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论文编号：	3958
作者编号：	1120060680
上传时间：	2011/12/14 11:34:31
中文题目：	上市公司交叉持股的的价值效应与盈余管理研究
英文题目：	Research on Value Effect and Earning Management
指导老师：	刘志远 教师
中文关键字：	上市公司，交叉持股，价值效应，盈余管理
英文关键字：	Listed company, Crossholding, Value effect, Earning management
中文摘要：	近年来，我国上市公司交叉持股的绝对数量和相对投资额均呈递增趋势。然而国内相关的研究却并不深入和系统。大量的研究集中于分析机构投资者对公司治理及资本市场效率等方面的影响。其中，对于机构投资者的定义是具备双重代理投资性质的投资者，包括基金、券商和公司（法人）投资者等。实际上，不同类型的机构投资者其利益实现方式可能不尽相同。在现有的激励机制下，基金和券商的经理人员可能过于追求短期收益，而公司股权投资更可能通过建立长期业务往来、整合产业链和互补优势资源等途径实现收益。因此细分机构投资者类型，将公司交叉持股与券商和基金持股分开考察，可能更有助于考察不同机构投资者对公司治理、价值绩效等方面的影响。基于上述考虑，文章在对现有文献进行梳理的基础上，从公司交叉持股的利益实现路径出发，结合中国具体制度环境，通过理论分析和实证检验，研究交叉持股对价值效应和盈余管理行为的影响。文章共分七章。第一章，导论。介绍研究背景、问题提出、研究意义、研究思路、框架和研究方法、对关键概念的界定以及研究结论和文章的创新。第二章，文献综述。系统回顾公司交叉持股对公司价值的影响、对盈余管理提供的机会等代表性研究文献，通过对文献的评述，提出本文的研究视角。第三章，制度背景分析。介绍我国上市公司交叉持股的形成和发展。第四章，理论分析与研究假设。提出公司交叉持股的利益实现路径，对交叉持股下的价值效应和盈余管理行为进行理论分析，并提出相应的研究假设。第五章，上市公司交叉持股的价值效应研究。实证检验公司交叉持股下，投资公司对被投资公司价值的总体影响，考察一级市场中不同行业、不同终极控制人性质的公司股权投资，对被投资公司价值的影响；并通过模型分析考察交互持股对经理人员的短视行为的约束作用。第六章，上市公司交叉持股的盈余管理行为检验。重点考察二级市场形成的交叉持股，投资公司是否通过对其股票投资的会计政策和出售时点的选择，实现其特定的盈余目标。我们的研究以新会计准则的公允价值计量为研究背景。第七章，研究结论、启示和局限性。在上述规范分析和实证检验的基础上，对文章的主要研究结论进行总结和归纳，并指出研究不足和未来的研究方向。通过上述研究和分析，文章得到以下主要研究结论：第一，从事后角度就公司交叉持股对被投资公司业绩的影响进行实证检验。发现通过一级市场购入而形成的公司股权投资，一年后被投资公司的营业利润增幅与被交叉持股比重成正相关关系。而且在一级市场购入形成的公司股权投资，被纵向持股的被投资公司的业绩增幅显著的高于非纵向持股的被投资公司，交互持股公司的业绩增幅显著高于单边持股被投资公司的业绩。这些实证证据不仅证明了通过一级市场形成的交叉持股，对被投资公司的价值增值具有积极影响，而且表明这种价值效应可能通过产业链整合、契约组织等方式实现。此外，我们并未发现二级市场形成的交叉持股存在上述价值增值的效应。这一方面说明，二级市场的股权投资金额较小、可能对被投资公司价值的总体影响不明显，另一方面，在一级市场由定向增发方式形成的公司交叉持股，投资和被投资双方需要达成买卖契约，而这样的契约更可能促进被投资公司价值的提升，投资公司从中获取股权投资收益。第二，对一些可能影响价值效应实现的因素加以考察。实证发现，在一级市场形成的交叉持股，被投资公司的国有产权属性会对交叉持股的价值效应造成负面影响；而被投资公司所在地的政府干预越少、市场化程度越高，股权投资的价值提升效应越容易实现。第三，通过模型分析，对交互持股公司价值实现的途径进行研究。发现在一定条件下，公司交互持股会使得参与博弈的各方利益均得以提升，规避被投资公司经理人员的短视行为，从而提升公司价值。这为交互持股公司的价值实现提供了新的理论模型依据。第四，对上市公司交叉持股的盈余管理行为的考察，以新会计准则公允价值计量模式为研究背景，实证发现投资公司可以利用对所持股票的信息优势，通过会计政策选择（会计盈余管理）和出售时点选择（真实盈余管理）来管理盈余，以实现特定的盈余目标。文章创新之处主要体现在如下方面：首先，对机构投资者加以细分，就公司法人的交叉持股对公司价值的影响加以单独考察，有助于更好地分析公司交叉持股的利益实现方式。其次，从事后角度就公司交叉持股对被投资公司价值的影响加以检验。实证发现通过一级市场形成的交叉持股，对被投资公司的价值具有积极影响，而二级市场形成的交叉持股，则没有表现出这种价值效应。此外，在一级市场中形成的纵向交叉持股与交互持股，相比于非纵向和单边持股，更有助于提升被投资公司价值。同时，我们将被投资公司终极产权性质、所在地市场环境等因素纳入考察范围，研究其对交叉持股价值效应的影响。通过限定性制度因素，证实了不同制度条件下，被投资公司的价值增值程度存在显著差异。这提供了不同制度条件下，交叉持股具有不同经济后果的深入证据，为发展和规范上市公司交叉持股行为提供了施政依据。再次，文章通过模型分析，考察了交互持股对经理人员投资项目选择的影响。研究表明，在一定的条件下，交互持股可以规避经理人员选择损害公司价值的投资项目，使得参与博弈的各方利益均得以提升，从而通过严密的理论模型证明了交互持股对持股双方的价值具有积极影响。最后，我们以2007年新会计准则公允价值计量模式为研究背景，实证考察了交叉持股中的投资公司，是否利用信息优势进行会计政策选择和出售时点选择，实证发现投资公司进行了以平滑盈余、规避债务契约等为目的的盈余管理行为。这为引导和监管上市公司的投资行为、保护投资者利益、以及考察会计准则的经济后果都提供了重要的实证证据。
英文摘要：	In recent years, the numbers and investment shares of cross-shareholdings in the listed company are increasing. But the existing domestic related studies are far from deep and systemic. Most of researches have focused on analysising the effect of the institutional investors on corporate governance and capital market efficiency. Among them, they defined institutional investors with double agent investment properties, including fund investors, brokers and company investors, etc. In fact, different types of institutional investors may have different investment objectives. In the existing incentive mechanism, the managers of funds and brokers may pursue short-term profits first, while the cross-shareholdings mode between companies is more likely to achieve its earnings through establishing long-term business relationship, integrating industrial chain and complementary advantage resources. Therefore, the subdivision institutional