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| 论文编号： | 328 | |
| 作者编号： | 043074 | |
| 上传时间： | 2008/1/2 18:01:52 | |
| 中文题目： | 在职消费、公司治理与自愿性信息 | |
| 英文题目： | The Study on Perk、Corporate G | |
| 指导老师： | 刘志远 | |
| 中文关键字： | 在职消费 公司治理 自愿性信 | |
| 英文关键字： | Perk Corporate governanc | |
| 中文摘要： | 在职消费普遍存在于国内外的公司高管层中，是公司正常经营活动必不可少的费用支出项目。在西方国家的上市公司对管理者在职消费具有严格的内部控制制度，尽量降低在职消费的道德风险成本。而在我国上市公司中对管理者在职消费尚未建立完善的内部控制制度，尤其对于受到薪酬管制的国有控股公司，基于公司业绩的货币报酬契约难以有效地实施，在职消费作为替代性的隐性报酬对管理者产生了以道德风险为导向的激励效应。从而导致管理者自愿性披露更少的公司信息，以降低股东监管管理者在职消费的道德风险行为的效率。因此，在职消费的道德风险效应越显著，管理者隐瞒公司信息的动机将越强烈，通过完善公司治理结构，提高公司信息的透明度，以期削弱管理者在职消费道德风险效应下隐瞒信息的动机。本文尝试将管理者在职消费这一隐性报酬与其自愿性信息披露联系起来进行研究，对自愿性信息披露动机、以及管理者报酬与自愿性信息披露相关性等文献进行系统性回顾和评述后，提出论文的研究角度。在分析了我国特有制度背景的基础上，构建了论文研究的理论分析框架，进而实证检验了在职消费与自愿性信息披露的相关性、公司治理结构与自愿性信息披露的相关性以及在职消费、公司治理与自愿性信息披露的相关性，分析比较了国有控股公司与非国有控股公司在职消费道德风险效应下管理者自愿性信息披露水平的差异，以及公司治理对其产生的影响作用。 全文共分为七章：具体内容如下：第一章，引言。提出了研究的背景和研究的问题，以及研究的结构框架和研究内容，研究的方法和研究的主要创新以及概念界定。第二章，国内外相关文献回顾。对管理者报酬与自愿性信息披露、公司治理与自愿性信息披露以及在职消费的相关文献进行回顾和评述，进而提出本文研究的角度。第三章，中国制度背景分析。对在职消费的制度背景与道德风险效应的原因分析、公司治理的制度背景与总体特征以及自愿性信息披露的制度环境进行分析。第四章，在职消费、公司治理与自愿性信息披露的理论分析。在委托代理理论框架下，分析了在职消费道德风险效应下管理者隐瞒信息的原因、在职消费道德风险效应下隐瞒信息的影响因素，以及在职消费道德风险效应下隐瞒信息的治理方式，进而分析了公司治理对在职消费道德风险效应下隐瞒信息的影响。第五章，在职消费与自愿性信息披露的实证检验。第六章，在职消费、公司治理与自愿性信息披露的实证检验。第七章，论文总结了研究的主要结论、研究存在的不足进而提出政策建议。 论文的创新点主要体现在以下四个方面： （1）论文选择的研究视角新颖。在已有的研究文献中大多是从显性报酬角度来分析自愿性信息披露，如股权报酬激励对自愿性信息披露均衡机制的影响作用，论文从中国上市公司的特殊制度背景出发，选择管理者在职消费这一隐性报酬作为研究的视角，来研究在职消费与自愿性信息披露之间的相关性，以及公司治理因素对两者之间相关性的影响。 （2）论文基于委托代理理论构建了研究在职消费与自愿性信息披露之间相关性的理论分析框架。管理者报酬与信息披露均为降低委托人与代理人之间利益冲突的有效方式，论文通过分析委托人与代理人之间的信息披露偏好差异而产生的代理成本，进而研究了管理者在职消费隐性报酬对信息披露代理成本的影响作用，以及公司治理结构中的股权结构特征和董事会独立性对在职消费隐性激励下管理者隐瞒信息的动机产生的制约作用。 （3）论文构建了适合于解释我国上市公司自愿性信息披露的指数。根据中国证监会指定的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第2号〈年度报告的内容与格式〉（2003年修订）》中已作法定披露的项目，借鉴Bostosan（1997）、Chau和Gray(2002)以及L.L.ENG和Y.T.Mak（2003）的指数构建模式，将我国上市公司年报中自愿性信息披露的项目分为战略性信息（Strategic information）、非财务信息（non-financial information）和财务信息（financial informatioin）三类，然后以一定的标准对具体的信息条目赋值计算总和，最后按照Mike Adams和Mahmud Hossain(1998)一致的方式对指数进行替换形成自愿性信息披露的代理变量。 （4）论文建立了多元线性回归模型，以自愿性信息披露指数作为模型中的被解释变量，分别以在职消费、公司治理结构因素作为模型中的解释变量，实证检验了上市公司管理者在职消费、公司治理与自愿性信息披露之间的相关性。通过比较加入公司治理变量后在职消费参数的变化，分析了公司治理对在职消费隐性报酬激励下管理者自愿性信息披露的影响。 | |
| 英文摘要： | The perk consists widely in corporate manage levels. It’s accepted that perk is absolutely necessary expenditure items in corporate operation. Western listed companies have built strict interior controlling system to reduce moral risk that may be raised by perk. But such precise systems can’t be find in Chinese listed companies especially state-control holding company in which managers’ salary is supervised by administration in order to that money pay contract based on company achievement is difficult to carry effectually into execution. The perk has been seen as effective and covert substitute welfare and brings to incentive for managers. This kind of recessive perk encourages managers to take as few voluntary information disclosure as possible while the supervise power from shareholders to perk has been weakened. Thereby，the more significance is moral risk effenction from perk，the more intensity is motivation to hold back information for managers. With consummating corporate governance and advancing the transparency of information，it will be helpful to decrease the motivation of information concealing.
We hope to find the relation of perk (recessive welfare) with manager voluntary information disclosure. Grounding on the analysis of manager voluntary information disclosure motivation，relation with manager recompense，and Chinese institutional background，we build theory frame and test positively the relation of perk with voluntary information disclosure, the relation of voluntary information disclosure with corporate governance, and the relation of the three variables. Furthermore， we compare state-control holding companies with non-state-control holding companies to find the difference of manager voluntary information disclosure affected by perk and corporate governance.
