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论文编号：	3386
作者编号：	1120070740
上传时间：	2011/6/10 9:44:40
中文题目：	信息结构与共谋防范机制
英文题目：	Information Structure and Collusion Precaution Mechanism
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	信息结构 共谋 防范机制 比较制度实验
英文关键字：	Information Structure Collusion Precaution Mechanism Comparative Instutional Experiment
中文摘要：	交往是人类的社会属性使然，在所涉当事人超过二人的交往情境中，人们既有的偏好与信念可能发生漂移，出于对利益的追逐或情感的考量，部分个体会达成共谋以对付他人。共谋现象广泛存在于政治、经济与社会生活中，且以委托-代理关系中最为常见，这在转型经济体中表现的尤为突出，本文主要关注对个人、组织乃至整个社会有严重负面影响的共谋行为并探求有效的制衡。 共谋现象在根本上是与不对称信息相联系的，委托-代理关系中私人信息处于不同的当事人节点，将衍生出不同的共谋主题，涉及不同的当事人，包含不同的利益关系，相应的防范机制设计也有不同，故研究共谋问题的逻辑起点是对契约或组织当事人之间信息结构的考察。本文重点对代理人信息优势时的监督型共谋和部分委托人信息优势时的剥夺型共谋进行研究，前一种情况下重点在于监督监督人，后一种情况重点则是约束知情委托人的行为。与以往的研究主要是进行逻辑推演或实证分析不同，由于更关心共谋现象背后当事人的行为理性，我们采用比较制度实验的方法，力图测度现行机制防范共谋的效果与效率，探寻共谋现象背后当事人的行为机理与影响因素，以便为改进机制设计提供线索和依据。本文的主要研究内容包括四个部分： 首先，对于私人信息处于代理人节点时的监督型共谋防范，为避免零监督和无穷监督循环两种极端情况，本文采用双监督人监督机制。尽管囚徒困境机制在理论上能够成功地阻止共谋，但国外学者的实验研究却表明情况远非如此乐观。对于序贯行动的双监督人机制，基于理性人假设的逻辑推演认为无法阻止两个监督人与监督对象之间的共谋，本文的实验结果对此结论没有提供相应的支持，现行机制能够在一定程度上阻止共谋，并且当事人自身特质对其行为策略缺乏显著影响。 其次，我们将信息不对称外生地嵌入到双监督人机制中，试图通过歧视对待在两个监督人之间营造利益冲突从而达到“分而治之”，并且考虑以一定的概率派遣第二个监督人，以期在阻止共谋的同时节约监督人资源并降低监督成本。实验结果显示，身份信息的模糊性使得监督人更加风险偏好，从而使得现行机制的效果远非理论模型预期的那样能完全阻止共谋。 第三，作为研究剥夺型共谋问题的前导性工作，我们关注委托人信息优势的情形。当私人信息前移至委托人节点时，契约提议当事人的偏好与信念会发生变化，当事人的策略选择与博弈均衡也与标准信息分布下不同。我们设置无声誉、有声誉和身份互换三种情境的实验，结果表明委托人在信息优势下更看重租金抽取而非资源配置效率，而代理人则相对更具合作性，同情共感效应也更为明显。 第四，我们将委托人知情的信息结构做进一步延展，考虑只是部分委托人拥有私人信息的情形，此时委托人群体裂变为知情的内部人与不知情的外部人，比如公司中的控股股东与中小股东。信息优势加上对现行公司法律关于剩余分配规则的认同度低，控股股东的偏好与信念会出现漂移，由“分享”变为“掠夺”，具体则是通过与管理层的共谋来实现，也就是所谓的第二类代理问题。此时，机制设计的重点在于加强对中小股东的保护，我们的实验结果表明外生惩罚机制对于防范剥夺型共谋效果良好，嵌入类别股东表决机制之后则更加明显，而投资者保护状况对中小股东的再投资意愿没有显著影响，这在很大程度上是缺乏更多投资机会时的无奈之举，与我国证券市场的实际情况高度相似。 论文的最后部分对全文进行了总结，并对未来的研究进行了展望。对于共谋防范，目前主流的研究以及本文所涉及的内容，主要还是倚重正式机制，并且实验结果表明现行机制设计有一定的作用。然而，在转型经济的背景下，正式机制或者缺失、或者缺位，或者实施不力，从而把一系列非正式治理机制推向前台，那么强化以媒体监督和税务实施为代表的中介治理的作用，通过增加透明度，弱化共谋赖以产生的信息基础和降低共谋的潜在收益以阻止共谋行为不失为一种可行的替代性选择。 本文主要做了以下创新性的探索工作： 1. 在实验室条件下对共谋当事人的行为理性进行观察而非推测，相对于逻辑推演或实证研究的事前或事后的推测，可以更深刻地理解共谋现象背后当事人的行为机理及其影响因素； 2. 为剥夺型共谋的成因提供新解释，提出信息优势以及对公司剩余分配规则的不认可是导致控股股东的偏好与信念由“分享”变为“掠夺”的根本原因，与管理层共谋对中小股东的侵害在某种意义上是与其自我补偿交织在一起的； 3. 在剥夺型共谋防范的实验研究中引入新的代理变量； 4. 将组织歧视机制的应用范围拓展到异质的双监督人中。
英文摘要：	Human’s sociality causes interaction, and the existing preferences and beliefs may drift in the interaction situation that more than two parties are involved in, for pursuit of interest or consideration of emotion, some individuals will form alliances to deal with others, this phenomenon that is called collusion widespread in the political, economic and social life, especially common in principal-agent relationship and transition economy, this dissertation concerns about collusion that may have serious effect on individual, organization and society and try to seek effective precaution. Collusion is associated with asymmetric information fundamentally, private information at different nodes of principal-agent relationship results in different collusion theme, involving different parties, including different interests relationship, and the corresponding precaution mechanism design is different. Therefore, the logical starting point for reaserch on collusion is the inspection on information structure of parties of contract or organization. We focus on supervision collusion with agent information superiority and deprivation collusion with part of principal information superiority, keystone of the former is to monitor the supervisor, the latter is to constraint the behavior of informed principal. Different from previous research that conduct with logical deduction or empirical study, as we concern more about the behavior mechanism of the parties behind the phenomenon, we use the method of comparative instutional experiment to analyse and try to measure the effect and efficiency of the existing mechanism on collusion deterrence, seeking factors and mechanism that affect the behavior of the parties, in order to provide clues and bases to improve the mechanism design. This paper has four main section: Firstly, for supervision collusion with agent privately informed, in order to avoid zero supervision and infinite supervision, we use mechanism with dual supervisors. Though prisoner's dilemma with two supervisors can deter collusion successfully in theory, experimental studies done by foreign scholars show that the thing is far from so optimistic. For the mechanism of sequential action of dual supervisors, logical deduction that based on hypothesis of rational man think it cannot deter collusion among two supervisors and supervision object, the experimental results do not provide appropriate support to this conclusion, the