investor’s types, and making a distinction between the cross-shareholdings and the holdings of brokers and funders, may be benificial for the investigation of effect of different goals of different institutional investors holding on corporate governance and the motive and the influence of performance. Based on the above considerations, this dissertation explores the ways of making profits for the cross-holding companies, and its systemic conditions through theory analysis and empirical test in Chinese background from the value effect and the information effect of the cross-holding. The dissertation includes seven chapters. The first chapter puts forward the research question, the research significance, the research content and the method, and the key concepts definition involved in the dissertation; The second chapter reviews on the representative literatures, which involves the study of the efficiency effect of cross-holding, as well as the relevant documents, and based on the existing literature review, the chapter further deepens the research question. The third chapter is system background, reviewing and analyzing the research background and system related on the theme, and introducing how Chinese cross-shareholding companies format and develop. The fourth chapter includes the theoretical analysis and assumptions suggesting, which indicate the value effect and information effect of cross-shareholdings through theoretical analysis, and proposes the corresponding research hypotheses. The fifth chapter, the research on the value of cross-shareholdings effect. Inspection of the overall impact of the value of investment Company by invested companies, empirical study examines by cross-shareholdings investment company value after the change, to analyze the cross-shareholdings to managers short-sighted constraint function through model. The sixth chapter, the empirical test of the information effect of the cross-shareholding companies. The cross-shareholding companies have information superiority on making a choice of accounting policies and selling date for their stock investments, through which they can manage their earnings. Our study regards the fair value measurement as our research background. Finally, in chapter seven, we summarize the main research results, and put forward the research weakness and further research direction. Through the research and analysis, we draw the main conclusions as follows: Firstly, we make empirical research on the influence of cross-shareholding on the performances of companies. We found that cross-shareholdings relations formed in the primary market, may be beneficial to the operational profit growth for the investment companies. And among the cross-shareholding companies in the primary market, longitudinal cross-shareholdings investment companies’ performance increase significantly higher than that of the unlongitudinal cross-shareholdings, and mutual shareholding companies’ performance increase significantly higher than unusual shareholding ones. These empirical evidences not only prove the value of cross-shareholdings have positive effect, but also show that the ways of performance growth are probably through improving chain integration, achieving superior resources complementary etc. In addition, we do not find there is the value effect of the cross-shareholding in the secondary market. The possible explanations are: on one hand, the amount of the secondary market cross-shareholdings is small, so that it can not affect investment company