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论文编号：	29
作者编号：	2120051894
上传时间：	2007/6/20 22:47:51
中文题目：	基于代理成本理论的审计质量研究
英文题目：	Audit quality research based o
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	代理成本;审计质量;审计风险溢价
英文关键字：	Agency Cost;Audit Quality;Audi
中文摘要：	随着我国证券市场的发展，上市公司的审计质量和代理成本问题，均已成为我国理论界、实务界和政府监管部门所关注的重大课题。委托代理关系中产生的代理成本与注册会计师审计质量是否存在某种相关性，是本文研究的重点问题。本文一方面研究了代理成本的替代变量，并根据资金的供求关系，细化了代理成本的构成；另一方面研究了委托代理关系中形成的代理成本对审计质量的影响以及如何影响的问题，为监管部门深入了了解审计质量的影响因素提供帮助。因此，本文对于完善代理成本衡量标准和研究审计质量的影响因素，都具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。 本文利用规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法，从多个视角研究了我国上市公司代理成本和审计质量的关系，通过选取2003～2005年度沪、深两市3417家上市公司样本，并对研究假设进行了检验，得出如下重要结论：（1）企业总体代理成本和审计质量呈倒U型的关系；（2）前十大股东存在关联将降低注册会计师的审计质量，保持独立董事工作地点和公司注册地的一致，有利于发挥独立董事的知情权，更好地了解上市公司，监督其经营运作和财务状况。 在分析结果的基础上，本文得到三点启示：首先，完善我国企业的外部法制环境；其次，推进上市公司高管人员的股权激励计划；最后，采取多种形式减持国有股，降低股权集中度。
英文摘要：	With the development of security market in our country, audit quality and agency cost problems of the listed companies are important projects that theory field, practical field and supervising departments pay attention to. The point of this paper lies in that whether or not agency cost and audit quality have some relations. On the one hand, this paper studies substitute variable of agency cost. According to supply and demand relation of funds, this paper fractionize the constitutive character of agency cost. On the other hand, this paper studies how agency cost have an impact to audit quality. These researches will help supervising departments understand the impacts of audit quality more deeply, Consequently this paper have a academic and practical significance to perfect the metric standard of agency cost and study the influence of audit quality. This paper uses the normative and positive meanings and study the relations between audit quality and agency cost from different angles by filtrating 3417 swatches from 2003 to 2005. It makes some conclusion as follows: (1) The relationship between agency cost and audit quality present is not a simple linear pattern but can be either an Inverted —U curve. (2) It was found that the existence of related parities in top ten shareholders of Chinese listed companies significantly reduce audit quality of registered accountants. The consistency between the working place of outside directors and registered place of listed companies improve the right to know of outside directors, which make outside directors understand the situation of listed companies further and supervise operation and finance of listed companies. On this basis, this paper receives three revelations. Firstly, perfect exterior environment of legal system in our country. Secondly, advance stock Incentive plan of management in listed companies. At last, reduce State-owned Share taking manifold forms and decrease the concentration of stockholders equity.
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