers will make different choices when they face different prices.Under the conditions of the existence of intellectual property protection, the higher the price is, the more difficult the critical value of the coordination game achieves. So the number of consumers who choose consumering goods gradually reduces, changing from all of the buyers to mostly none of the buyers. And with the decreasing of this number, manufacturer welfare, consumer welfare and total social welfare drastically reduce. Then the efficiency of social welfare is decreased. In terms of the equity, with the increasing of price, the proportion of the consumer welfare decline, so social welfare’s relative fairness is undermined. The vendor’s behavior of pricing highly, weaken the efficiency and equity of social welfare. In the experiment of intellectual property protection non-existent, consumers have three choices: buying genuine, pirating goods or no-consuming goods. With the increasing of price, the number of select consumer goods is reduced. But comparing with the treatment of intellectual property protection, consumers are more inclined to choose consumer goods. As price increases, the number of consumers who do not consume goods and the number of consumers who select pirated goods increase, and the number of consumers who buy genuine goods the increase. In addition, as price increases, manufacturer’s net profit, the total net income of consumers in group A and social welfare slightly decrease, but the total net income of consumers in group B decreases relatively largely, the total social welfare is reduced, and so is efficiency of social welfare. In addition, the vendor's price behavior decreases consumers enjoying social welfare proportion, weakening the equity of social welfare. Finally, we analyze the impact of intellectual property on social welfare. Intellectual property protection’ influence on the earnings of members in the market varies with different prices. When the price is lower, the protection of intellectual property will increase the vendor income, consumer welfare will remain basically unchanged, the total social welfare increases. When prices is in an intermediate level, the protection of intellectual property can increase the vendor income, while reducing consumer welfare, but increasing total social welfare. When the price is higher, intellectual property protection will reduce vendor income, and consumer welfare is substantially reduced, the total social welfare is also greatly reduced. And protection of intellectual property weakens the proportion of social welfare enjoyed by consumers, as reduce the social welfare of the fair.
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