existing mechanism can deter collusion in a certain extent, and the party's own character lack significant effects on behavioral strategy. Secondly, we embed exogenous asymmetric information into the mechanism of dual supervisors, trying to create a interest conflict between the two supervisors through discrimination in order to “divide and conquer”, and consider sending a second supervisor with a certain probability, and to deter collusion while save supervisor resources and reduce monitoring cost. The results of experiment show that the ambiguity of identity make supervisor more risk preference, which make the effect of existing mechanism far from the expectation of theoretical models. Thirdly, as instructive work for research on deprivation collusion, we concern about the situation that principal has information superiority. When we move private information ahead to principal node, preference and belief of the parties of contract will change, strategy choice of the parties and equilibrium of the game also differ from that under standard situation. We set experiment with three treatments such as no reputation, reputation and identity exchange, results show that the principal with information superiority prefer rent draw rather than allocation efficiency of resource, while the agents are relatively more cooperative, sympathetic effects are also more obvious. Fourthly, we make further extension on information structure of informed principal and consider the case that only part of the principal have private information, then the principal groups are divided into informed insiders and uninformed outsiders, such as the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders of a corporation. Information superiority coupled with the low recognition of the remaining allocation rules, the preference and belief of controlling shareholder may drift, strategy of action vary from the “Sharing” to “deprivation”, achieve concretely through collusion with management, this is the other type of problem of agency. Then, the focus of mechanism design is to strengthen the protection of minority shareholders, the specific ideas: on the one hand rise the cost of collusion of controlling shareholders and management by exogenous punishment mechanism, on the other hand the vote mechanism of classified shareholders give minority shareholders opportunities for self-protection. The results of corresponding experiment show that the exogenous punishment mechanism has good effect on collusion deterrence, and even more evidently after the vote mechanism of classified shareholders embedded in. This is largely because of lack of investment opportunity, highly similar with the actual situation of China's securities market. The final part summarizes whole dissertation, and look forward to the future research. For the precaution of collusion, the current mainstream of research and the content covers in this dissertation, mainly rely on formal mechanism, and experimental results show that the existing mechanism design works to a certain extent. However, in the circumstance of transition economy, the formal mechanism or missing, or absence, or lack of implementation, thus bring a series of informal governance mechanism into the foreground, then strengthen the role of media supervision and tax implementation as the representative of the intermediation governance, by increase of transparency, weaken the information basis of collusion and reduce the potential benefit of collusion in order to deter collusion is a feasible alternative option after all. We do the following innovative exploration work in this dissertation: 1. Relative to pre-speculation or post-speculation in logical deduction or empirical studies, observation on behavior rationality of parties to collusion under lab condition help to understand the behavior mechanism of collusion parties behind the phenomenon and their influencing factors deeply; 2. We provide a new interpretation for the cause of deprivation collusion, arguing that the fundamental causes that make principal’s preference and belief change from “sharing” to “deprivation” is controlling shareholder’s information superiority and disagreement with the allocation rules proposed by corporation law, collude with the management and hurt minority shareholders is intertwined with its self-compensation in a sense; 3. We introduce new proxy variables into the experimental research on deterrence of deprivation collusion; 4. We extend the application of discrimination mechanismin into the scope of dual heterogeneous supervisors.
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