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论文编号：	3234
作者编号：	1120080731
上传时间：	2011/6/5 18:28:51
中文题目：	战略投资者引进对中国商业银行治理效率的影响研究
英文题目：	Study on the Effect of Stratigic Investors Introduction on Governance Efficiency of Chinese Commercial Banks
指导老师：	于斌
中文关键字：	商业银行 治理转型 境外战略投资者 治理效率
英文关键字：	Commercial Banks, Governance Transformation, Foreign Strategic Investors, Governance Efficiency
中文摘要：	在金融全球化和中国公司治理转型的背景下，中国已有多家商业银行陆续引进了境外战略投资者。随着中国经济的快速发展，今后还将有更多的中国商业银行引进境外战略投资者。境外战略投资者的引进对中国商业银行治理效率的影响，成为理论界和实务界关注的焦点。 本文采用27家银行2004年到2008年的数据，130个观测值的非平衡面板对境外战略投资者引进对商业银行治理效率的系统影响进行了分析。论文共分七章，第一章是引言，第二章分别对商业银行公司治理转型和战略投资者引进与商业银行治理的国内外研究进行述评；第三章基于商业银行引进境外战略投资者的国际经验和中国实践，对商业银行引进境外战略投资者的驱动因素和模式进行总结；第四章在理论分析的基础上提出了本文的研究假设，之后对本文的样本选择进行了阐释，并对相关变量的定义进行了说明；第五章对境外战略投资者引进对商业银行内部治理效率的影响进行了实证分析，采用随机前沿范式对商业银行内部治理效率进行了分解，并分别进行了验证；第六章对外部治理环境对境外战略投资者的持股变化进行了实证分析；第七章是全文的结论。通过研究，本文得出以下主要结论： 第一，境外战略投资者引进具有公司治理效应，体现为境外战略投资者引进改善了银行的治理结构、提高了银行治理绩效，增强了安全性；境外战略投资者提高了治理结构改善效率，但是对其他效率的提升程度较弱，即境外战略投资者的引进作用似乎只聚焦在“治理结构的改善”层面。总体来讲，境外战略投资者引进及其持股比例的提高增强了银行的治理结构改善效率、治理绩效激励效率以及治理安全保障效率。 第二，境外战略投资者对银行的治理追求“用脚投票”的投机获利效应，同时又追求“用手投票”的监督效应；境外战略投资者持股注重经济型治理质量较高、经济发展环境较好、地区金融市场化较成熟的地区，提示我们对于需要引进境外战略投资者的城市商业银行来讲，应首先推进公司治理从“行政型治理”向“经济型治理”转型，并塑造“规则、合规”的治理环境。 相对于一般银行研究的数据难点，本文在样本容量及样本数据方面具有一定的比较优势。本文的样本容量为27家银行2004年到2008年的130个非平衡观测值，包括了国有大型银行、全国股份制商业银行、城市商业银行等各个类型，从而能与科学的固定效应、随机前沿分析相匹配，有利于深入挖掘样本银行战略投资者引进前后的系统特征。本文的数据获取是借助工作网络，分别对每一家银行采用邮寄的方式，并借助工作网络促进调研和相关数据的整理。尽管数据获取及收集的成本较高，但在一定程度上形成了本数据的“进入障碍”，形成了本文独特的数据优势。 本文的创新点主要体现在以下三个方面： 第一，基于实证分析构建了银行治理效率的基本要素。基于随机前沿分析范式，构建并创新了银行治理效率的系统要素，并将其提炼为治理结构的改善效率、治理绩效的激励效率以及治理安全的保障效率三个维度，实现了“效率相对化”。 第二，基于制度、实践及理论研究的三维分析框架提炼了中国商业银行战略投资者引进的基本特性。本文参考Gersick(1999)的三维分析模型，初步构建了包含制度演变维度、实践发展维度、理论研究维度的三个相互交叉又相互影响的三维分析框架。 第三，在优势数据的基础上，本文充分参考南开大学公司治理指数的评价体系的权重标准，构建了商业银行内部治理效率的评价指标。
英文摘要：	Some Chinese commercial banks have introduced foreign strategic investors under the background of financial globalization and governance transformation of Chinese corporates. With the rapid development of Chinese economy, there will be more commercial banks of China introducing foreign strategic investors in the future. The effect of the introduction of foreign strategic investors on the governance efficiency of Chinese commercial banks has become the research focus of theory and practice area. Based on 130 non-balanced panel observations of 27 banks from 2004 to 2008, this paper analyzes the effect of introduction of foreign strategic investors on the governance efficiency of Chinese commercial banks. This paper is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One is the introduction. Chapter Two respectively reviews the domestic and foreign researches about the governance transformation of commercial banks and the relationship between the introduction of strategic investors and the governance of commercial banks. Based on the international experience and Chinese practice of the introduction of foreign strategic investors, Chapter Three concludes the driving factors and the models of the introduction of foreign strategic investors. Chapter Four presents the hypotheses in the basis of the theoretical analysis and then explains the sample selection and the definitions of the relevant variables. Chapter Five analyzes the effect of the introduction of foreign strategic investors on the internal governance efficiency of commercial banks in the empirical way and then decomposes and validates the internal governance efficiency of commercial banks with the stochastic frontier paradigm. Chapter Six analyzes the relationship between the external governance environment and the ownership percentage change of foreign strategic investors in the empirical way. Chapter Seven is the conclusion. