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论文编号：	3937
作者编号：	2120092301
上传时间：	2011/12/8 9:42:40
中文题目：	上市公司高管薪酬、董事会特征与非效率投资的实证研究
英文题目：	The Executive Pay, Board Characteristics and Non-efficient Investment of the Listed Company
指导老师：	梅丹副教授
中文关键字：	高管薪酬，非效率投资，投资不足，过度投资，董事会特征
英文关键字：	Executive pay, Non-efficient Investment, Overinvestment, Underinvestment , Board characteristics
中文摘要：	我国上市公司大多由国企改制而来，而国企产权不清晰、所有者不到位等历史遗留问题造成上市公司各主体间利益目标存在差别，这就产生了利益冲突，从而引发代理成本。代理成本的表现之一是上市公司的非效率投资，具体包括两种情况：过度投资和投资不足。投资决策是一项重要的公司财务活动，企业价值是否增加取决于公司的投资活动是否科学合理，因为只有科学合理的投资决策才能给企业带来更多的现金流。所以企业只有做出正确的投资决策，才能提高投资效率，增加企业价值。解决委托代理问题的关键是采取有效措施来激励代理人，使得代理人对自身个人利益最大化的追求和对股东利益最大化的追求趋于一致。随着经济体制改革的不断深入和理论研究的广泛开展，我国上市公司的激励机制开始出现，目标是改善公司治理结构、降低代理成本。本文侧重于研究薪酬激励与企业非效率投资的关系，从另一个角度探讨代理问题和代理成本如何影响企业价值、损害股东财富。 董事会作为公司内部治理的重要机制之一，是股东与经理人沟通的桥梁，在公司起着重要的决策和监督作用。规范的董事会能够高效地进行投资决策，并对管理层的投资活动进行监督，从而减少公司非效率投资，增加企业价值。本文也探讨上市公司董事会特征对非效率投资的影响。从研究问题出发，本文首先从理论上分析上市公司高管薪酬和董事会特征对非效率投资的影响；然后分析我国上市公司高管薪酬和董事会特征现状，选取我国2007—2009年1054家上市公司的数据，通过Richardson投资模型计算出上市公司的非效率投资程度（包括过度投资和投资不足），以及选取一系列高管薪酬和董事会特征的指标，将其与公司过度投资和投资不足程度进行回归分析，得出本文的实证结论：董事会规模、董事会会议次数、独立董事比例对过度投资有显著影响，而高管薪酬、高管持股比例、董事会规模、董事会会议次数、领取报酬的董事比例对投资不足有显著影响。
英文摘要：	Most of the listed companies in China are reformed by state-owned enterprise, while state-owned enterprises have widespread property owners of unknown problem, moreover the company management is not employed by market mechanism competition rules, so this has caused serious agency problem. Because the company stakeholders’ goal are completely consistent with each other, it shows the conflict of interest, thus giving rise to agency cost. The agency cost will reduce enterprise performance and enterprise value, thus hurting stockholder wealth. Agency cost performance of listed companies is investment inefficiency, including over-investment and under-investment. The investment decision is the one of the three most core financial activities, content increased enterprise value depends on enterprise's investment activities. And the enterprise only make the right investment decisions and to improve investment efficiency. Because only scientific and efficient investment decisions and to bring more cash flow, thereby increasing enterprise value. To solve the principal agent problem and protect shareholders' equity goal, it is important to take effective measures to encourage agent, making executives own personal benefit maximization at the pursuit of profit maximization of shareholders. As the reform of economic system and the theory study extensively, the listed companies in China already began to appear the incentive mechanism, the goal is to improve corporate governance structure, reduce agency cost. This paper focuses on the study of salary incentive and enterprise investment efficiency, from another angle discusses how the agency problems and agency costs influence enterprise value, damage the stockholder wealth. The board of directors ,as one of the core corporate governance mechanism ,is the link of shareholders and managers, and is of important decision-making and supervision institutions. Standardized and effective board of directors can effective decision-making and supervise management of investment activities, reduce the efficiency of investment and increase enterprise value; Instead, invalid board will cause the company to produce all sorts of problems, even bankruptcy. This article discusses the board characteristics and efficiency of investment. According to this problem, this paper first theoretically discusses the executive compensation ,characteristics of the board of directors, , the influence of the efficiency of the investment; Again, this paper selects 1054 companies from 2007 to 2009, three years of data reference in 2006 Richardson investment model of listed companies, estimate the efficiency investment degree (including excessive investment and investment), and then select a series of board features characterizing index as independent variables, excessive investment and investment shortage as dependent variable regression analysis respectively, it is concluded the final empirical conclusions.
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