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| 论文编号: | 3316 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120092336 | |
| 上传时间: | 2011/6/7 19:18:46 | |
| 中文题目: | 关联方交易与公司价值的关系研究——基于中国A股市场的经验数据 | |
| 英文题目: | Related Party Transactions and Company Value: Empirical Analysis of A-share in China | |
| 指导老师: | 陈国欣 | |
| 中文关键字: | 公司治理;关联交易;公司价值 | |
| 英文关键字: | Corporate Governance;Related Party Transactions;Corporation Value | |
| 中文摘要: | 伴随我国证券市场的发展,关联交易在我国上市公司中大量涌现,并呈现出范围广、金额大、比例高的特征。众所周知,关联交易既有可能产生正面影响,也有可能产生负面影响,并且大多数研究表明关联交易的负面影响大于正面影响,那么为什么关联交易还如此频繁?不同类型的关联交易对不同类型公司的价值影响不同,那么什么情况下才能发挥关联交易积极效应同时避免其负面效应? 本文遵循了“公司治理机制(根本原因)——关联交易(行为)——公司价值(结果)”的研究思路,从公司内部治理机制入手,试图探寻影响关联交易的内在动因,以及由此导致的关联交易行为对公司价值的影响。根据交易成本和委托代理理论,关联交易有可能提高公司价值,也有可能侵害公司价值,本文以沪深A股市场2005-2009年发生关联交易的上市公司为研究对象,选取股权结构、董事会特征和高管薪酬三个方面的公司治理变量作为研究因素;本文根据CCER中关联交易数据整理得到上市公司关联交易的总体状况,并将总体关联交易分为两大类:经营往来类和资产重组类关联交易,并且对经营往来类关联交易选取了占关联交易总额比例前三位的关联交易类型作为研究对象,试图更细致的研究不同关联交易方式对公司价值的影响;将关联交易按是否存在控股股东和是否与第一大股东进行关联交易划分为不同的子样本,对不同关联交易类型与公司价值关系进行了研究。 通过实证研究发现:公司治理机制越强,非正当关联交易的可能性越小,从而公司的关联交易越能提升公司价值;反之,公司治理机制越弱,非正当关联交易的可能性越大,从而关联交易更多的体现为侵害公司价值。 | |
| 英文摘要: | Related party transactions are emerging with the development of stock market in China. And they presented the character of a broader coverage, amount and proportion. it is well known that the related party transaction just like a double-edged sword: it produce positive effects, and it may have a negative impact on company value at the same time. Most studies showed that the negative effects were much larger than positive ones. Nevertheless why related party transactions are so frequent? And when related party transactions can take large advantages of themselves since different type of related party transactions have different effects on company value? In this thesis, we follow a clear picture of “Reason-Action-Result”. We start with corporate governance and look for the really motive of related party transactions. According to transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory, related party transactions may raise the company value and may encroach the value too. For the purpose of studying the problems mentioned, we select listed companies which had related party transactions in A-share market as our object of study. And the related data starts from 2005 to 2009. As for variables we select comprehensive corporate governance variables and related party transactions variables. For deep study, we divide the gross sample into different subsamples in accordance of whether exist controlling shareholders and whether trade with the first majority shareholder related party. According to the analysis above, we concludes: a strong corporate governance can reduce improper related party transactions, and then have more positive effects on company value. Conversely, weaker corporate governance, more improper related party transactions, and then lower company value. | |
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