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| 论文编号: | 3309 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120092315 | |
| 上传时间: | 2011/6/7 17:01:31 | |
| 中文题目: | 上市公司社会责任报告披露研究——基于披露动机和经济后果的实证研究 | |
| 英文题目: | Study on the Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility Report for Listed Companies——Empirical Research Based on Disclosure Motivations and Economic Consequence | |
| 指导老师: | 李姝 | |
| 中文关键字: | 企业社会责任报告 报告披露动机 权益资本成本 | |
| 英文关键字: | corporate social responsibility report, disclosure motivation of CSR report, cost of equity capital | |
| 中文摘要: | 近年来,自然灾害、食品安全事故、产品召回事件等频发,企业社会责任被人们越来越多的关注。尤其是对于上市公司来说,人们期望其承担更多的社会责任。伴随着企业社会责任的蓬勃发展,企业社会责任报告也正在成为全球企业的普遍实践。社会责任报告的编制是要花费一定成本的,那么企业为什么要发布社会责任报告,其动机何在?社会责任报告的发布将给企业带来怎样的经济后果呢? 本文从经济动机、社会动机和合规动机三方面考察了企业社会责任报告发布的动机。作者分别用高权益资本成本、融资动机来衡量经济动机,用机构投资者持股比例和实际控制人性质来衡量社会动机,用是否属于重要指数样本股来衡量合规动机,利用沪深两市A股上市公司2006-2009年度数据进行了全样本和配对样本的实证检验。研究结果表明,前一年权益资本成本较低的上市公司,机构持股者比例较高的上市公司,国有控股的上市公司,属于重要指数样本股的上市公司倾向于披露社会责任报告,而有融资动机的上市公司不倾向于披露社会责任报告。一定程度上,该结果说明我国企业发布社会责任报告是了满足社会需要或者是合规需要,而不是企业权益资本成本的降低和融资的需要。 接下来本文以权益资本成本变动为出发点,对社会责任报告发布的经济后果进行了研究。由于数据的可获得性和可靠性,作者以2008年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,对社会责任报告是否披露,社会责任报告披露质量与权益资本成本变动的关系进行了实证检验。检验结果表明,发布社会责任报告的企业下一年的权益资本成本不一定会降低,社会责任报告披露质量较高的企业也不意味着会有较大程度权益资本成本的降低。预期假设未得到验证的原因可能是所作的前提假设——投资者为理想投资者并不成立,或者投资者并没有把社会责任信息作为其投资决策的重要依据,社会责任报告发布在降低信息不对称、传递有利信号方面的作用就受到了一定程度的限制。此外为了检验评级机构对社会责任报告经济后果的影响,本文对社会责任报告披露与后一年权益资本成本变动关系进行了评级机构数高低组的分组回归,所得结论未发生变化。 | |
| 英文摘要: | In recent years, those issues such as natural disasters, food safety incidents and product recalls usually happen. So, people pay more and more attention to corporate social responsibility. Especially for listed companies, they are expected to shoulder more social responsibility. With the vigorous development of CSR, CSR report is also becoming a common practice of global businesses. It needs certain amount of cost to prepare CSR report and why do companies publish CSR report, and what are their motives? What benefits will the disclosure of CSR report bring? This paper makes a research on disclosure motivation of CSR report in terms of economic motivation, social motivation and compliance motivation. The author uses reduction of the cost of equity capital and financing motivation to measure economic motivation, the percentage of institutional shareholding and actual controller to measure social motivation, important index to measure compliance motivation and then employs the data of companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from Year 2006 to Year 2009 to conduct an empirical research. We find that companies having a financing motivation do not tend to make a disclosure of CSR reports, and companies with a lower cost of euqity capital in previous year, a higher proportion of institutional shareholding, state-owned companies, and companies which are included in the important index tend to disclose CSR reports. To some extent, the result shows that CSR report is used to meet social motivation or the compliance motivation rather than to reduce cost of equity capital and meet financing need. And then we examine a potential benefit associated with the disclosure of CSR report: reduction of the equity cost of capital. Due to data availability and reliability, the author selects A-share listed companies in Year 2008 from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the sample to conduct related research. The empirical results show that CSR report will not necessarily reduce the cost of equity capital in the following year and CSR reports with higher quality do not mean that they will result in a greater reduction of cost of equity capital. They are not consistent with our hypothesis. The reasons may be that the assumption of rational investors is not appropriate in China or investors donot take CSR information as an important factor in their decision-making. So, to some extent, the function that CSR report can reduce information asymmetry and send a favorable signal to stakeholders is limited. And in order to examine the impact of institutional analyzers on the economic consequence of CSR report, we divide the sample into two groups to conduct the model regression according to the number of institional analyzers who cover the company. The conclusions are the same as the above. | |
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