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论文编号：	3330
作者编号：	2120092354
上传时间：	2011/6/8 8:52:39
中文题目：	我国地方国有上市公司过度投资问题研究——基于广义公司治理机制视角的分析
英文题目：	Over-investment studies of China’s local state-owned listed companies from a general perspective of corporate governance
指导老师：	陈国欣
中文关键字：	地方国有上市公司；过度投资；自由现金流；地区法治；政府干预
英文关键字：	Local state-owned listed company; Over-investment; Free cash flow; Law; Government intervention
中文摘要：	投资作为现代公司理财中的三大重要决策之一，无论是对于微观层面企业的成长还是宏观层面社会经济的发展都具有显著的影响。2002年开始，我国就已经出现了宏观经济的过热现象，这与微观层面企业的“过度投资”密切相关。对上市公司过度投资问题的研究无论是对于其自身的良好发展还是对于整体宏观经济的有效运行都具有重要的现实意义。 “投资——现金流敏感度”分析作为国外研究投资问题的经典方法一直以来也是国内学者研究我国上市公司过度投资问题的主要借鉴范式。其中较为有代表性的“自由现金流代理假说理论”也已得到大多数国内学者的验证，在对我国上市公司过度投资问题的研究中普遍认为“代理问题”是导致这一行为发生的重要因素。 本文立足于我国现实制度环境背景，选择我国制造业地方国有上市公司2004-2009年的相关财务数据作为研究样本，从广义公司治理机制角度（包括内部公司治理结构如股权结构、董事会特征、经理层激励、负债治理等；外部公司治理机制如产品市场竞争、地方法治水平、政府干预等）对我国地方国有上市公司的过度投资问题进行了更为深入的研究。研究结果发现，过度投资问题在我国地方国有上市公司中普遍存在，但“代理问题”可能并不是导致这种行为产生的主要原因。本文的研究结论具体阐述如下：传统的从国有股“股权泛化”导致的严重“内部人控制”即经理层私人利益角度对我国上市公司过度投资行为的分析没有得到本文实证数据的支持，实证检验结果没有表明我国地方国有上市公司的自由现金流量及内部公司治理机制各因素与过度投资行为之间存在显著的相关性，即自由现金流代理假说理论在我国地方国有上市公司至少在制造业类地方国有上市公司中并没有体现出它的适用性；本文的实证检验结果同样也没有表明市场层面的产品竞争对我国地方国有上市公司的过度投资行为有显著影响作用，而基于中国国情的地区法治水平、政府干预、政府控制等外部公司治理机制因素却体现出了与我国这类上市公司过度投资问题的显著相关关系。基于这一研究结论，本文在最后部分提出了相关的制约政策思路。
英文摘要：	Investment decisions play an import role in both micro enterprises’ growth and macro economic development. In China’s recent years, macro “hot investment” phenomenon has appeared in many industries and regions; and what accompanies is the micro business enterprises’ over-investment. The research on the listed company’s over-investment has a significant meaning to the healthy development of the companies themselves and as well to the effective operation of China’s macro economy. As the classic method in foreign investment studies, the analysis of “Investment-Cash flow Sensitivity” has been considered as the main reference for the domestic scholars who study on the issues of over-investment in China’s listed companies. The “free cash flow agency hypothesis” has been verified by most domestic scholars’ empirical tests, and in China, the agency problem has been generally thought as the most important factor which led to the over-investment behaviors of listed company. Based on the current situations in China, this paper chooses the financial data of local state-owned manufacturing listed companies from 2004 to 2009 as the empirical sample and has a more deeply study on the issues of over-investment in these companies from a broad perspective of corporate governance (including the internal governance factors such as equity structure, the features of the board of directors, executive salary incentive as well as the external factors such as product-marketing competition, local law and government intervention ). The results of this thesis suggest that over-investment phenomenon generally exists in China’s local state-owned listed companies, but the main reason that cause this issue may not be the “agency problem” because the empirical results don’t show there is a significant correlation between the free cash flow as well as the internal government factors and the over-investment of these companies; and the same result appears in the test of the products marketing competition. However, the external governance factors such as the law and government intervention have showed a significant relation with the issues of over-investment in China’s local state-owned listed companies. Based on this conclusion，this paper finally gives some relative suggestions.
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