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the introduction of foreign strategic investors has the corporate governance effect which is reflected in the improvement of the banks’ governance structure, the enhancement of the banks’ governance performance and the buildup of the banks’ safety. The introduction of foreign strategic investors helps to improve the banks’ governance structure efficiency. However, the improvement of other efficiency is weaker. The function of the introduction of foreign strategic investors seems to only focus on “the improvement of governance structure”. Overall, the introduction of foreign strategic investors and the increase of their ownership percentage improve the banks’ improvement efficiency of the governance structure, incentive efficiency of governance performance and guarantee efficiency of governance safety. Secondly, foreign strategic investors seek both the speculative gain effect of “voting with their feet” and the supervision effect of “voting with their hands” in the banks’ governance. Foreign strategic investors attach more importance to the regions with higher economic governance, better economic development environment and more mature regional financial market, suggesting that the city commercial banks which will introduce foreign strategic investors should first promote the corporate governance transformation from “Administrative Governance” to “Economic Governance” and shape the governance environment of “rules and compliance”. Compared with the general data difficulty of the search concerning with the bank, this paper has the comparative advantage in respect of the sample size and sample data. This sample size is composed of 130 non-balanced panel observations of 27 banks from 2004 to 2008 including large state-owned banks, the joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks and so on, which can match with the fixed effects and stochastic frontier analysis and is conducive to the dig systematic characteristics of the samples before and after the introduction of foreign strategic investors. With the work network, the data of this paper is acquired and the research and collation of relevant data is promoted. Although the cost of data acquisition and collection is high, to some extent, this data forms the “entry barriers”. This is the unique data advantage of this paper. The innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly, based on the empirical analysis, this paper constructs the basic factors of the bank governance efficiency. With the analysis paradigm of stochastic frontier, this paper constructs the systematic factors and then abstracts three dimensions including improvement efficiency of the governance structure, incentive efficiency of governance performance and guarantee efficiency of governance safety so as to achieve the “relativized efficiency”. Secondly, based on the three-dimensional analytical framework of the system, practice and theory, this paper abstracts the basic features of the introduction of the foreign strategic investors of Chinese commercial banks. With the reference of the three-dimensional analysis model of Gersick (1999), this paper constructs the three-dimensional analytical framework including the dimensions of system evolution, practice development and theoretical study which cross and affect each other. Thirdly, this paper refers to the weight standard of Chinese Corporate Governance Index of Nankai University and constructs the valuation index of the internal governance efficiency of the Commercial Banks.
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