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论文编号：	3952
作者编号：	1120070697
上传时间：	2011/12/12 19:43:07
中文题目：	业务流程模块化度影响下的业务流程外包激励契约设计
英文题目：	Research on Incentive Contract Design in Business Process Outsourcing with the Influence of Business Process Modularity
指导老师：	侯文华
中文关键字：	业务流程外包，业务流程模块化度，激励契约，多任务代理，关系契约
英文关键字：	business process outsourcing, the degree of business process modularity, incentive contract, multi-task agency, relational contract
中文摘要：	业务流程外包（BPO）是继信息系统外包之后信息技术服务发展的第二个高潮。作为国际服务外包的主要承接地之一，中国被越来越多的发包国家所重视。中国的服务外包产业得到了中国政府的高度重视。企业在实施BPO的过程中将会遇到很多风险。本文的研究问题是如何设计外包契约才能有效地解决BPO的道德风险和多任务代理问题，实现发包商和服务商的长期稳定合作。为了使契约更符合实际，本文提出应该考虑外包业务流程模块化度的影响。本文包括七章内容，第一章介绍了研究背景、研究问题和研究意义，技术研究路线和论文结构。第二章是文献综述和理论基础部分。第三章提出了外包业务流程模块化度（DBPM）的概念，分析了DBPM的影响因素和测量方法，以及DBPM对BPO激励契约设计的影响。第四章分别设计了存在单边和双边道德风险的考虑DBPM影响的单流程外包激励契约。第五章分别设计了收益函数为线性形式和柯布道格拉斯生产函数形式的两流程外包激励契约。第六章设计了存在双边道德风险的考虑DBPM影响的单流程外包关系契约和考虑DBPM影响的两流程外包关系契约。第七章总结了本文的研究工作和结论，指出了有待进一步完善和探讨的地方。文章指出市场因素以及业务流程因素都会影响DBPM。DBPM对BPO中的成本和风险都存在影响，是BPO契约设计时应考虑的一个重要因素。在契约模型构建方面，主要包括六个结论。 （1）在存在单边道德风险的单流程外包中，使用了激励机制和奖惩机制。研究发现，当DBPM高时，应使用高激励强度和奖惩强度，发包商将获得高利润。当业务流程的不确定性高时，应使用低激励强度和高奖惩强度，发包商将获得低利润。当业务流程的不可观测性高时，应使用高激励强度和低奖惩强度，发包商将获得低利润。当服务商具有低风险规避度时，应使用高激励强度和奖惩强度，当服务商具有高技术水平时，应使用高激励强度，发包商将获得高利润。当DBPM低时，发包商不购买信息系统监督服务商。（2）在存在双边道德风险的单流程外包中，使用了激励机制。结果表明，只使用激励机制不会完全解决双边道德风险。当服务商具有高水平技术、低成本时，发包商将获得高外包利润。当服务商同时具有技术优势和成本优势，或只具有足够高的技术优势或成本优势，且DBPM较高时，发包商将获得高外包利润。当DBPM较高，或服务商具有高水平技术和低成本系数时，发包商应制定高的收益共享系数。（3）在BPO交易价值为线性函数的两流程外包中，使用了奖惩机制。结果表明，当业务流程具有高模块化度、低不可观测性，以及发包商具有高技术水平时，应在相应的业务流程上制定高奖惩强度。每一项业务流程模块化度对另一项奖惩强度系数的影响依赖于流程间的相关关系和服务商的风险规避度。流程间的互补性增大了对易观测流程的奖惩强度，流程间的替代性促使在易观测流程上使用低的奖惩强度。流程的不易测量性降低了奖惩强度。（4）在BPO交易价值函数为柯布道格拉斯生产函数的两项业务流程外包中，使用了激励机制。当服务商具有高技术水平和管理水平、低成本系数和不确定性，且DBPM高时，发包商将获得高利润。当业务流程的重要性越高、不确定性越低，以及服务商的该项流程技术水平越高时，该项流程上的激励强度越高。当一项业务流程的模块化度越高、服务商的该项流程技术水平越高时，在另一项业务流程上的激励强度越高。（5）在存在双边道德风险的单项流程外包中，发包商与服务商可能建立彼此都以整体利益为重的关系契约。研究发现，如果在设计关系契约时不考虑DBPM的影响，那么DBPM的变动将会影响关系契约的建立。当DBPM较高、服务商具有高技术水平和低服务成本时，服务商的收益分享率会较高。（6）在两项业务流程产出都不能被第三方验证的两项流程外包中，发包商和服务商只能建立关系契约，此时服务商没有违背关系契约的动机。当DBPM较高时，发包商和服务商很容易建立关系契约，发包商将获得高利润。当发包商非常重视与服务商的合作时，发包商将会与服务商建立最优关系契约，并提供最高奖金额。当发包商不很重视与服务商的合作时，发包商将会与服务商建立次优关系契约，此时DBPM越高，奖金额也越高。本文创新之处在于将DBPM的影响引入到激励契约模型的构建中。主要创新点包括以下三点。第一，本文首次分析了BPO中DBPM的影响因素，提出了一种测量DBPM的方法，拓展了有关模块化度测量的研究。第二，本文在设计BPO正式激励契约时创造性地引入了DBPM的影响，分别建立了单流程外包下考虑DBPM影响的BPO激励契约和多流程外包下考虑DBPM影响的激励契约，推进了有关业务流程模块化度对契约设计的影响的研究。第三，本文利用重复博弈模型分别构建了考虑业务流程模块化度的影响的两项业务流程外包关系契约模型，以及在双边道德风险下考虑DBPM影响的单流程外包关系契约模型，丰富了有关服务外包关系契约的研究。
英文摘要：	Firms increasingly disaggregate business processes and source them on a global basis. Business process outsourcing (BPO) is expected to be “the next big wave” in the development of information technology services. As a major base undertaking international outsourcing service, China has been valued increasingly by contracting countries. China’s service outsourcing industry has been highly valued by the Chinese government. Enterprises will encounter many risks in the implementation of BPO. The research problems in this paper are how to design contracts under the situations of one business process and two business pr0cesses outsourced, in order to effectively address moral hazards and multi-task agency problem in BPO, and promote long-term stable cooperation between service providers and contracting firms. In order to make the contracts more efficient, the impact of business process modularity should be considered in the contractual design. This dissertation includes seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the research background, research questions and research significance, research route and the structure of dissertation. Chapter II is the part of theoretical basis and literature review. In chapter III, the concept of the degree of outsourced