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论文编号：	339
作者编号：	043078
上传时间：	2008/1/3 17:22:46
中文题目：	激励因素对审计判断影响的研究
英文题目：	The effects of Incentive facto
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	激励因素 客户重要性 诉讼风险
英文关键字：	incentive factors 　client imp
中文摘要：	审计判断研究是当今世界范围内最具活力的审计研究领域之一，已引起我国审计理论界和实务界的关注。为了更综合的理解审计判断行为，我们需要考虑审计环境中激励因素对审计判断的影响。因此，本文以我国注册会计师为实验对象，中国上市公司案例为背景，验证三个激励因素客户重要性、诉讼风险与预期复核意见对审计人员判断的影响。 本文共分七章。第一章为引言；第二章为文献回顾，分别回顾了激励理论、激励对工作行为影响、心理学中激励对判断影响及激励对审计判断影响的文献；第三章分析激励对审计判断的影响；特别用自我服务偏见理论、惩罚理论、社会影响理论论证了三个激励因素，即客户重要性、诉讼风险与预期复核意见对审计判断的影响，进而提出了本文的研究假设；第四章提出了实验设计来检验激励对审计判断的影响；第五章审计人员个体判断行为模型；第六章数据结果与分析，在对样本状况描述、激励因素的操纵性检查后，检验了激励对审计判断的影响；第七章总结全文的研究结论及局限性，并讨论了进一步的研究方向。 本文得到的主要结论包括： 1．激励是影响审计人员判断的重要的环境因素，审计判断的激励因素分为正激励和负激励两类，主要包括以下三个具体要素：（1）客户重要性；（2）诉讼风险；（3）预期复核意见。 2．社会心理学的理论分析表明，在会计准则存在可选择的灵活性的情况下，由于存在从众和自我服务偏见等心里倾向，客户重要性、诉讼风险和预期复核意见对审计人员的判断存在激励作用，其中，客户重要性能够起正激励的作用，而诉讼风险和预期复核意见则起负激励的作用。 3．形成了中国审计人员个体判断模型。本文以实验资料为基础，运用结构方程的方法，对我国审计人员的个体判断模型进行了检验，并形成了我国审计人员的个体判断模型。为识别判断行为和进一步的实验分析的准确性和可靠性奠定了基础。 4．客户重要性、诉讼风险、预期复核意见三个激励因素对审计判断影响的实验结果表明： （1）客户重要性会对审计人员判断产生明显影响。客户为越重要，审计人员就会越倾向于客户的意见，审计人员接受客户提出的处理意见的可能性更大。 （2）诉讼风险对审计人员判断产生明显影响。审计人员面临低的诉讼风险比面临高的诉讼风险的情况下，接受客户提出的处理意见的可能性明显增大。 （3）预期复核意见对审计判断影响的主效应不显著。在不考虑其他因素的情况下，预期复核意见没有对审计人员的判断产生明显的影响。 （4）预期复核意见与诉讼风险之间存在明显的相互影响。不同诉讼风险状况，预期复核意见对审计人员的影响是不同的。在诉讼风险高的情况下，预期复核意见不一致时，预期复核意见会影响审计人员的判断，使审计人员更加保守；而在诉讼风险低的情况下，审计人员常忽略预期复核意见。这表明诉讼风险是审计人员考虑预期复核意见的一个重要因素。 （5）在客户重要性、诉讼风险和预期复核意见三个激励因素之间，没有发现相互影响。 （6）诉讼风险对签字注册会计师和非签字注册会计师及其他人员的审计判断有明显影响。签字注册会计师表现的更加保守，这表明签字注册会计师有更强的风险意识。 （7）在存在激励的情况下，我国东西部地区的审计人员在进行判断时，不存在显著的差异。
英文摘要：	Auditing judgment is one of the most dynamic fields in auditing research, and has already be paid particular attention by auditing professional and academic. For a better understanding of audit judgment, incentive factors of audit environment should be considered. Therefore, the CPAs are taken as the research subject. Based on the analysis of Chinese public company cases, the author examines the effects of three incentive factors, including client importance, lawsuit risk, and the effect of expected review opinion on the audit judgment. The dissertation is divided into seven parts. Chapter 1 is an overall introduction. Chapter 2 is a literature review which presents the incentives theory, the incentive effects on work behavior, the incentive effects on judgment and audit judgment in psychology and auditing. Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of incentives on audit judgment in terms of the social effect theory, the self-serving bias theory and the punishment theory so as to develop theoretical arguments on which the research hypotheses are based. Chapter 4 presents experimental design to examine the effect of incentives on audit judgment. Chapter 5 develops the model of the auditor personal judgment. Chapter 6 analyses the tests of the hypotheses and describes the results. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by stating its implications, limitations and extensions of the research. The major conclusions of the dissertation are as follows: 1．Incentives are important factors that affect auditor judgment. There are positive incentives and negative incentives, including (1)client importance,(2)lawsuit risk and (3) expected review opinion． 2．By using social psychology theory it can be concluded that client importance, lawsuit risk and expected review opinion will affect auditors under the alternation of accounting principal because of the psychological tendencies of conformity and self-serving bias. Client importance has a positive effect; lawsuit risk and expected review opinion have a negative effect. 3．Develop the Chinese auditor judgment model. Laying a foundation for evaluating and measuring validity and incredibility and for judgment behavior recognition and further experimental analysis of accuracy and reliability, a Chinese auditor judgment model is created by structure equation. The experimental results indicate that client importance, lawsuit risk and expected review opinion will affect audit judgment: (1) Client importance affects audit judgment significantly. The more important client, the more willing auditors are to take the client’s advice. (2) Lawsuit risk affects audit judgment significantly. Auditors are more likely to take the client’s advice when the risks are lower. (3) Expected review opinion does not significantly affect audit judgment if no other factors are considered. (4) There is a significant interaction between expected review opinion and lawsuit risk. The effect varies when different lawsuit risks are involved. If the lawsuit risk is high and expected review opinions differ, the auditor will be inclined to be conservative. If the lawsuit risk is low, the auditor will neglect the expected review opinion. (5) There is no interaction effect on client importance, expected review opinion and lawsuit risk. (6) Lawsuit risk will significantly affect certified public accounts. Signing certified public accounts tend to be more conservative than no-signing certified public accounts and others. (7) There is no significant difference in the auditor’s judgment between the east and the west of China.
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