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论文编号：	3213
作者编号：	2120092438
上传时间：	2011/6/4 20:49:10
中文题目：	董事会特征与公司绩效的关系研究——基于CEO权力的调节效应分析
英文题目：	The Relationship between Borad and Firm Performance——Based on the Morderating Effect of CEO Power
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	CEO权力 董事会特征 公司绩效
英文关键字：	CEO Power Board Firm Performance
中文摘要：	随着企业发展的需要，公司所有权与控制权逐渐分离，所有权与经营权的分离使得企业内出现了企业所有者和管理者之间的契约关系，企业所有者授权管理者经营管理企业，但是由于管理者总是为自身利益考虑的本质，使得管理者在经营过程中极有可能为谋取自身利益而牺牲公司利益。为了有效监督管理者，董事会这一机构便应运而生。董事会的职能主要是为公司制定长远战略目标、监督管理者的行为。理论上来说，董事会的存在是为了使公司有更好的绩效，但现实生活中，不同公司的董事会起到的作用不尽相同，究竟董事会对公司绩效有怎样的影响，什么影响了董事会与公司绩效的关系，CEO权力究竟是否会对董事会与公司绩效的关系产生影响。这是本文要研究的主要内容。 在对相关理论进行梳理的基础上，本文选取中国深市与上市公司2005年——2009年的数据为样本，采用实证研究的方法验证董事会对公司绩效的影响，以及在CEO权力的影响下，董事会与公司绩效的关系会受到怎样的影响。本文首先对董事会特征与公司绩效间的关系进行了分组检验；然后，又在模型中加入CEO权力与董事会特征的交叉变量，以考察在CEO权力的影响下，董事会特征与公司绩效间的关系是否有变化。 研究结果表明，在全样本下，董事会规模、董事会持股比例与公司绩效均呈现显著负相关关系，独立董事比例、董事会会议次数以及董事薪酬与公司绩效均呈现显著正相关关系。以两职兼任和CEO薪酬衡量CEO权力时，在CEO权力较强的公司，独立董事比例、董事会会议次数、董事薪酬与公司绩效间的正向关系更加明显，此外，虽然以两职衡量CEO权力时，CEO权力对董事会规模与公司绩效间关系没有显著影响，但是以董事薪酬衡量CEO权力时，实证结果表明董事会规模与公司绩效间的负相关关系减弱；以CEO持股衡量CEO权力时，在CEO权力较强的公司，独立董事比例、董事会会议次数、董事薪酬与公司绩效间的正向关系减弱，董事会规模与公司绩效间的负向关系更加明显；无论以何种变量衡量CEO权力，CEO权力大小对董事会持股与公司绩效间关系均没有影响。
英文摘要：	As the development of corporate, the owner and the manager are no longer the same person, which makes the emergence of the contract between the owner and the manager. The owner authorizes the manager to operate corporate. But according to the agency theory, agents are assumed to be self-interested and to possess goals that diverge from the shareholders. Besides, they will engage in self-serving actions at shareholders' expense when given an opportunity. As a result, the task of furnishing adequate incentives and monitoring managers falls first to the board which is thought to help protect shareholders from managers’ self-serving behaviors. Most people hope the board makes the corporate better performance. In fact, different boards in different firms have different effects. How does the board influence the firm performance? What influences the relationship between the board and firm performance? Is it true that the CEO power can influence the relationship between the board and firm performance? We will discuss these in the following. Based on the relative theories, using the data of China listed companies through the 5 years from 2005 to 2009, this thesis empirically tests the relationship between the board and firm performance and the moderating effect of CEO power. Firstly, we divide the complete samples into two parts according to the CEO power，and contract the different relationships between the board and firm performance in different groups. Then we use 6 models which are added cross-variable to analyze the effect of CEO power. The results prove that in the complete samples the board size is negatively associated with the firm performance. The ratio of independent directors is positively associated with the firm performance, so do the number of board meeting and the wage of director. When the CEO power is measured by the dual position of CEO and board chairman and by the wage of CEO, in the corporate which has a powerful CEO, the ratio of independent directors is more positively associated with the firm performance, so do the number of board meeting and the wage of director. What’s more, when measured by the dual position of CEO and board chairman, CEO power does not influence the relationship between the board and firm performance, but when measured by the wage of CEO, a powerful CEO can mitigate the negative relationship between the board and firm performance. At the same time, when measured by the share of CEO, in the corporate which has a powerful CEO, the ratio of independent directors is less positively associated with the firm performance, so do the number of board meeting and the wage of director, while the board size is more negatively associated with the firm performance. No matter how to measure the CEO power, it doesn’t influence the relationship between the share of board and the firm performance.
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