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论文编号：	3713
作者编号：	2120092727
上传时间：	2011/11/23 10:34:26
中文题目：	整体上市央企非相关多元化子公司治理问题研究
英文题目：	Research on Corporate Governance Problem for Non-related Diversification Subsidiary of Listed Central Enterprise
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	央企；非相关多元化子公司；公司治理；振华物流
英文关键字：	Central Enterprise; Non-related Diversification Subsidiary; Corporate Governance; Zhenhua Logistics Group
中文摘要：	本文重点分析了中央企业中非相关多元化子公司的公司治理问题，并结合企业案例对这些治理问题提出了相应的改善建议。经过十多年的发展，中央企业已经走出管理不善、亏损的境遇，成为企业群体的代表，在国民经济中占据异常重要的地位。按照国家对央企的定位和发展规划，央企都将向成为“彻底多元化，彻底资本化”、“不附带任何存续公司和母公司”的上市企业的目标发展，严格遵循市场经济的原则来运营。按照这一要求，整体上市将是大部分央企发展的必由之路。随着一个个央企集团的诞生，大量多元化发展的巨无霸公司进入了市场中搏杀，除主业所在的板块外，这些企业还有大量非相关多元化的业务板块。这些业务大都以非上市子公司的形式存在，股东数目少，公司治理机制不完善，存在着大量的如行政化治理、内部人控制、大股东控制等问题，给国有资产保值增值目标的实现带来了巨大阻碍。现今对央企公司治理的研究大都集中在对央企公司本身的治理问题，做好央企非主业子公司治理的研究，可以进一步丰富央企治理的理论体系。文章从回顾公司治理相关理论和集团治理相关理论入手，将央企非相关多元化子公司的治理问题分为普遍性问题和特殊性问题。普遍性问题主要涉及政府职能问题、企业产权结构问题、公司内部治理机制存在的问题和公司外部治理机制存在的问题等。特殊性问题主要表现为中央企业集团的母子公司治理问题，体现为过长的国有资产委托代理链条和复杂的委托代理关系，这使得代理成本增加，内部人控制问题严重；此外，央企子公司还存在着行政型控制重于产权性控制，母公司对子公司的运营过度干预，造成激励约束机制不完善，企业经营效率低下等问题。该部分还重点通过表格的形式对相关多元化和非相关多元化子公司的治理特点和问题进行了对比，具体涉及企业规模、公司类型、股东数目、董事会和监事会人员构成、内部人控制程度、集团管控力度、战略决策制定等方面。论文主要采用分析推理和案例分析的方法，针对央企子公司的公司治理问题提出了从产权改革开始到完善内部治理机制和外部治理机制的一系列建议，内部治理机制建议涉及建立合理的董事会制度，强化监事会职能，建立积极的激励约束机制，妥善处理新三会和老三会的关系，完善积极股东的影响途径等方面；外部治理机制涉及完善相关法律制度，完善产权市场、产品市场、经理人市场、劳动力市场、资本市场等市场机制，发挥中介机构、新闻媒体和自律组织的外部约束作用等方面。文章尝试以振华物流为例，总结该公司自身成长的历程，并通过其与同一集团下的相关多元化子公司振华重工的对比，分析了其公司治理现状，针对其存在的治理问题提出了一系列改进的意见。如完善产权结构、建立更健全的内部治理机制等，以期为同类型的央企非相关多元化子公司的公司治理改革提供一些参考。
英文摘要：	This article mainly focuses on the analysis of the corporate governance issues of central enterprise’s Non-related Diversification Subsidiary. It also provide suggestions with cases to solve these problems. After over ten years’ development, the central enterprises have changed the situation of bag management and loss, become to be the good representative of many kinds of enterprises, occupy an extremely important position in the national economy. According to the positioning and development plan of the central enterprises from the government, the central enterprises will turn to listed company with the characteristics of “complete diversity, completely capitalized," "without any surviving corporation and parent company". They need to strictly follow the principles of market economy. According to this requirement, list in integrity will be the only way for most of the central enterprises. With the merge of more and more central enterprises, a large number of diversified giant companies have entered the market. Besides the main business sector, these companies also have many non-related diversification business sectors. Most of these business sectors are in non-listed subsidiaries. They have few shareholders and non-perfect corporate governance mechanisms. They also have many problems such as administrative governance, insider control, majority stake control. These problems strongly block the achieving to the aim of keeping and adding value of national assets. The current researches on corporate governance of the central enterprises are mainly focusing on the central enterprises itself. To perfect the research of non-core business subsidiary’s governance can further enrich the theoretical system of the corporate governance toward central enterprises. This paper firstly reviews the corporate governance theory and group governance theory. And then divide the governance problem of the central enterprises’ non-related subsidiary into universal problem and special problem. The universal problem mainly refers to governance functions, the corporate ownership structure, internal governance mechanisms and external governance mechanism problem. The special problem mainly refers to the corporate governance problems between parent and subsidiary companies. It mainly reflects in the long and complex agency chain of state-owned assets. It will increase the agency cost and make insider control more serious. The special problem also reflects in administrative control over property rights control, excessive intervention from the parent company to the subsidiary. It will result in the imperfect of incentive and restraint mechanisms as well as the low efficiency of business operation. This section also using form to compare the characteristic and problem of related and non-related subsidiaries refers to firm size, company type, number of shareholders, composition of board of directors and board of supervisors, degree of internal control, strength of group management and control, strategic decision making and so on. This paper mainly uses analytical reasoning method and case analytical method. According to the governance problem of central enterprises’ subsidiary, it provides a series of suggestions from reform of property right to improve internal governance and external governance mechanisms. Internal governance mechanisms refers to build adequate board of directors system, strengthen supervisor function, establishing a active incentive and restraint mechanisms, proper handling the relationship of the board of directors, board of supervisors, management team, Party committee, staff congress and labor union. External governance mechanisms refers to the perfection of the relevant legal system, the perfection of market mechanisms such as property market, product market, manager market, labor market, capital market. The external constraint functions of intermediary institution, the media and self-regulatory organization should also be developed. This article attempts to take Zhenhua Logistics Group as an example. It summarizes this company's growing history, through the comparison with Zhenhua Heavy Industries-the related subsidiary of the same group, analyzes the present situation of corporate governance and provides a series of suggestions according to the corporate governance problems. These suggestions include the perfection of property right structure and establishing a better internal governance mechanism. This paper is aiming to provide some reference for corporate governance reform of central enterprises’ non-related diversification subsidiary in the same type.
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