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论文编号：	2898
作者编号：	1120060716
上传时间：	2011/1/13 20:31:44
中文题目：	中国上市公司利益相关者治理评价与实证研究
英文题目：	Research on Evaluation and Evidence of Stakeholder Governance of Chinese Listed Companies
指导老师：	程秀生 李维安
中文关键字：	利益相关者治理；财务绩效；董事会特征；股权结构
英文关键字：	Stakeholder governance; financial performance; characteristics of boards of directors; ownership structure
中文摘要：	20世纪80年代之前，企业的经营宗旨是股东利益最大化，公司治理研究的问题主要是围绕如何建立合理的激励约束机制，将代理人的道德风险问题降至最低限度，最终达到公司利润最大化。但是随着公司治理和企业社会责任理论与实践的不断发展，利益相关者治理研究也得到了极大的丰富。目前企业的经营者要充分关注股东、债权人、雇员、顾客等利益相关者的权益，公司治理也转变为利益相关者的“共同治理”模式。李维安指出，所谓公司治理是指，通过一套包括正式或非正式的、内部或外部的制度或机制来协调公司与所有利益相关者之间的利益关系，以保证公司决策的科学化，从而最终维护公司各方面利益的一种制度安排。公司治理的主体不仅局限于股东，而是包括股东、债权人、雇员、顾客、供应商、政府、社区等在内的广大公司利益相关者。可见，利益相关者治理问题已成为管理者与学者必须关注的问题。目前我国公司治理正处于行政型治理向经济型治理的转型阶段，在这种转型经济条件下，如何加强利益相关者治理问题显得尤为重要。 本文的研究目标包括：（1）衡量我国上市公司利益相关者治理水平；（2）从公司治理的角度检验利益相关者治理的影响因素；（3）探索中国上市公司与利益相关者之间的利益均衡关系；（4）为加强我国上市公司利益相关者治理提出可行性建议。本文研究的创新如下：（1）建立适合我国转型经济条件下的利益相关者治理评价体系。目前我国公司治理正由行政型治理向经济型治理转变，新的治理问题不断出现，现有的利益相关者治理评价指标体系不足以清楚地反映利益相关者治理状况，所以本文从利益相关者治理机制入手，建立了更为完善的利益相关者治理评价体系。（2）深化了公司利益相关者制衡机制的理论研究。利益相关者治理研究不但要突出对利益相关者权益的保护，同时还要关注各利益方之间的制衡关系。本文应用公司治理研究的理论成果，完善了公司与利益相关者之间的利益制衡机制的理论研究，从而为进一步研究适合中国上市公司的治理模式和治理机制奠定了基础。（3）在实证研究的设计中，本文从公司治理的角度提出影响利益相关者治理水平的因素，并对此进行实证检验。以往的学者对利益相关者治理的研究主要集中在利益相关者与公司财务绩效的关系方面，本文除此之外，还从股权集中度、股权制衡度等股权结构和独立董事比例、战略委员会的设置等董事会特征的角度对利益相关者治理进行实证研究，得到相应的结论。 本文以中国上市公司为研究对象，对上市公司利益相关者治理状况进行研究，在相关文献回顾和理论分析基础上，综合运用了理论归纳与规范分析、描述性统计与实证检验的方法和内容分析法。本文研究框架如下：第一章是绪论，该章阐述了本文的研究背景和研究意义，对相关概念进行界定，并提出研究方法、技术路线与内容安排、研究目标与创新之处；第二章是文献回顾，该章从利益相关者的内涵、利益相关者治理的兴起与发展，利益相关者治理与公司治理的关系三个方面对国内外的主要研究成果进行梳理和评述，为后续的利益相关者治理评价体系的构建及实证研究设计提供了理论基础；第三章是中国上市公司利益相关者治理的环境分析，包括经济体制环境、法制环境和监管环境，通过对利益相关者治理环境分析，有利于建立适合我国转型经济条件下的利益相关者治理评价体系；第四章是中国上市公司利益相关者治理评价研究，主要包括利益相关者治理机制与模式、利益相关者治理评价系统的建立和中国上市公司利益相关者治理状况的描述性统计分析；第五章是中国上市公司利益相关者治理的实证研究，该章主要实证检验了利益相关者治理水平对财务绩效的影响，并从董事会特征、股权结构两个方面研究公司治理因素对利益相关者治理水平的影响；最后一章是研究结论与展望，本章主要对以上章节进行总结，提出有助于提高我国上市公司利益相关者治理水平的建议；另外，本章还提出了后续研究展望和本研究存在的不足。 通过对中国上市公司利益相关者治理评价与实证研究，本文得到以下主要结论：（1）总体来说，中国上市公司利益相关者治理指数偏低，大多数上市公司利益相关者治理机制较为薄弱，有待进一步完善；（2）利益相关者治理水平对公司财务绩效有显著的正向影响，这表明良好的利益相关者治理机制有助于财务绩效的改善，有利于公司的长期可持续发展；（3）从利益相关者治理水平与董事会特征的实证结果来看，战略委员会的设置对利益相关者治理水平有显著的正向影响，这说明战略委员会的设置有助于公司制定战略时充分考虑利益相关者的权益，并且督促上市公司社会责任的履行，提高利益相关者治理水平；（4）从利益相关者治理水平与股权结构的实证结果来看，国有控股上市公司利益相关者治理的平均值显著好于民营控股上市公司；利益相关者治理指数与股权集中度显著呈“倒U”形关系，说明股权的适度集中有利于利益相关者治理；股权制衡度对利益相关者治理指数的回归结果显示，股权制衡度越强，越能防止控股股东利用其自身控制权优势侵害中小股东等利益相关者的权益，利益相关者治理水平越高。 结合上述结论，本文提出以下建议：（1）针对目前我国上市公司利益相关者治理水平低下，本文提出应通过提高利益相关者参与程度，注重环保等来加强和完善利益相关者治理机制；（2）针对利益相关者治理水平与董事会特征的实证结果，本文提出上市公司可以通过设立战略委员会等董事会专门委员会，来监督公司的战略与决策是否兼顾到利益相关者权益等问题；同时通过加强董事会建设，可以实现上市公司的自主治理机制，保证公司与利益相关者的和谐发展，最终提高公司财务绩效；（3）针对利益相关者治理水平与股权结构的实证结果，本文提出对于控股股东持股比例较大的上市公司，应当通过调整股权结构，使股权适度集中，并且对控股股东进行有效地制衡，以此提高利益相关者治理水平；（4）针对目前我国公司治理所处的转型经济条件，本文提出要健全利益相关者治理的法律法规，并制订可执行的法律法规，引导上市公司加强利益相关者治理。
