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| 论文编号: | 33 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120051931 | |
| 上传时间: | 2007/6/20 23:02:55 | |
| 中文题目: | 我国上市公司控制权结构对股权融 | |
| 英文题目: | A Study on Equity Financing Bi | |
| 指导老师: | 王全喜 | |
| 中文关键字: | 上市公司 股权融资偏好 控制权| | |
| 英文关键字: | Listed Company Equity Financ | |
| 中文摘要: | 融资是现代企业经营决策的重要内容。从上世纪50年代起,现代西方财务学界已经逐渐建立起了一套成熟的现代企业资本结构理论体系,其中,关于企业融资偏好问题的研究是企业资本结构理论的重要组成部分。西方融资理论和实践一般认为,企业融资的顺序为:内部融资优于外部融资,外部融资中债务融资优于股权融资。而我国上市公司则恰恰相反,表现出强烈的股权融资偏好,这种“不一致”的现象表明了我国上市公司融资行为的特殊性。 本文选择我国上市公司股权融资偏好这一特殊现象进行研究,运用实证研究和规范研究相结合的方法,通过对2002至2006年间存在股权再融资行为的130家样本公司的实证检验,旨在探讨控制权结构如何影响公司股权融资偏好,分析这一现象产生的深层次原因并提出有意义的改进方案,以最终达到完善公司内部管理结构、提高公司业绩的目的。 本文共分六章。第一章阐述了本文的研究背景和意义,并对研究方法和内容进行了概述;第二章对国内外控制权及股权融资偏好问题的研究现状进行了理论回顾及评述,并对相关概念做出界定;第三章分析了我国上市公司股权融资偏好现状,重点讨论了其产生原因及带来的不利影响;第四章先分析了我国上市公司控制权结构现状,指出它们存在“第一大股东超强控制”和“内部人控制”的双重问题,并从股权集中度和经理控制权收益两个角度探讨了控制权结构对股权融资偏好的影响;第四章是实证检验部分,在此前理论回顾和现状分析的基础上,做出若干基本假设并通过主成分分析和多元线性回归方法加以检验,主要实证结论包括:上市公司第一大股东持股比例与股权融资偏好正相关;独立董事比重与股权融资偏好负相关;股权制衡度越高,上市公司的股权融资偏好就越可能得到扼制等。第六章中,本文结合实证结论提出相关建议,具体措施包括构建合适的股权集中度、完善独立董事制度和公司治理结构等。 本文的主要创新点之一是将控制权结构纳入股权融资偏好分析范畴,国内相关文献多关注于股权融资成本被低估、我国特殊的股权分置现象等原因来解释此现象,而本文选择控制权角度切入,有其独特之处。 | |
| 英文摘要: | Corporate financing is very important to the management decision-making in modern enterprises. The research on corporate financing has been made by the financial academe in western countries since 1950's and has formed a mature system about capital structure, among which, the financing bias research is a vital part. According to the western financing theory and practice, the internal financing is superior to external financing, debt financing is superior to equity financing in external financing. However, the condition of our county's listed companies is just the opposite, giving keen preference to equity financing. This phenomenon reflects some unique features of financing behavior of China’s listed companies. Therefore, this dissertation chooses the special phenomenon of equity financing bias as the research subject, with the purpose to discuss its deep-rooted reason, propose valuable improvement plan, and finally not only perfect its internal management structure but also improve corporate performances. The dissertation selects 130 Chinese listed companies which have the re-financing behavior from 2002 to 2006 as the sample to investigate the relationship between the control rights structure and the equity financing bias, with the method of both theoretical and empirical research. This dissertation includes six chapters. Chapter 1 is the brief introduction of the dissertation, including the research background, research objectives, and methods, and so on. In Chapter 2, the main achievements on both control rights and equity financing bias issue by scholars from home and abroad are reviewed and summarized. Some important concepts are also defined. Chapter 3 mainly discusses the current status of Chinese listed companies’ equity financing bias, including the characteristics, reasons and influences. Chapter 4 analyses the two main problems about the control rights structure faced by the Chinese listed companies, one is “the strong control by the biggest shareholder”, and the other is “the insider control”. The relationship between the control right and the equity financing bias is also explored from the perspectives of equity concentration and benefits of control. Chapter 5 is the empirical testing process of several hypotheses with principle component analysis and regression models, on the basis of the previous theoretical analysis. The main empirical testing conclusions are as follows: share holding proportion of the biggest shareholder has a positive correlation with the equity financing bias; the proportion of the independent directors has a negative correlation with the bias; the higher the equity restriction ratio,the less probability of the bias occurring. In Chapter 6, the dissertation puts forward three policy suggestions based on the empirical conclusions, including designing a proper equity concentration ratio, building a better system of independent director and perfecting the corporate governance structure. The primary creation of this dissertation is the research perspective, which is from the controlling rights to the equity financing bias. It is quite unique from the other scholars’ research point, which is mainly about the low cost of equity financing and the special split-share-structure of China’s stock market. | |
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