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论文编号：	3306
作者编号：	1120070739
上传时间：	2011/6/7 15:57:37
中文题目：	雇佣保护、最低工资与劳动契约当事人行为研究
英文题目：	Employment Protection，Minimum Wage and Labor Contract Behaviours
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	雇佣保护； 最低工资； 劳动契约； 行为； 比较制度实验
英文关键字：	Employment Protection; Minimum Wage; Labor Contract; Behaviour; Comparative Institutional Experiment
中文摘要：	劳动契约是现代经济体系中最重要的契约之一，劳动契约直接当事人是企业与工人，工人的行为是影响劳动契约效率的关键变量，而工人的行为又受多种因素影响，尤其是随着我国人口红利的结束、刘易斯拐点的出现，雇佣保护和最低工资等制度安排陆续被纳入了劳动立法。 关于劳动制度安排对劳动契约当事人行为的作用机制，不同的理论假设有不同的结论，论文在社会偏好的视角下，以偏好异质性作为基本假设，使用比较制度实验方法研究雇佣保护、最低工资与劳动契约当事人行为的关系，论文在以下几个方面有所创新： 1．率先使用比较制度实验方法探索雇佣保护和最低工资制度对劳动契约当事人行为的影响。新《劳动合同法》强化了雇佣保护，引起了广泛的争议，但这些研究主要是学者基于法学意义上的逻辑推断，本文的研究塑造了雇佣保护的微观经济系统，可直接观察雇佣保护下当事人的行为；最低工资制度的本意是提高工人的谈判能力，保障其基本福利，现有的研究主要用实证数据分析最低工资的就业效应和福利效应，但最低工资本身的制度效应并没有被关注，如最低工资的水平与工人谈判能力的关系等，本文用实验经济学的方法测度了最低工资的制度效应等。 2．发现雇佣保护制度挤出了工人的社会偏好和企业的长期契约偏好。制度的有效性在于它的激励方向与当事人行为偏好的互补性，有些制度安排的运行情况与制度设计者所追求的效果恰恰相反，这是因为制度设计忽略了激励相容和参与约束，本文通过比较制度实验的行为分析，发现我国新《劳动合同法》的雇佣保护制度对工人的社会偏好和企业的长期契约偏好具有挤出效应，这为我国《劳动合同法》的修改提供了行为指导。 3．将劳动契约的不完全性和保留工资等结合在一起进行实验研究，提高了实验检验的有效性和全面性，发现最低工资制度维持了工人的社会偏好。现有最低工资的实验研究主要是国外一些学者以发达市场经济为背景的研究，针对中国背景的最低工资实验研究还没有开展，国外学者的实验研究也没有将契约不完全性和工人的保留工资等纳入统一的实验框架，本文针对中国的最低工资制度将契约的不完全性和保留工资等纳入统一的实验研究框架，有针对性地考察了中国被试对最低工资制度的行为反应，发现了诸如最低工资制度与社会偏好的促进现象等。 论文包括文献梳理、模型构建和实验研究三部分，共六章，其中第二章是文献梳理，第三章是模型构建，第四章、第五章是实验研究。 第二章从不同的劳动制度研究范式出发，分别从新古典框架和社会偏好视角对雇佣保护和最低工资制度以及劳动契约行为的文献进行了梳理，同时研究了制度对社会偏好的挤出和互补文献。 第三章沿着Fehr公平理论的思想，构建了劳动契约模型，提取了异质偏好、雇佣保护、最低工资和劳动契约行为的理论参数，建立了劳动过剩（短缺）、公平（自利）偏好、最低工资、雇佣保护和工人努力水平不同关系的命题，奠定了实验研究的基础。 第四章在基础实验的基础上，开展了禁止解雇、有成本解雇等实验研究，检验《劳动合同法》有关雇佣保护条款与契约当事人行为的关系，发现（1）雇佣保护影响企业的合同期限选择，在存在合同期限雇佣保护的情况下，企业不倾向与工人签订无固定期限的长期劳动合同；（2）相对于不可解雇的长期合同，可解雇的长期合同促使工人提供更高的努力水平；（3）企业提供的工资水平随时间变化而趋向平稳，工人提供的努力水平随时间变化而降低；（4）合同期限限制与就业效率弱相关，但是降低了契约效率；解雇威胁提高了契约效率和就业效率。 第五章在基础实验的基础上，开展了最低工资、废除最低工资等实验研究，发现（1）最低工资制度提高了工人的实际工资；（2）最低工资制度提高了工人的保留工资，但最低工资制度废除后保留工资又恢复到原有水平；（3）最低工资制度降低了就业水平，提高了契约效率；（4）最低工资制度降低了企业的收益水平；（5）最低工资制度维持了工人的社会偏好。 论文使用比较制度实验探索了雇佣保护和最低工资等劳动制度与社会偏好之间的相互作用，以及它们对劳动契约当事人行为的交互影响，对于如何利用社会偏好来构建和谐的劳动关系、设计和谐的劳动契约具有一定的理论意义，也为监管部门劳动政策的制定提供了一些可资借鉴的信息支撑。
英文摘要：	Labor contracts are the most important contracts in the modern economic system. Direct parties in a labor contract include firms and workers. Workers’ behavior influenced by several factors is the key variable affecting labor contract efficiency. With the end of the demographic dividend and the appearance of Lewis Turning Point, Chinese government begins to issue employment protection law and minimum wage law. On operating mechanisms of labor institutional arrangement toward labor contract parties’ behaviors, different conclusions have been drawn under different assumptions. From the perspective of social preference, this dissertation studies effects of employment protection and minimum wage on labor contract behaviors by means of comparative institutional experiments based on preference heterogeneity assumption. Innovations in this paper are listed below. 1. This dissertation first explores employment protection and the minimum wage’s effects on labor contract behaviors based on comparative institutional experiments. The implementation of new employment contract law leads to debates on employment protection, but these studies are based on logical deduction. This dissertation constructs a micro-economic system of employment protection, so labor contract behaviors can be observed directly. The purpose of the minimum wage is to increase workers’ ability to bargain and safeguard workers’ basic welfare. Existing studies analyze employment effects and welfare effects of the minimum wage, but institutional effects of the minimum wage are not involved. This dissertation tests institutional effects of the minimum wage with experimental methods. 