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论文编号：	3236
作者编号：	1120080747
上传时间：	2011/6/5 18:37:15
中文题目：	基于股东权益保护的投资者关系管理有效性研究
英文题目：	Study on the Effectiveness of Investor Relations Management Based on Shareholder Rights and Interests Protection
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	股东权益保护 投资者关系管理 有效性 治理效应 价值效应
英文关键字：	Protection of shareholder rights and interests, Investor Relations Management, Effectiveness, Governance effect, Value effect
中文摘要：	经过多年发展，发达国家的投资者关系管理已经形成了较为成熟、完善的体系。虽然与发达国家成熟的资本市场相比，中国上市公司的投资者关系管理存在较大差距，但已经越来越引起中国上市公司和有关监管部门的重视。2005年，中国证监会指出“投资者关系工作是指公司通过信息披露与交流，加强与投资者及潜在投资者之间的沟通，增进投资者对公司的了解和认同，提升公司治理水平，以实现公司整体利益最大化和保护投资者合法权益的重要工作”。基于现实需要，作为一种重要的股东权益保护机制，上市公司开展的投资者关系管理对于公司治理水平和公司价值会产生怎样的影响呢？ 基于上述问题，本文从七部分进行研究。第一章是引言；第二章是文献综述；第三章对投资者关系管理发挥股东权益保护作用的机理进行分析；第四章是理论分析和研究设计，通过理论分析提出研究假设，建立研究模型，然后提出研究变量、样本选择和数据来源。第五章和第六章运用实证方法对本文的研究假设进行检验和分析。第七章是全文的结论和研究展望。通过研究，本文主要得出以下结论： 第一，中国上市公司的投资者关系互动沟通水平有待提高。目前我国A股上市公司在投资者关系管理方面与投资者的互动沟通整体水平偏低。 第二，高的股权集中度对上市公司的治理水平具有显著的负面影响。在中国独特的制度背景下，股权过分集中、国家股或法人股占绝对控股地位是中国大多数A股上市公司股权结构的普遍特征，当控股股东与其他大股东的利益一致时，他们会共同联合起来，“合谋”掠夺其他股东的财富，侵害中小股东的利益，大股东之间的这种合谋行为会对公司治理水平产生负面影响。 第三，投资者关系管理的治理效应明显。上市公司通过开展投资者关系管理，与投资者进行互动沟通，能够在整体上提高上市公司的治理水平，但这种提高主要体现在股东治理方面。进一步研究发现，上市公司通过投资者关系管理，能够抑制大股东之间的合谋行为，进而提高上市公司的治理水平。 第四，投资者关系管理的价值效应明显。上市公司开展投资者关系管理能有效保障投资者对上市公司的知情权；上市公司在与投资者互动沟通的过程中，可以获取投资者的合理化建议，从而改善公司的经营管理和治理结构，加强投资者对公司的投资信心，降低融资成本，提升公司价值。进一步研究发现，上市公司通过投资者关系管理提升了公司治理水平，在此基础上提升了公司价值，说明公司治理在投资者关系管理的价值效应中发挥了积极作用。 本文的创新点主要包括以下三方面： 第一，揭示了投资者关系管理发挥股东权益保护功能的内在机理，构建了投资者关系产生股东权益保护功能的理论分析框架。在大多数国家的公司中，所有权都有一定程度的集中，公司代理问题不仅仅是高管与股东的委托代理问题，更多凸显的是控股股东掠夺中小股东的问题，所以要对控股股东损害中小股东利益的行为进行限制，保护中小股东的权益。但由于契约和法律的不完备，通过契约或者法律的手段对股东权益进行保护是不完全的，公司开展的投资者关系管理能够在很大程度上作为股东权益法律保护机制的重要补充。本文以对投资者关系管理发挥股东权益保护功能的内在机理进行了深入分析，进而构建了投资者关系管理产生股东权益保护功能的理论分析框架。 第二，构建了以互动沟通为核心的投资者关系管理评价指标。公司与投资者之间的互动沟通是投资者关系管理产生治理效应和价值创造的关键，是评价投资者关系管理水平的关键因素，本文从网站沟通、电话沟通和现场沟通三个维度构建了投资者关系互动沟通指标，并通过实证方法对该指标体系进行有效性检验。该指标对投资者关系管理水平从深度和广度上进行了度量，深化了对投资者关系管理的研究积累，完善了投资者关系管理评价指标体系，进而优化了上市公司治理评价指标体系。 第三，分析了投资者关系管理的治理效应和价值效应，并发现公司治理对投资者关系管理价值效应的中介作用。本文探索性地基于股东权益保护的视角构建了投资者关系互动沟通指标，并借鉴南开大学公司治理研究中心构建的上市公司治理指数，对上市公司开展投资者关系管理产生的治理效应和价值效应进行了深入分析，在此基础上，探究投资者关系管理、公司治理和公司价值三者之间的内在关系，发现公司治理对于上市公司的投资者关系管理价值效应具有显著的中介作用。
英文摘要：	Investor Relations Management of the developed countries has formed a more mature and sound system with the development for several years. Compared with the mature capital markets of the developed countries, Investor Relations Management of the Chinese listed companies still has a big gap, but it has been attached more and more importance by the Chinese listed companies and the relevant regulatory authorities. In 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission pointed out that, “The work of relationship with investors refers to the important work that the listed companies, through information disclosure and communication, strengthen the communication with investors and prospective investors, enhance the investors’ knowledge about and recognition of the listed companies, uplift the corporate governance level so as to maximize the overall interests of the companies and to protect the lawful rights and interests of the investors.” Based on the practical needs, the listed companies carry out Investor Relations Management. As an important mechanism for the protection of shareholder rights and interests, how does Investor Relations Management affect corporate governance and corporate value? Based on the above issues, this paper develops the research in seven parts. Chapter One is the introduction. Chapter Two is the literature review. Chapter Three analyzes the mechanism by which Investor Relations Management plays the role of the protection of shareholder rights and interests. Chapter Four is the theoretical analysis and research design. This chapter puts forward the hypotheses through theoretical analysis, establishes the research model and then puts forward the research variables, sample selection and data sources. Chapters Five and Chapter Six examine and analyze the hypotheses with the empirical methods. Chapter Seven is the conclusion and research prospects. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the level of Investor Relations interactive communication of Chinese listed companies needs to be improved. At present, the overall level of Investor Relations Management of A-share listed companies of China is lower. Secondly, the high degree of ownership concentration has a significant negative impact on the governance level of the listed companies. Under the unique institutional background of China, the general characteristics of the ownership structure of A-share listed companies of China includes over-concentration ownership, absolute controlling status of the state-shares or legal-person-shares. When the interests of the controlling shareholders are consistent with those of other large shareholders, they will join up to conspire to plunder the wealth of other shareholders, aggrieve the interests of the median and small shareholders. Such collusion of the major shareholders will have a negative impact on the corporate governance. Thirdly, the governance effect of Investor Relations Management is significant. Through Investor Relations Management, the listed companies interactively communicate with the investors so that the overall governance level is enhanced. However, the enhancement is mainly reflected in the shareholder governance. Further study finds that, through Investor Relations Management, the listed companies can inhibit the collusion among the major shareholders and then improve the governance level. Fourthly, the value effect of Investor Relations Management is significant. With Investor Relations Management, the listed companies can effectively protect the right to know of the investors. In the process of interactive communication with the investors, the listed companies can get some reasonable suggestions to improve the companies’ management and governance structure, strengthen investors confidence, lower financing costs, and enhance corporate value. Further study finds that, through Investor Relations Management, the listed companies can enhance the corporate governance level, and then enhance the corporate value on this basis, which indicates that corporate governance plays an active role in the value effect of Investor Relations Management. The innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the paper reveals the internal mechanism by which Investor Relations Management plays the role of the protection of the shareholder rights and interests and constructs the relevant theoretical analysis framework. The companies of most countries have a certain level of ownership concentration. The agency problem of the companies exists not only between the executives and shareholders, but also between the controlling shareholder and the median and small shareholders. The rights and interests of the median and small shareholders should be protected. However, due to incomplete contracts and the law, it is not complete to protect the rights and interests of the shareholders by contract or law means. To a large extent, Investor Relations Management can be used as an important complementary mechanism for the protection of shareholder rights and interests. This paper deeply analyzes the mechanism by which Investor Relations Management plays the role of the protection of shareholder rights and interests and then constructs the relevant theoretical analysis framework. Secondly, this paper constructs Investor Relations Interactive Communication Index. The interactive communication between the companies and the investors is not only the key to governance effect and value effect of Investor Relations Management but also the key to the evaluation of the level of Investor Relations Management. This paper constructs Investor Relations Interactive Communication Index from three dimensions including website communication, telephone communication and locale communication, and then validates the effectiveness of the index system through empirical methods. The index measures the level of Investor Relations Management from the depth and breadth, deepens the study on the accumulation of Investor Relations Management, improves the evaluation index system of Investor Relations Management, and then optimizes the evaluation index system of corporate governance of the listed companies. Thirdly, this paper analyzes the governance effect and value effect of Investor Relations Management and finds the mediation of corporate governance for the value effect of Investor Relations Management. Based on the perspective of the protection of the shareholders rights and interests, this paper explores to construct Investor Relations Interactive Communication Index. With Chinese Corporate Governance Index of the Center for Studies of Corporate Governance of Nankai University, this paper deeply analyzes the governance effect and value effect of Investor Relations Management. On this basis, this paper then deeply analyzes the intrinsic relationship among Investor Relations Management, corporate governance and firm value and finds that corporate governance has the significant mediation for the value effect of Investor Relations Management of the listed companies.
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