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论文编号：	3184
作者编号：	2120092289
上传时间：	2011/6/3 14:20:09
中文题目：	C2C电子商务交易信用评价模型设计—以淘宝为例
英文题目：	The design of reputation rating model for C2C e-commerce transaction –with the case of the platform of Taobao
指导老师：	张建勇
中文关键字：	C2C电子商务 信用评价 客观度 非互评机制
英文关键字：	C2C e-commerce reputation rating objectivity non-mutual rating mechanism
中文摘要：	由于C2C电子商务长期存在信用管理上的不到位现象，交易的参与者和社会对C2C电子商务交易诟病不已。在淘宝等C2C电子商务平台逐步将战略中心调整为B2C的背景下，C2C电子商务的发展到了生死攸关的时刻。并不是C2C模式的供求出现了问题，而是C2C模式的信任模式造成了市场的混乱。本文结合对已有文献的研究，重点以淘宝信用评价机制为例，分析了现行信用系统存在的缺陷，构建一种改进的信用评价模型，并结合算例模拟了模型的运作、分析其运作效果。模拟结果证明本文提出的模型能够识别恶意评价、信用欺诈等不诚信行为，并部分修正不客观评价对于卖家的信用损害或夸大的影响。模型具有激励双方诚信交易的效果。 本文的创新性体现在：首次提出双方互评机制的有效性问题。以往的研究基本都是关注对于卖方评价的有效性，很少有研究探讨互评机制对于买方是否具有同样的约束力。本文建立模型验证了实际交易中卖家的信用会约束其交易行为，所以卖家会在意信用；而卖家并不拒绝买家导致买家并不关心自己的信用的现象。本文提出的非互评信用评价机制具有创新意义。采取买家评价卖家、平台评价买家的评价形式，使得买家的评价能够约束卖家交易行为的同时实现自我约束。本文首次引入客观度因子。本文定义了客观度并构建了其求解过程。客观度在本文提出的模型中占有重要意义：客观度修正了买家评分，使得卖家的信用得以接近客观真实评价；同时，客观度构成了买家的信用，激励买家追逐信用。客观度的引入使信用模型具有自动调节功能，减少偏低评价带来的损失和偏高评价引起的夸大，并使恶评行为对卖家的影响接近于零。
英文摘要：	As the development of e-business, there are more and more complains from participants. Recently, taobao.com is adjusting the strategy from C2C to B2C. It’s the really critical time for the development of C2C in China. However, the decreasing demand from consumers is not the reason for the decline of C2C, but the lack of trust is. On the base of prior researches, this paper takes the case of Taobao’s reputation mechanism to analyze its defects and give an effective solution by setting up a new reputation model. In order to test the effectiveness of this new proposed model, the author does a simulation with the data from 30 deals. The result of simulation proves that the new model can adjust the error between the buyer’s evaluation and the real one automatically and effectively and distinguish dishonest action in the trade, thus stimulate buyers and sellers to deal truthfully. This paper mainly has two significant innovations. First, it is the first paper to study effectiveness of the mutual scoring mechanism. The prior literatures always pay attention to the effectiveness of part of reputation system for rating sellers’ reputation, but few mention the effectiveness of part of reputation system for rating buyer’s reputation. By building the mathematical model, this paper validates the phenomenon that buyer’s feedback can restrict seller’s malicious action, but buyer does not care about the feedback from seller. So I design a new reputation model called as “non-mutual rating mechanism”. In the new model, a buyer rates a seller to restrict not only seller’s malicious action, but also his own action at the same time. Secondly, this paper firstly introduces a factor named “objectivity”. I define this factor and design a calculating structure for its measurement. This factor is the key component for calculating buyer’s reputation. Moreover, it can modify buyer’s feedback in order to access to the real level that is very important for this research.
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