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论文编号：	3484
作者编号：	2120092320
上传时间：	2011/6/15 15:34:05
中文题目：	配股公司的盈余管理行为及其经济后果研究
英文题目：	Research on Earnings Management Around Rights Issues and its Economic Consequences
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	配股 盈余管理 经济后果
英文关键字：	rights issues ; earnings management ; economic consequences
中文摘要：	管理层存在利用盈余管理行为达到盈余目标这一现象已经得到很多学者的证实。其中一种盈余管理方式是通过操控应计项目进行的，一般称为应计项目盈余管理。而管理层也存在操控真实活动以达到特定盈余目标的动机。现有的关于盈余管理的研究多集中于对应计项目盈余管理及其经济后果的研究。 本文研究了配股公司的真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理及其经济后果。样本包括139家2001-2003年实施配股的上市公司。文章用修正的截面琼斯模型来衡量应计利润盈余管理，借鉴Roychowdhury的模型来衡量真实活动盈余管理。用Heckman两阶段回归模型对影响公司在应计项目和真实活动两种盈余管理方法之间进行选择的因素进行分析，用配对公司的方法对真实活动盈余管理的经济后果进行研究。 通过将这两种盈余管理研究思路结合起来，本研究得到了以下三个结论：首先，本研究的结果表明配股公司在采用应计利润进行盈余管理的同时，也通过操控真实经营活动以达到预期的盈余目标。主要采用的真实活动盈余管理方法为销售操控和费用操控。其次，本研究对影响公司在这两种盈余管理方法之间进行选择的因素进行分析，结果证明公司在两种盈余管理方法之间的选择受到公司采用应计利润盈余管理的成本和能力的影响。说明了管理者会同时使用应计利润盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理来达到盈余目标，且这两种盈余管理方法在程度上是互为替代的。最后，对于不同类型的真实活动盈余管理的经济后果的研究表明，销售操控和费用操控均对配股公司后续的业绩带来的负面的影响，且真实活动盈余管理比应计利润盈余管理对后续业绩的影响更为严重。真实活动盈余管理主要对配股后第一年和配股后第三年的业绩有显著的负面影响，且对配股后第三年的业绩影响更大。研究结果使得我们重新审视配股后业绩下降的原因，应计利润的转回会对后续业绩带来一定的影响，但是真实活动盈余管理才是配股后业绩下滑的真正原因。
英文摘要：	There is substantial evidence that executives engage in earnings management. One means of managing earnings is by manipulation of accruals, hereafter referred to as accrual manipulation. Managers also have incentives to manipulate real activities during the year to meet certain earnings targets. Much of the current research on earnings management focuses on detecting abnormal accruals and the economic consequences of it. In this paper, we examine real earnings management activities around rights issues by focusing on both real activities and accrual-based manipulation. Our sample includes 139 firms that have rights issues between 2001 and 2003. To capture accrual-based earnings management, we use modified cross-sectional Jones model. To capture real earnings management activities, we follow Roychowdbury (2006) and estimate abnormal levels of cash flow from operations, production costs and discretionary expenses. We use Heckman two-stage regression to analyze the factors that influence managers’ choice between real and accrual-based earnings management. Using a matching sample of 137 firms，we investigate the economic consequences of real activities manipulations. By combining these two topics, we make three contributions to the literature. First, we document that firms use real, as well as accrual-based, earnings management methods around rights issues. Managers prefer to manipulate real activities by sales discounts and reduction of discretionary expenditures. Second, we show how the tendency for firms to tradeoff real versus accrual-based earnings management activities around rights issues varies cross-sectionally. We find that firms’ choices vary predictably as a function of the firm’s ability to use accrual management and the cost of doing so. Third, and most important, we examine the effect of each type of earnings management strategy on the firm’s operating performance after rights issues. Our evidence implies that sales manipulation and reduction of discretionary expenditures have significant negative effect on future performance, and what’s more, the decline in operating performance after rights issues attributable to real activities management is more severe than just by accrual management and real activities management negatively affects the operating performance of the first and the third year after rights issues, especially the third year. Overall, our findings show the importance of real earnings management activities around a specific corporate finance event, rights issues. The economic consequences of real earnings management make us rethink the reasons of the decline of operating performance after rights issues.
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