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论文编号：	3277
作者编号：	2120092359
上传时间：	2011/6/7 7:49:01
中文题目：	民营上市公司治理结构对财务风险影响的实证研究——基于制造行业的数据
英文题目：	An empirical study about the impact of governance structure on the financial risk in the Private listed companies——Based on the data from machinery industry
指导老师：	刘建
中文关键字：	民营上市公司;内部治理结构;财务风险
英文关键字：	Private listed company;Financial risk;Internal corporate governance
中文摘要：	随着社会经济不断发展，民营经济在我国经济体系中扮演的角色也越来越重要，如何进一步壮大对我国经济发展至关重要。财务风险作为财务理论研究中的一项重要课题，同时也是影响企业持续健康发展的重要因素。民营上市公司治理作为提升企业综合实力的重要因素，研究内部治理结构对财务风险的影响具有很好的理论意义和实践意义。 在这一背景下，本文在阐述了委托代理理论、公司治理理论、掏空与支持理论等基础理论的前提下，对国内外关于治理结构对财务风险影响的研究文献进行了系统的回顾和综述。在此基础之上本文在介绍了民营上市公司内部治理结构的特点之后，从内部治理结构的股权结构、董事会、监事会、高管层四个方面对财务风险的影响进行了详细的分析。在此基础之上，本文提出了相关的理论假设，随后以经过合理筛选后得到的96家制造业民营上市公司2006-2009年相关数据，构建了相关的检验模型，运用面板数据分析的方法，对所做出的假设进行了检验。 实证研究表明：民营上市公司中，股权集中度和财务风险呈负相关关系，并通过10%显著性水平检验；股权制衡度和财务风险也呈负相关关系，通过10%显著性水平检验；董事会规模和财务风险之间存在不显著的负相关关系；董事会薪酬和财务风险之间存在显著的正相关关系, 通过10%显著性水平检验；独立董事比例和财务风险之间存在负相关关系，通过5%的显著性水平检验；监事会薪酬及监事会持股比例均和财务风险之间存在不显著的正相关关系；高管薪酬和财务风险之间存在负相关关系，且通过1%水平的显著性检验。根据实证结果和之前的理论分析，本文就研究结果进行了分析并得出结论。最后基于研究结论本文提出了一些政策和建议：通过多种方式，适当提高股权集中度；引入战略投资者，提高股权制衡度；进一步完善独立董事制度，提高董事会的独立性和专业性；优化监事会人员构成，提高监事会独立性和专业水平；完善高管人员的激励方式，提高激励效率。
英文摘要：	With the continuous development of social economy, private economy is playing a more and more important role in China's economy, how to further strengthen the private economy is very important to our economic development. Financial risk is an important subject in financial theory, and an important factor which affects the sustained and healthy development of firms. Considered that corporate governance is an important role to improve the overall strength of the Private listed companies, the internal governance structure of the impact of financial risk has a good theoretical and practical significance. In this context, under the premise of describing the basic theories, such as the principal - agent theory, corporate governance theory and Tunneling and Propping theory, this paper make a systematic review of the literature about the impact of governance structure on the financial risk in the home and abroad. On this basis, this paper describes the characteristics of internal governance structure of private listed companies. And then, this paper makes a detailed analysis about the internal governance structure’s impact on the financial risk through four dimensions: ownership structure, board of directors, supervisors and managers. On this basis, we propose a related hypothesis, and with data between 2006 and 2009 of the properly selected 96 private listed companies of machinery industry, this paper constructs the relevant test model and makes the hypothesis tested using the panel data analysis method Empirical research shows that: in private listed companies, ownership concentration and financial risk are negatively correlated, which bypasses the 10% significance level test; equity balance degree and the financial risk is negatively correlated, which bypasses the 10% significance level test; Board size has not significant negative correlation with financial risk; board revenue has significant positive correlation with the financial risk, which bypasses the 10% significance level test; The proportion of independent directors and financial risk is negatively correlated, which bypasses the 5% significance level test; Supervisory revenue and Supervisory share have not significant positive correlations with the financial risk; executive revenue and financial risk is negatively correlated, which bypasses the 1% significance level test. According to previous empirical results and theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes the findings. Finally, based on the conclusions this paper proposes some policies and proposals: various ways to appropriately increase the ownership concentration; introduce strategic investors to raise equity balance degree; further improve the independent director system to improve the independence and professionalism of the board of directors; optimize staff composition of Board Supervisors to improve the independence and professionalism of the board of supervisors; improve the way of the incentive for senior executives to improve incentive efficiency.
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