business process modularity (DBPM), the influencing factors and measurement method of DBPM, the impacts of DBPM on BPO contract design are proposed and analyzed. In chapter IV, the contracts with the impact of DBPM are designed in the presence of unilateral and bilateral moral hazard when single business process is outsourced. In chapter V, the contracts with the linear form of revenue function, and with the form of Cobb-Douglas production function are designed respectively under the situation of two business processes outsourced. In chapter VI, two long relational contracts are designed under the situation of two business processes outsourced, and under the situation of single business process outsourced with the existence of bilateral moral hazard respectively. The last chapter summarizes the work and conclusions of this dissertation, and also points out the defects in the research and the research directions. The dissertation points out that market factors and business process factors affect DBPM. DBPM affects costs and risks in BPO and is an important factor affecting the BPO contract design. In the respect of contractual design, there are six conclusions. (1) In single business process outsourcing with the presence of unilateral moral risk, incentive mechanism and R&P (rewards and punishments) mechanism are used to solve moral hazards. The results show that, when DBPM is high, a high incentive Intensity factor and a high R&P Intensity factor should be used, and the contract provider (the client firm) will be highly profitable. When the outsourced business process is with high uncertainty, a low incentive Intensity factor and a high R&P Intensity factor should be used and the client firm will receive low profit. When the outsourced business processes is unobserved to a large extent, a high incentive Intensity factor and a low R&P Intensity factor should be used and the client firm will receive low profit. When the service provider is with a low degree of risk aversion, a high incentive Intensity factor and a high R&P Intensity factor should be used. When the service provider’s technical level is high, a high incentive Intensity factor should be used and the client firm will receive high profit. When DBPM is low, the client firm would not buy the information system to monitor the service provider. (2) In single business process outsourcing with the presence of bilateral moral hazards, incentive mechanism is used. The results suggest that the only use of incentive mechanism will not completely solve the bilateral moral hazards. When the service provider has a high level of technology and low cost, the client firm will gain high profit. When the service provider has technical and cost advantages, or only has a sufficiently high technical advantage or cost advantage, and DBPM is high, the client firm will gain high profit. When DBPM is higher, or the service provider is with a higher level of technical and lower cost factor, a higher revenue sharing coefficient should be provided for the service provider. (3) In two business processes outsourcing with the linear function of BPO business value, R&P mechanism is used. The results show that when an outsourced business process is with high degree of modularity, low non-observation, as well as the service provider is with high-tech level on the business process, a high R&P Intensity factor should be used on the corresponding business process. The impact of each DBPM on the R&P Intensity factor that is used on the other business process depends on the relationship between two cost functions of the business processes and service provider’s degree of risk aversion. The complementarity between the two processes increases the R&P Intensity