value obviously; on the other hand, cross-shareholding in the primary market need both sides achieve the contract, which is more likely to realize value effect. Secondly, we investigate other factors that may have effect on the value effect of cross-shareholding. It proves, of all the cross-shareholdings formed in the primary market, the less government intervention locates the invested company and the higher degree of marketization, the easier of the value of the effect on cross-shareholdings implement. Thirdly, through the model analysis, we study the other possible ways of the value effect in the cross-shareholdings company as well. We found that, in certain conditions, the cross-holdings in companies promote the interests of all parties involved in game, which avoid invested company managers short-sighted, and thus enhance the company value, which proves the existence of cross-shareholdings value effect from another way. Fourth, in the investigation of information effect, we regard the new accounting standards for the fair and equitable value measurement model as our research background, which confirmed that buying other listed company stock company can be used to stock held by the information superiority, through the choice of accounting policy and selling point choose to management, to realize information effect surplus. The mainly contributions are embodied in the followings: First of all, segment the institutional investors, and examine the cross-shareholdings company alone, which is good to analyze the interests of different institutional investors’ implementation. Secondly, we found that the cross-shareholding relationship formed the value of the positive effect in the primary market, while not in the secondary market. In addition, rather than the longitudinal and unilateral shareholding, unlongitudinal cross-shareholdings and interactive shareholding in the primary market are better promoted the invested company value. Meanwhile, we located the ultimate nature of property right, factors such as market environment of cross-shareholdings value effect realization to the influence degree of the empirical research. Through the finite system factors, we confirmed that the value of cross-shareholdings exist significant differences in different system conditions. This provides different economic consequences of cross-shareholdings for the further evidence in different system conditions, which with provides policy cross-shareholdings behavior basis for development and standard listed company. Thirdly, we regard the new accounting standards in 2007 as our research background, which empirically inspected the cross-shareholdings of investment companies making use of the information superiority of accounting policy choice and selling point, founding the evidences of earnings management motivated by earning smoothing and avoiding debt contracts. The empirical test results, in given system conditions, are useful for supervising listed company’ investment behavior, protecting investors and creditors' interests, and analysis of the economic consequences. Finally, the dissertation inspects the managers’ investment project alternative for cross-shareholding companies through the model analysis. The research shows that, under certain conditions, the cross-shareholding can help managers avoid the investment project that may damage the company’s value. Therefore, the interests of all parties involved in the game makes are enhanced.
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