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论文编号：	3214
作者编号：	2120092314
上传时间：	2011/6/4 22:01:32
中文题目：	大股东资金占用对上市公司盈余质量的影响研究 ——基于证监会（2008）27号文件的研究
英文题目：	The Influence Study of the Major Shareholders Embezzling Listed Companies’ Fund to the Quality of Accounting Earnings – Based on the 27th document of CSRC 2008
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	大股东资金占用;盈余质量;盈余管理;盈余信息含量
英文关键字：	Controlling Shareholder''s Embezzlement of Fund; Earnings Quality; Earnings Management; Information Content of Earnings
中文摘要：	在中国，大股东占用上市公司资金的现象非常普遍，也非常严重，且具有中国“特色”。近年来对大股东占用上市公司资金行为的研究成为了一个较为热门的课题。本文就是在前人研究的基础上，结合中国证监会于2008年出台的27号文件，研究了该政策的效果及市场反应，同时对大股东资金占用行为对上市公司盈余质量的影响进行了研究。 本文首先介绍了论文的相关研究背景，阐述了国内外关于大股东资金占用及盈余质量（主要包括盈余管理和会计盈余信息含量两个方面）相关的研究成果，在此基础上根据已有的文献研究结果及理论分析推导出了本文的研究假设，然后以其他应收款占总资产的比重作为大股东资金占用的替代变量，以操纵性应计利润和盈余的信息含量作为盈余质量的替代变量，在深沪两市2007年和2008年所有的上市公司中选取了资金占用严重（其他应收款占总资产的比例大于等于15%）和资金占用极轻（其他应收款占总资产的比例小于等于0.5%）两组样本，经过描述性统计发现，2008年出台的27号文件对于抑制大股东资金占用的行为具有良好的效果，市场给予了良好的反应；经过实证检验发现，大股东占用上市公司的资金降低了公司的盈余质量，严重影响着上市公司的盈余管理行为，而且对于资金占用越严重的行为，上市公司的盈余管理程度越大；遗憾的是未能有效的检测到大股东的资金占用行为对于盈余信息含量的影响。由于27号政策的执行使得一些控股股东对上市公司的侵占行为有所收敛，对上市公司的资金占用有所减少，从而使得该上市公司的盈余管理程度有所降低，对于提高公司的盈余质量有着良好的作用。
英文摘要：	In China, the major shareholders of listed companies occupy the funds is widespread and very serious, and with Chinese "characteristics." The research of the behavior of the major shareholders embezzling listed companies’ fund has become a more popular topic in recent years. Based on previous studies, combined with the 27th document which issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2008, the paper studied the effect of the policy and the market reaction, while made research on the influence of controlling shareholder’s embezzlement to the earnings quality of listed companies. Firstly, the paper introduces the background of related research, elaborated relevant research results about controlling shareholder's embezzlement and earnings quality(including earnings management and information content of earnings), on the basis of that and according to the existing literature and theoretical analysis derived the paper’s hypothesis. Then using other receivables as a proportion of total assets as an alternative variables of large shareholder embezzlement, and using discretionary accruals and value relevance of earnings as an alternative variables of earnings quality, then choose two samples from all listed corporations at Shenzhen and shanghai stock exchange in 2007 and 2008, one sample which fund was severely occupied by large shareholder, and the other sample which fund was litter occupied. According to the descriptive statistics, it found that the 27th document which was issued in 2008 had a good effect of inhibiting controlling shareholder embezzlement, and the capital market gave a good response. According to the empirical test, it found that controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of listed company’s funds had a severely influence on earnings management，and the more listed company’s funds were embezzled by controlling shareholder, the more severely the listed company’s earnings were managed which lowered earnings quality of listed company. It didn’t found the relationship between large shareholder embezzlement and information content of earnings. However, due to the implementation of the policy, it decreased the behavior of controlling shareholder embezzlement of listed company’s funds, which lowered the earnings management of listed company. It had a good effect on increase the earnings quality of listed company.
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