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| 论文编号: | 3399 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120092302 | |
| 上传时间: | 2011/6/10 11:24:35 | |
| 中文题目: | 上市公司盈利预测披露研究 | |
| 英文题目: | Research on Earnings Forecast Disclosure of Listed Companies | |
| 指导老师: | 王志红 | |
| 中文关键字: | 盈利预测 盈利预测信息披露 盈利高估 | |
| 英文关键字: | Earnings Forecast Earnings Forecast Disclosure Earnings "over-forecast" | |
| 中文摘要: | 盈利预测信息对于投资者,特别是中小投资者有重要的意义。我国目前上市公司盈利预测信息披露存在着信息披露意愿薄弱,信息披露质量不高的问题。其中盈利预测信息披露中存在的“高估”现象更是会损害投资者的利益。由此可见,对盈利预测信息披露和盈利预测“高估”现象的研究就显得尤为重要。 目前关于盈利预测信息的研究主要集中在盈利预测信息披露影响因素及盈利预测准确性的影响因素两个方面,而较少研究关注盈利预测“高估”现象。本文从影响盈利预测披露的信号传递理论、信息不对称理论及代理理论三个角度出发,研究影响盈利预测信息披露及盈利预测“高估”现象的因素。本文选取2008年我国沪市A股上市公司作为研究对象,通过二元Logistic回归、Pearson相关性检验研究了影响盈利预测信息水平及是否披露“高估”的盈利预测信息的因素。另外,本文还对2008年披露了盈利预测信息的上市公司进行了描述性统计,获得了我国盈利预测信息披露现状的直观证据。 本文发现,盈利能力越强的企业越倾向于披露盈利预测信息;负债程度高的企业也更倾向于披露盈利预测信息;股权集中度不会对企业是否披露盈利预测信息产生影响,但股权越集中的企业越不倾向于披露“高估”的盈利预测信息;筹融资计划不会对盈利预测信息披露产生影响;投资者预期不会影响企业是否披露盈利预测信息,但是投资者预期高的企业会更倾向于披露“高估”的盈利预测信息;董事会规模不会对盈利预测信息披露产生影响,董事会会议次数越多的企业会更倾向于披露盈利预测信息;董事会规模和董事会会议次数均不会对企业是否披露“高估”的盈利预测信息产生影响。本文认为应当进一步提高企业的盈利预测披露积极性,建立完善的公司治理体系,增大对投资者的保护程度。 | |
| 英文摘要: | Earnings forecast information has an important significance for investors, especially for medium and small investors. China's listed companies’ will to disclose earnings forecast is weak and disclosure quality is not high. Earnings “over-forecast” in disclosure are harmful to the interests of investors. Thus, research on the disclosure of earnings forecasts and earnings “over-forecast” is particularly important. This paper starts with the signal transmission theory, asymmetric information theory and agency theory to study the factors affecting earnings forecasts. Further, we study "over-forecast" in the earnings forecast. This article also disclosed the descriptive statistics, providing the visual evidence of the status of earning forecast. We find that companies with stronger corporate profitability are more inclined to disclose the earnings forecast information; Companies with high debt levels are more inclined to disclose the earnings forecast information; Ownership concentration does not affect whether to disclose the earnings forecast information, but companies with high ownership concentration are more inclined to disclose the "over-forecast" information; Financing plans do not affect earnings forecast information disclosure; Investors’ expect does not affect whether to disclose the earnings forecast information, but companies with high investors’ expect would be more inclined to disclose the earnings "over-forecast" information; Size of the board does not affect the level of information disclosure. Companies with larger number of board meetings will be more inclined to disclose corporate earnings forecasts. Board size and board meetings do not affect whether to disclose the earnings "over-forecast" information. This paper argues that enterprises should further improve the will to disclose earnings forecast information, make efforts to establish the sound corporate governance system and increase the level of protection for investors. | |
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