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论文编号：	3250
作者编号：	2120092373
上传时间：	2011/6/6 10:50:24
中文题目：	资产替代与代理成本的关系研究
英文题目：	The Study on the Asset Substitution and Agency Cost
指导老师：	古志辉
中文关键字：	资产替代 代理成本 伦理道德约束 股东侵占
英文关键字：	asset substitution agency cost moral entrenchment of shareholders
中文摘要：	Jensen和Meckling（1976）对代理行为引发的债权人的财富损失进行了开创性研究。在这篇论文中，首次提出了资产替代问题，即公司通过首先承诺债权人投资于低风险项目卖出债权，然后在现实中真正投资于高风险项目，经理人员可以将财富从天真的债权人手中转移到自己名下。权益所有者会倾向于选择高风险的活动，以降低债务价值为代价来增加权益价值。 所有者与经营者利益不一致所带来的代理问题一直受到国内外学者的广泛关注，而对企业中股东与债权人之间利益冲突导致的代理问题的研究则相对较少。对资产替代问题的深入刻画，以及由此引发的代理成本的度量还是理论界的难题。通过对已有研究的梳理，我们注意到学者对资产替代问题的研究都忽视了两个问题。首先是资产替代与股东侵占公司资产的割裂，对资产替代问题进行的研究忽视了股东侵占所引发的代理成本。事实上，股东的侵占行为是普遍存在的。其次是对股东行为的约束。传统的代理理论是以自利和追求效用最大化的人性假设为基础的。Aristotle(2004)认为在文明社会中个体决策往往会包含伦理道德准则。代理理论中人性自利假设无疑会使分析的视角变得狭窄。 论文以Jensen和Meckling（1976）为起点，遵循Leland（1998）的研究范式。首先，运用期权定价的方法建立资产替代模型，定义由于资产替代行为引发的代理成本。通过模型计算，我们得到了代理成本的表达式。通过数值模拟的方法，我们验证了股东的资产替代激励。其次，针对以往的研究忽略的两个问题，我们对基础资产替代模型进行修正，在基础资产替代框架下，引入新的变量，获得在伦理道德约束条件下的资产替代模型和股东侵占条件下的资产替代模型。最后，通过修正模型与基础资产替代模型的对比，研究伦理道德约束的经济作用。在考虑伦理道德约束后，股东没有激励进行资产替代。在一个充满伦理约束和强烈道德意识的社会中，股东会倾向于信守债务合约，选择低风险投资项目。
英文摘要：	Jensen and Meckling（1976）profoundly present the “asset substitution” problem.Equityholders of a levered firm, can potentially extract value from debtholders by increasing investment risk after debt is in place. Equityholders prefer to higher risk investments in order to increse the equity value at the cost of the loss of debtholders. A large volume of work has built upon the agency problem caused by the conflict between the owner and manager. However, Past researches pay less attention to the conflict between equityholders and debtholders. At the same time, analysis about literatures tell us that it’s inadequate and difficult to measure the agency cost by the “asset substitution” problem. Past research falls short in two critical dimensions. First, the studies on the “asset substitution” problem ingore the agency cost by the entrenchment of shareholders.In fact the entrenchment of shareholders is normal. Second, the limit of the decide of shareholders. The past research has an implied hypothesis that the shareholder focus only on hisown benefits.In deed, as far back as Aristotle(2004),it was proposed that individuals in a civilized society incorporate ethical standards into the decisions that they make. Ethical individuals make decisions within a self-imposed moral confine. This paper built on the pricing model of Leland(1998) seeks to examine the asset substitution problem and agency cost. First, we build the basic asset substitution model. According to the derivation of theoretical model, we get the expression of agency cost. The results of numerical simulation show that the shareholders indeed have the incentive to implement asset substitution. Second, we introduce a new variables to the basic model, the ethical variable. We study the asset substitution problem and the agency cost in the new conditions.To our surprising, the shareholders have no incentive to implement asset substitution. Maybe this is the role of moral.That is to say, there is no asset substitution problem in a world full of moral. Third, we introduce another new variable to the basic model, the entrenchment of shareholders. The entrenchment of shareholders will increase the agency cost.
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