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论文编号：	3369
作者编号：	1120050736
上传时间：	2011/6/9 20:58:08
中文题目：	公司治理结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究——股权分置改革的调节作用分析
英文题目：	Empirical study of the relationship between corporate governace structure and earning management ----the shareholder structure reform as a moderator
指导老师：	任雪锋
中文关键字：	股权分置改革 公司治理结构 盈余管理 调节作用
英文关键字：	Shareholder structure reform, Corporate governance, Earning management, Moderating effect
中文摘要：	股权分置改革是近十年来我国资本市场最重要的制度变革，它从根本上弥 补了我国证券市场原有的制度性缺陷，提高了上市公司的治理质量。在这一新 的制度环境下，我国上市公司原有的一些企业行为发生了变化，在股权分置改 革完成以后，大股东盈余管理的动机以及行为都发生了一些重要的转变。此外， 在股权分置条件下的已有研究结论已经不再适用于股权分置改革完成以后的市 场环境，本文的主要目的就是研究股权分置改革之后，公司盈余管理动机和行 为的变化，以及公司治理结构与盈余管理关系的变化。 本文以股权分置改革为调节变量，利用大样本的上市公司数据，深入考察 股权分置改革对大股东盈余管理动机和行为、公司治理结构与盈余管理关系的 调节作用，实证检验股权分置改革的成效，丰富了公司治理、盈余管理及股权 分置改革等相关领域的理论研究。针对股权分置改革后，公司治理出现的新的 问题，提出相应的监管对策。 研究结果表明，虽然在股权分置改革过程中，非流通股股东支付了股改兑 价，但同时也通过财务手段降低了兑价成本，在一定程度上侵占了中小流动股 股东的权益。股权分置改革之后，大股东与上市公司之间的利益输送方向，从 之前的掏空行为，变为支持行为。但反应在盈余管理的数值上，上市公司整体 的盈余管理均值水平，由典型的负方向的盈余管理转变为正方向的盈余管理。 也就是说，股权分置改革，使得所有上市公司整体上更加热衷于利用短期的正 向盈余管理，提高公司的短期业绩和股价表现，而忽视了盈余管理带来的透支 公司长期业绩增长潜力和长期市场价值的作用。在股权分置改革结束初期，由 于大股东非流通股刚刚解禁可以通过减持兑现利润，其盈余管理行为的利益结 果与长期持股的中小股东并不一致。这种短期的盈余管理行为和随后的股份高 价减持转卖给中小股东的行为，也可以看做股权分置改革过程当中的一种必然 发生的改革成本。 股权分置问题解决之后，大股东、董事会、监事会以及高管人员与中小股 东的利益较股权分置改革之前更加趋于一致，但其中每个群体又对公司的长期 和短期的价值有不同的偏好，表现为偏好不同的盈余管理方向；股权分置改革的启动和执行确实起到了提高证券市场效率，完善证券市场游戏规则的作用， 但同时大股东与高管对于中小投资者利益的侵占方式和方法也有了新的变化， 因此相应的监管政策也需要与时俱进。
英文摘要：	The shareholder structure reform is the most important revolution in Chinese capital market over the past decades, it essentially makes up the original system defects in the securities market, and improves the quality of governance of listed companies. In this new system environment, some of the existing listed companies in China changed corporate behavior. After the completion of the reform, both the motives and the action of the earning management of the listed companies have changed. Besides, those study conclusions made before the reform no do not apply any more. The main purpose of this study is to reveal the changes happened in the motives and activities of the earning management, and to reveal the changes happened between the relationship of the corporate governance structure and the earning management. This paper conducted large sample empirical study of data of listed companies to investigate the moderating effect of the shareholder structure reform interacted with the relationship between the corporate governance structure and the earning management, and to discover the changes happened in the motives and activities of the listed companies’ earning management. This study examined the real effects and consequences of the reform, enriched the corresponding theoretical and empirical studies of the shareholder structure reform, corporate governance and earnings management. Proper regulation suggestions have been made to solve the new corporate governance problem accompanied with the reform. The empirical study of this paper shows that, during process of the reform, while the non-tradable shareholders made the compensation against those tradable shareholders to gain the circulation right, they reduced their costs through the earning managements, thus occupied the interests of small shareholders. After the shareholder structure reform, the major shareholders of listed companies changed their direction of controlling activities from tunneling into supporting. However, the mean level of earnings management showed a typical change from the negative direction before the reform to a positive direction after the reform. That is, after the shareholder structure reform, all listed companies on the whole are keen on the use of short-term positive earnings management to improve the short-term accounting performance and stock price, but neglected to protect the long-term growth potential of the company. After the completion of the shareholder structure reform, the major shareholders gained their rights to sell off stocks at the stock market. Thus, in the short term, they intend to use their controlling power to manipulate the earning results of the listed companies and take profits through the share reduction. In this process, the controlling shareholders can sell their shares at unfair higher price to the market and thus hurt the other small shareholders’ benefits. This behavior results in an unfavorable and inevitable cost which is not supposed by the policy makers. This paper also shows that, after the completion of the reform, the interests of major shareholders, board of directors, supervisors and executives are more consistent with those of small shareholder. However, each of the groups has different preferences over the company's long-term and short-term value, and show preference over different earnings management direction. The initiation and completion of the shareholder structure reform did improve stock market efficiency and the rules of the game of Chinese stock market, but at the same time, the major shareholder and executive still have different short-term and long-term interests from those of small investors, and their method to occupy small shareholders interests also changed. Thus the appropriate regulatory policies need to advance with the times as well.
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