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论文编号：	3228
作者编号：	2120092366
上传时间：	2011/6/5 12:37:17
中文题目：	我国上市公司股权结构与敌意收购关系的实证研究
英文题目：	An empirical research on the relationship between ownership structure and hostile takeover of China’s listed companies
指导老师：	王全喜
中文关键字：	上市公司;股权结构;敌意收购
英文关键字：	The listed company;The ownership structure;Hostile takeover;Logistic regression
中文摘要：	近年来，伴随经济全球化和一体化进程的加快，市场竞争日趋激烈。为了在竞争中求得生存与发展，世界范围内掀起了新一轮并购浪潮。激烈的竞争促使并购技术得到了巨大创新和发展，从早期企业间的协议收购发展到绕过目标公司大股东或者管理层的敌意收购，并成为兼并收购的一种重要实现形式。1993年“宝延风波”掀起了我国资本市场上敌意收购的序幕，随后陆续出现三新和君安抢购申华，北大控股延中，深圳天极光电公司试图控股上海飞乐公司等敌意收购现象。随着股权分置改革的顺利进行，我国股权结构日趋分散，第一大股东持股比例逐渐降低，流通股比例扩大，股份全流通时代到来，国家相继出台与收购相关的法律法规，使得融资方式多元化，减轻收购方的资金压力，降低收购难度系数，这些举措大大增加了敌意收购的可能性。在这一背景下，更需要对我国敌意收购活动进行深入研究。本文从股权结构角度入手，试图探寻股权结构与敌意收购之间的内在联系，找出二者的特征和规律，从上市公司大股东及管理层角度出发，减少由于股权结构的原因引发的敌意收购可能性。公司可以根据被敌意收购公司的股权结构特征，做出有利的股权结构设置，加强反收购意识，随时关注自己是否成为敌意收购的对象，做好事前防御工作。 本文根据理论与实证相结合的原则，在国内外目前已有研究的基础上，采用利益最大化等相关理论对股权结构与敌意收购的关系进行分析，并选取我国上市公司1998-2010年所发生的敌意收购案例及相等数量的非敌意收购案例为样本进行配对分析。研究结果表明：随着股权分置改革的进行，股权分散程度加大，敌意收购可能性随之增加。股权集中度、管理层持股比例、国有控股与敌意收购均为负相关，流通股比例与敌意收购正相关。说明股权集中度高或管理层持股比例较高的上市公司，敌意收购可能性较小；流通股比例越高，被敌意收购可能性越大；国有控股公司被敌意收购的可能性小于非国有控股公司。 从上市公司控股股东的角度，若要保持对上市公司的控制权，要注意股权的相对集中，适度扩大管理层持股比例，建立健全敌意收购预警机制，采取防范措施降低敌意收购的可能性。
英文摘要：	In recent years, with the rapid development of economy globalization and integration, the market competition is becoming intense day by day. In order to survive and develop in the competition, there have been more and more mergers and acquisitions occurred in the world, many enterprises hope to re-integration of resources, expand business scale, enhance their own power through the merger and acquisition activity. The keen competition made M & A technology a great innovation and development, it develops from the early consensus among enterprises to bypass the target company's management and an offer directly to shareholders, the hostile takeover created in this case, and it becomes an important form of Mergers and acquisitions, "Po Yan storm" in 1993 set off a hostile takeover of China's capital market prelude, the phenomenon of hostile takeover starts to appear after that, such as Sanxin and Junan competed to acquire Shenhua, Beijing University wanted to hold Yanzhong, Shenzhen YORK Optoelectronic Technology Co., Ltd tried to hold shares of Shanghai Feile. With the Equity Division Reform going on smoothly, our share structure is becoming more dispersed, The largest proportion of shareholding is decreasing gradually, the proportion of tradable shares is expanding, the stock entire circulation time is arriving. The related laws and regulations announced by our country one after another causes the financing way multiplication, reduces the the fund pressure of purchase side, reduces the purchase difficulty coefficient. These actions increased the hostility purchase possibility greatly. In this background, it is imperative for us to research M&A of our country’s enterprises. This article obtains from the stockholder's rights structure angle, in order to inquire about the inner link between the stockholder's rights structure and the hostility takeover, and discover the characteristic and rule between them, and reduce possibility of hostility takeover as a result of unreasonable ownership structure. The company may establish its own reasonable ownership structure according to by the purchase company's ownership structure feature, strengthens the anti-takeover consciousness, momentarily pays attention to itself whether to become the object of hostility and makes defense work in anticipation. This article researches with both theory and demonstration method. On the basis of studies at home and abroad, It analyzes the relationship between the ownership structure and hostile takeover, using maximum benefits and other related theories. It selects the listed companies from 1998 to 2010 in China’s stock market as examples. The main conclusions of the article are followed: ownership concentration , managerial Ownership and state-owned equity are correlated negatively with hostile takeover, tradable equity is correlated positively with hostile takeover. It explains that the stockholder's rights concentration degree high or the management owns stocks the proportion high to be listed, the hostility takeover possibility is small; The circulation stock proportion is higher, is been bigger by the hostility takeover possibility; The state-owned Holding company is smaller than the non-state-owned holding company by the hostility purchase's possibility. As the article’s conclusion, the listed companies in our country need to further optimize the ownership structure, guaranteed that the stockholder's rights concentrate relatively, expands the management to own stocks the proportion moderately, establishes the perfect complete hostility takeover early warning mechanism, takes the measure to reduce the hostility takeover possibly the harm which brings to the company.
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