The dissertation consists of 7 chapters. It’s particular contents are as following: In chapter 1 is introduction, we bring forward the background，purpose and method of the research, theory frame and innovations, important concept explanations. In chapter 2, we review and comment the relative literatures inside and outside of nation，including research on the relation of manager’s reward with voluntary information disclosure，corporation governance with voluntary information disclosure，and perk. On the base of forward summarizing，we bring forward research’s angle of view. In chapter 3, we analyze Chinese institutional background，including perk’s institutional background and reason，corporation governance’s transforming process and general character，voluntary information disclosure’s institutional environment. In chapter 4, we build a theory frame of perk, corporate governance and voluntary information disclosure. Based on principal-agent theory，we analyse the reason why managers hide information under perk inspirit，factors effected on managers’s hiding informantion，and governance manner. In chapter 5，we study positively the relation of perk with voluntary information disclosure. In chapter 6, we study positively three variables: perk， corporate governance and voluntary information disclosure. In chapter 7，we summarize the important conclusion，and analyse briefly shortage. Finally，we put forward several items on policy suggestions.
Maybe these innovations should be given attention:
First，the research’s angle of view that dissertation has selected is more different and novelty than previous relative studies. In the most relative literature，research on voluntary information disclosure selects view of obvious reward， for example effect of stock reward inspirit on voluntary information disclosure equilibrium mechanism. But those previous studies fruit can not explain for chinese economical realism nowadays in that the managers’ reward in most listed companies is controlled by administration in our country. In particular，the managers’ reward in state-control holding companies is confronted with a kind of realism that the means of putting stock inspirit into practice have come on just now. The effection of money salary and stock salary on managers’ achievement is affected by administrative intervening. We take a new research start that grounding on the relation of the recessive welfare (perk) and voluntary information disclosure，while existing researches always start from dominant welfare.
Secondly，based on principal-agent theory we build a new frame of the relation of perk with voluntary information disclosure. Both managers reward and information disclosure become good way for reducing conflct of interests between principal and agent. We analyze principal’s difference tendency for information disclosure from agent’ tendency and product agent cost. Using this frame, we analyze how managers’ perk effects on agent cost of information disclosure，and how corporate governance，for example share structure and independence of board of directors，affects voluntary information disclosure and how corporate governance produces condition action on managers’ motivation for holding back information under perk intention.
Third，we construct voluntary information index that is fit for explaining for listed companies in China. According to 《The No. 2 Standard of Information Disclosure Content and Format for Public Issuing Securities Companies | |
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