factor used on the easily observed business process. The substitution promotes the use of a low R&P Intensity factor on the easily observed business process. The measurement difficulty of business process lowers the R&P Intensity factor. (4) In two business processes outsourcing with Cobb-Douglas production function, incentive mechanism is used. The results show that when the service provider has a high level of technique and management, low cost coefficient and low uncertainties, and DBPM is high, the client firm will gain high profit. When a outsourced business process is with higher importance, lower uncertainty, and the service provider has a higher level of process technology, a higher incentive Intensity factor should be used on the business process. When the modularity degree of an outsourced business process is higher, the service provider has a higher level of technology on the process, the incentive Intensity factor on the other busies process should be higher. (5) In single business process outsourcing with the presence of bilateral moral hazard, the client firm and the service provider may build a relational contract, which requires both of the client firm and the service provider put the union benefit on the first place. The study found that if the impact of DBPM is not considered in the design of relational contracts, then the change of DBPM will affect the establishment of relational contract between the client firm and the service provider. When DBPM is high and the service provider has a high level of technique and low service costs, the service provider's revenue sharing rate would be high. (6) In two business processes outsourcing with the outputs of two business processes unverifiable to a third party, the client firm and the service provider can build relational contract. The service provider will not violate the contract. When DBPM is high, the client firm and the service provider can build relational contract easily and the client firm will gain high profit. When the client firm attaches much enough importance to the cooperation with the service provider, the client firm and the service provider will establish the optimal relational contract and provide the highest prize. When the client firm does not attach much enough importance to the cooperation, the client firm and the service provider will establish the second-best relational contract. At this time, when DBPM is higher, the prize will be higher. The innovation of this dissertation is the introduction of the impact of DBPM into the design of incentive contracts. This dissertation has three innovation points. Firstly, this is the first analysis of the affecting factors of DBPM in BPO, and proposes a method to measure the degree of DBPM, expanding the research on modularity measurement. Secondly, this dissertation introduces creatively the impact of DBPM in the design of formal incentive contract. The formal contract with the impact of DBPM under the situation of single business process outsourcing and the formal contract with the impact of DBPM under the situation of two processes outsourcing are established respectively, by using principal-agency model. This boosts the research on the impacts of business process modularity on contract design. Thirdly, the relational contract with the impact of DBPM under the situation of two business process outsourcing and the relational contract with the impact of DBPM under the situation of single-process outsourcing with the existence of bilateral moral hazards are constructed respectively by using repeated game model, enriching the research on relational contract under the situation of service outsourcing.
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