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论文编号：	3326
作者编号：	2120092389
上传时间：	2011/6/7 22:26:30
中文题目：	总经理薪酬激励水平对公司多元化战略的影响研究
英文题目：	A Study on the Impact of CEOs’ Incentive to Company’s Diversification Strategy
指导老师：	薛有志
中文关键字：	总经理 薪酬激励 绩效 多元化战略
英文关键字：	CEO; incentive; performance; diversification strategy
中文摘要：	中文摘要 国民经济和世界贸易的发展对企业的科学化、规范化和国际化提出了更高的要求。经理人员是企业的主要经营者，由于委托-代理关系的存在，对经理人员的激励和监督一直备受学术界和实践界的关注。而其中经理人员的激励水平、激励方式与企业绩效的关系更是理论研究的焦点。 根据委托-代理理论，高管激励影响企业绩效的路径应该是高管激励-高管行为-企业绩效，而已有的大多数研究却忽略了高管行为这一重要媒介，直接去研究高管激励与企业绩效的关系，这在逻辑上是存在着一定的欠缺的。 多元化战略自上世纪五十年代由Ansoff提出以来，一直备受国内外学者的关注。在Rumelt（1974）的开拓性研究的带动下，针对企业多元化程度、类型、进入方式等与企业价值、公司绩效关系的研究逐渐成为学者们的研究重点，由此而得出“多元化折价”、“多元化溢价”等结论性判断。然而本研究认为，多元化战略本身并不天然存在所谓的“折价”或“溢价”。导致多元化战略实施绩效有好有坏的原因，其实在于战略实施保障机制是否完善，其中经理人员的激励机制便是非常重要的一个方面。 因此，本研究针对于总经理激励水平对多元化战略决策和实施的影响进行研究。一方面对高管激励-高管行为-企业绩效的传导路径进行论证；另一方面对影响多元化实施绩效的原因进行初步探讨。采用描述性统计和多元线性回归的统计方法，本研究选取2002-2008年沪深两市制造业上市公司的相关数据进行实证研究。通过研究得出如下结论：（1）总经理现金激励水平的提高对企业多元化行为和企业规模扩张具有促进作用，而总经理股权激励水平的提高则会抑制多元化行为；（2）总经理现金激励和股权激励对多元化战略实施绩效不具有显著的调节作用。
英文摘要：	Abstract The development of national economy and international trade give higher requirements to the scientific, standardization and internationalization of enterprises. Managers are main operators in enterprises. Because of the relationship of the principal-agent, the incentive and supervision of managers have been concerned by both the theory and practice of community. And the relationship between the incentive of managers and the performance of enterprises has had even more concerns than other issues. According to the Theory of Principal-agent, the path in which the incentive of managers affects the performance of enterprises is ‘incentive-behavior-performance’. However, most of the existed researches have ignored the ‘behavior’ and study the relationship between ‘incentive’ and ‘performance’, which is wrong logically because the ‘behavior’ is a very important intermediary between ‘incentive’ and ‘performance’. Since proposed by Ansoff in the fifties of last century, the diversification strategy has always been paid much attention by scholars local and abroad. Led by the pioneering study of Rumelt(1974), scholars have been focused on the relationship between the level, type and enter mode of the diversification strategy and the value and performance of the company. Thus the conceptions of ‘Diversification Discount’ and ‘Diversification Premium’ were proposed. However, we believe that diversification strategy itself dose not naturally have so-called ‘discount’ or ‘premium’. The reason why the performances of the implementation of diversification strategy are not the same is that the security mechanisms of the implementation of strategy are not all perfect. And the mechanism of incentive of managers is a very important aspect. Thus we put our focus on the affect the incentive of managers makes on the decision and the implementation of diversification strategy. On one hand, we can make the argument of the pathway of ‘incentive-behavior-performance’; on the other hand, we can make a preliminary study on the reasons of the impact the implementation of diversification strategy makes on the performance of the company. Using the descriptive statistic and multiple linear regression, our study choose the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies in manufacturing between year 2002 and 2008 to make the empirical analysis. Finally we have the conclusions as below: (1) the raising of the level of CEO compensation incentive can promote the behavior of diversification and the scale expansion of companies, but the raising of the level of CEO equity incentive has the opposite effect. (2)the raising of the level of CEO compensation incentive and equity incentive does not have significant effect to the performance of implementation of diversification strategy.
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