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论文编号：	370
作者编号：	052264
上传时间：	2008/1/6 22:01:25
中文题目：	我国生物医药行业上市公司股权激
英文题目：	The Study on Equity Incentive
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	股权激励、生物医药行业、激励机
英文关键字：	equity incentive、bio-pharmace
中文摘要：	随着我国股权分置改革的基本完成、《上市公司股权激励管理办法》的颁布以及资本市场的持续火爆，有关股权激励的问题已经越来越受到投资者和上市公司的关注。股权分置改革的基本完成使绝大多数上市公司具备了实施股权激励计划的条件，在法律法规逐步完善的条件下，股权激励机制必将被越来越多的上市公司，特别是成长性良好、产品技术含量高的生物医药行业上市公司所使用，从而为他们业绩的持续增长发挥积极的作用。因此，现阶段深入的研究股权激励机制对生物医药行业上市公司具有重要的现实意义。 股权激励是指在经营者员工与公司之间建立一种基于股权为基础的激励约束机制，经营者员工以其持有的股权与公司形成以产权为纽带的利益共同体，分享公司的经营成果并承担公司的经营风险。股权激励实际上是一种薪酬政策，即股权作为一种支付薪酬的方式，以此来最大程度的调动被激励人的积极性和创造性，发挥其主观能动性，大幅度的提高公司的绩效。相对于津贴、奖金等短期激励而言，股权激励属较有成效和持久的中长期激励方式。目前，国际上通行的股权激励方式有股票期权、员工持股计划、管理层收购/管理层员工收购、虚拟股票、股票增值权、业绩股票、延期支付计划、限制性股票等，但从国际、国内的实践情况看，最主要的股权激励方式为股票期权。 股权激励的核心目标是解决上市公司经营者和股东之间目标不一致所产生的委托——代理矛盾，通过让经营者持有一部分股权，使资产所有权与经营权部分合一，从而使经营者具有委托人和代理人的双重身份，由此刺激经营者创造优秀业绩，以实现股东财富最大化的目标。委托——代理理论是股权激励制度的一个重要的理论基础，该理论认为由于信息不对称及由此产生的道德风险和逆向选择问题，委托人必须事先设计一种激励机制，采用奖励和惩罚的措施，诱使代理人在实现委托人的利益最大化的同时也实现自己利益的最大化，使委托人和代理人的行为目标最大程度的趋于一致。 国内外学者对股权激励进行了广泛的研究，其中国外学者从股权激励方案要素、股权激励方案实施过程和股权激励实施效果三个方面对股权激励进行了深入的研究，国内学者则多从实证的角度研究股权激励的实施效果。股权激励机制起源于二十世纪50年代的美国，经过几十年的实践获得了很好的发展，为我国股权激励实践提供了良好的经验借鉴。从国外股权激励的实践我们得出了实施股权激励的条件，即：健全的资本市场、完善的产品市场、健全的经理人市场、规范的中介市场、完善的法律法规、社会理解和接受及产权制度和组织结构的健全。 我国股权激励机制产生于二十世纪90年代，一些上市公司也就此进行了尝试和探索。但由于股权分置改革以前我国股权激励的制度环境不完善，当时股权激励在我国的实施面临很多障碍，使得我国上市公司实施股权激励的动力不足，从而导致我国上市公司高管长期激励普遍缺乏。《公司法》的修订和《上市公司股权激励管理办法》的颁布，改善了我国上市公司股权激励的政策环境，我国上市公司开始实施符合国际惯例的股权激励计划。据统计，截至2007年6月30日，沪深两市共有52家上市公司推出了规范的股权激励方案，这些上市公司中国有企业和民营企业各占据了半壁江山。股权激励的最主要方式是股票期权，占比达到69%。尽管这些实施股权激励计划的上市公司只是沪深两市1400多家上市公司中的极少部分，但却覆盖了大部分的主要行业。其中，成长性良好、产品技术含量高的生物医药行业上市公司——双鹭药业、康恩贝和海南海药也都结合自身的实际情况推出了自己的股权激励计划。这三家上市公司的股权激励方案有一定的共性，也有各自的特点。本文从激励对象、标的股票行权/授予价格、授权及行权条件、行权安排、标的股票禁售期等方面对上述三家公司的股权阿激励方案进行了比较分析。通过对他们股权激励方案的比较分析，可以看出这三家上市公司的股权激励方案是符合行业特点的，也具有一定的激励作用。不过，从他们实施股权激励的整体情况看，股权激励的实施在宏观和微观层面都还存在问题，比如相关法律法规衔接不严密、证券市场有效性不足、上市公司治理结构不完善等等。 针对上述三家生物医药行业上市公司股权激励实施的情况及发现的问题，笔者提出了一个适用于生物医药行业上市公司的框架性的改进设计思路。改进设计思路从股权激励计划的实施范围、实施股权激励计划的股票来源、股权的授予时机和数量等六个方面展开，并提出了一些有建设性的建议。在这一改进的股权激励设计方案框架下，本文以康缘药业为标本，为其设计了模拟的股权激励方案。 通过以上分析，我们发现我国生物医药行业上市公司在推行股权激励机制的过程中仍存在一些问题，其中既有法律法规和政策制度方面的问题，也有上市公司本身的问题，问题的解决需要上市公司的股东、上市公司经营者、监管部门等相关各方的共同努力。为了解决股权激励实施中存在问题，笔者提出了一些对策建议，包括完善法律法规体系、完善公司治理结构、建立合理的报酬体系、培养有效稳定的资本市场等等。
英文摘要：	Since the complement of stock right splitting reform, the promulgation of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies and the hot capital market, the issue of executive equity incentive has been paid more attention by investors and listed companies. Most of the listed company can implement the equity incentive plans since the complement of stock right splitting reform. With the gradual improvement of laws and regulations, the equity incentive mechanism will be applied to improve their performances continuously by more and more listed companies, especially by those bio-pharmaceutical listed companies who grow fast and have high-tech products. Therefore, it is important and meaningful to study the equity incentive mechanism for bio-pharmaceutical listed company. Equity incentive is to establish an incentive constraint mechanism based on equity between the manager and the company. The manager shares the interests and risks with his company by taking equity. Equity incentive is a kind of pay policy. It motivates manager’s enthusiasm, creativity, and initiative, and improves the company’s performance substantially by taking giving equity as a way to pay salary. Comparing to short-term incentive, such as allowance and bonus, equity incentive is an effective long-term inventive means. Nowadays, the general inventive means include executive stock option, employee stock ownership plan, manager buy-out/ manager employee buy-out, phantom stock, stock appreciation rights, performance shares, deferred payment plans, restricted stock and so on. However, the major equity incentive means is executive stock option according to internal and external practice. The primary goal of equity incentive is to solve the principal-agent conflict by aligning the goals of listed company’s executive with those of shareholders, and to stimulate executive to create excellence performance and to maximize shareholder wealth through partly integrating the possession rights and management rights which can be realized by giving executive a part of equity, and thus, giving the principal and agent the double identities. Principal-agent