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论文编号：	3274
作者编号：	2120092353
上传时间：	2011/6/6 22:18:03
中文题目：	地方政府干预对国有上市公司并购绩效影响研究
英文题目：	The Infrequence of Local Government Intervention on State-owned Enterprises’s M&A Performance
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	地方国有上市公司 政府干预 并购绩效
英文关键字：	State-owned Enterprises Government Intervention M&A Performance
中文摘要：	并购是企业实现跨越式发展的重要方式，随着全球性金融危机接近尾声，第六次并购浪潮也似乎正在到来。企业将并购作为一种发展战略，很重要的动因在于获得协同效应，提升企业价值。但是，从对并购绩效研究成果来看，目前并没有统一的结论。这很大程度上是因为国内学者对并购绩效的研究局限于并购本身的价值创造性，而没有结合并购发生的动因。在我国，1994年的财政管理体制改革使得我国地方政府承担着社会管理者职能，要实现搞活地方经济、增加税收、促进就业以及维持社会稳定等多方面目标。但另一方面，地方政府又是国有资产实际控制者，其目标的多重性必然会促使地方政府对辖区内国有上市公司并购行为进行干预，从而对地方国有上市公司并购绩效产生重要影响。因此，研究地方国有企业并购绩效必然要考虑地方政府干预因素，通过研究地方政府干预对并购绩效影响机理探索地方国有上市公司的真实并购绩效。 文章选取了2006-2009年间发生的地方国有上市公司244起并购事件作为研究样本，按照“地方政府干预——并购关联模式——并购绩效”的范式研究我国地方政府干预对国有上市公司并购绩效所产生的影响。文章研究主要分为两个环节。在第一个环节研究中，文章按照樊纲指数将地方政府分为高干预地区和低干预地区，采用Logistic回归对地方政府干预强度和地方国有上市公司并购关联属性进行实证分析，验证了地方政府干预对并购关联属性所带来的影响。在第二个环节研究中，文章利用多元线性回归对并购关联模式和滞后一年的绩效进行实证分析，从而验证了并购关联模式对并购绩效所带来的影响。 文章研究中，地方政府干预对并购关联模式的影响实证结果表明，地方政府干预强度对并购关联属性有显著影响，高干预地区为了转嫁财政负担和实现自身其他社会目标更倾向于推动地方国有上市公司进行非关联并购。并购关联模式对并购绩效影响的实证结果表明地方国有上市公司非关联并购绩效差于关联并购绩效。文章认为，为了更好的发挥并购功效应要发挥地方国有上市公司的市场主体地位，防止地方政府过度干预企业并购行为，同时要进一步规范政府职能，做好地方政府在国有企业并购中的角色定位。
英文摘要：	M&A is an important way for a company to development by leaps and bounds. The sixth wave of M&A seems to be coming as the approaching of the end of the global financial crisis. To obtain synergies and enhance corporate value, enterprises take M&A as a development strategy. However, so far there is no consistent conclusion can be drawn from the empirical research what M&A effects are. This is largely because domestic scholars only concern the creativity value of M&A, ignoring M&A motivation. In China, after the reform of financial management system in 1994, the local governments shoulder much more responsibilities，such as economy revitalizing, increasing tax revenue, promoting employment, maintaining social stability and other social management matters. At the same time, the local governments is the actual controllers of state assets, the multiplicity of their goals is bound to intervent M&A activities of state-owned companies. For the above reaseans, the research of state-owned enterprises’s M&A performance must think over the fact of government. M&A events of state-owned companies took place between 2006 and 2009 are taken as samples to reseach the influence of local government’s intervention on state-owned enterprises’s M&A,following the pattern of "Local Government Intervention——M&A Related Properties——M&A Performance". The article can be divided two parts，the first one mainly research the influence of local government on M&A related properties of state-owned companies，and the following one mainly study the influence of M&A related properties on M&A performance of state-owned companies. In the first part of the study,local governments are divided into high-intervention areas and low-intervention areas according to Fan Gang index, and the we use logist regression to carry out the relationship between the government intervention and the M&A related properties of local state-owned companies. In the second part, we use multiple linear regression to study the relationship between the M&A related properties and the M&A performance of local state-owned companies. Empirical result of local government intervention impact on M&A related shows that Intensity of local government intervention had significant effects on M&A related properties. Areas of high Intervention tend to passed on their financial burden and other implicates to State-owned companies, and promotes non-related acquisitions. Empirical result of M&A related properties impact on acquisition performance shows that performance of State-owned companies in non-related M&A is worse than that in related M & A. On one hand, market advantage can be formed in related M&A. On the other hand related M&A is easier to achieve resources integration, management integration, cultural integration and things like that. This Article pointed out that in order to take advantage of M&A, local government should play the dominant position of State-owned companies, do not interference in M&A excessively, regulate their functions, and do good positioning of their roles in M&A of State-owned companies.
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