2. This dissertation finds that employment protection crowds out social preference of workers and long-term contracts preference of firms. The validity of institutions depends on the complementarity between incentive direction and parties’ behavior preference. Some institutions’ operational effects contrast to the purpose, because designers ignore incentive compatibility and individual rationality. This dissertation finds that employment protection in new employment contract law has crowding-out effects on social preference of workers and long-term contracts preference of firms, which provides behavioral guides to modification of employment contract law. 3. This dissertation designs an experiment that includes both incompleteness of labor contracts and reservation wages, and improves effectiveness and comprehensiveness of experimental tests. Furthermore, this dissertation finds that the minimum wage sustains workers’ social preference. Most existing studies on the minimum wage are based on developed market economics, while studies based on Chinese economy have not been developed. Moreover, existing studies have not considered incompleteness of labor contracts and reservation wages together. This dissertation designs an experiment that includes both incompleteness of labor contract and reservation wages based on Chinese economy, and tests Chinese subjects’ response to the minimum wage. This dissertation consists of six chapters. The second chapter is literature review. The third one is modeling. Experimental tests are described in the fourth and fifth chapters. The second chapter starts from different labor institution research paradigm, and reviews literatures on employment protection, the minimum wage and labor contract behaviors from the perspective of classical framework and social preferences respectively, as well as literatures on crowding-out and crowding-in between institutions and social preferences. Following the thoughts of equity theory by Fehr, the third chapter designs a simple labor contract model, analyzing theoretical parameters of preference heterogeneity, employment protection, the minimum wage and contractual behaviors. This dissertation demonstrates corresponding theoretical propositions, which lays a theoretical base for experimental tests. In the fourth chapter, three types of labor markets are designed to explore effects of employment protection on contracting parties’ behaviors. Experimental results show: (1) employment protection affects the firms’ choices of contract term, that is firms prefer medium-term employment contract than open-ended employment contract; (2) in contrast to open-ended employment contract without firing, open-ended employment contract with firing can stimulate workers to contribute more efforts; (3) wages stably change over time; efforts decrease over time, and firing threat can stimulate workers to contribute more efforts; and (4) there is weak correlation between open-ended employment contract and employment, but contract efficiency decreases; firing threat can improve contract efficiency and employment. In the fifth chapter, behavior effects of minimum wages are tested. Three types of experiment treatment are designed, and experimental results show: (1) the minimum wage increases real wages; (2) the minimum wage increases reservation wages, but removal of the minimum wage restores reservation wages to its previous state; (3) the minimum wage reduces employment and improves contract efficiency; (4) the minimum wage reduces firms’ payoff; and (5) the minimum wage maintains social preferences of workers. By comparative institutional experiments, this dissertation explores the interaction between labor institutions such as employment protection and the minimum wage and social preference, as well as the interaction on labor contract behaviors. The exploration of interaction attempts to give significant theoretical insight as to how to build harmonious labor relations and design harmonious labor contracts using social preference. Furthermore, it also provides information support for the labor policy formulation by related regulatory departments.
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