theory is a major basic theory of equity incentive mechanism. In principal-agent theory, information asymmetry brings moral risks and adverse selection. Thus, agent must design an incentive mechanism firstly which apply rewards and punishment to maximize the interests of both principal and himself and unify their behavior targets to the greatest extent. There have many researches on equity incentive. Among them, external researches on equity incentive mainly focused on the elements of equity incentive plans, the process and the effect of equity incentive plans’ implement. Most of internal researches focused on the effect of equity incentive plans’ implement using empirical research methodology. Equity incentive mechanism originated from America in the 1950s and has been developed in practice for some decades, as provides some experiences to Chinese equity incentive practice. From these experiences, it can be concluded that the conditions of equity incentive plans’ implement include perfect capital market, improved product market, perfect manager market, regulated intermediary market, perfect laws and regulations, social understanding and acceptance, and perfect property right system and organization structure. Chinese equity incentive mechanism occurred from the 1990s. Some listed companies have attempted and explored this mechanism in practice. However, in China, there were many obstacles in the implement of equity incentive before stock right splitting reform, which resulted from the factors such as the laws and regulations related, opinions of the management and so on. As a result, it was generally lack of the motivation to implement equity incentive mechanism, and thus, the senior managers in Chinese listed company lacks incentive for a long term. However, policy environment of equity incentive has been improved since the amendment of the Company Law of the PRC and the promulgation of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies. It makes Chinese listed companies begin to implement the equity incentive plans which accord with international tradition. There are 52 listed companies in stock market of Shanghai and Shenzhen who have implement regulated equity incentive plans. The main means of equity incentive in these plans is executive stock option. There are 69% of all plans take this means. Although these companies are minority in all of the more than 1400 listed companies, they are involved in most of industries. Among these companies, 3 bio-pharmaceutical listed companies, SL Pharmaceutical, Conba Bio-pharm, and Hainan Haiyao, which all grow fast and own high-tech products, make their equity incentive plans according to their practice. These equity incentive plans are same in some aspects. However, there are differences among them. By comparing and analyzing their equity incentive plans, it can be concluded that, all these plans accord with the characteristic of their industry and can stimulate the managers to some extent. Nevertheless, there are some problems in the implement of the equity incentive mechanism from macro to micro level when the whole conditions of implement are been observed. These problems include imprecise texts cohesion in law and regulations, lack of stock market validity, incomplete corporate governance of listed companies and so on. Aiming at these problems, an improved design method of the equity incentive mechanism is proposed, which is suitable for the bio-pharmaceutical listed companies. Some constructive suggestions are proposed in six aspects, such as the scope and the shares’ source of plans’ implement, the awarding occasion and amount of shares. Based on it, the equity incentive plan of Kanion Pharmaceutical CO is designed as an example. It is concluded that there are some problems when Chinese bio- pharmaceutical listed companies implement their equity incentive plans. Some of them relate to the law and regulations, others are caused by companies themselves. To resolve these problems, it is necessary that shareholders, manager, monitoring and management department, and other related departments make great efforts together. As a result, some advices to improve the equity incentive are proposed. They are to perfect the law and regulations system, to perfect cooperation governance, to establish rational salary system, to cultivate valid and steady capital market and so on.
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