英文摘要：	Before the 1980s, the purpose of companies is to maximize the interests of shareholders. The research of corporate governance mainly focuses on how to create a reasonable incentive and restraint mechanisms to minimize the moral risk of agents and ultimately achieve the greatest value of the companies. However, with the continued development of the theory and practice of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility，the research of stakeholder has also been greatly enriched. At present, the managers of companies should give full attention to the interests of stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, employees, customers and so on. Corporate governance has changed into the “common governance” of stakeholders. Li Wei’An pointed out, the so-called corporate governance refers to a kind of system arrangement that coordinate the relationship between the companies and all stakeholders through a formal or informal, an internal or external system or mechanism in order to ensure the company’s scientific decision-making and ultimately safeguard the interests of all stakeholders. The main participants of corporate governance are not confined to the shareholders, but stakeholders including shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, Government, communities and so on. It can be seen that stakeholder governance has become the topic that managers and scholars must concern about. Currently, the model of corporate governance in China is on the stage of transition from administrative governance to economic governance. Under the transitional economic condition, it is very important to consider how to strengthen stakeholder governance. The research objectives of the paper include: Firstly, measuring the level of stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies; secondly, testing the factors that influence stakeholder governance from the perspectives of corporate governance; thirdly, exploring the equilibrium relationship of interest between Chinese listed companies and stakeholders; lastly, making feasible suggestions for strengthening stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies. The innovations of the paper are as follows: firstly, the evaluation system of stakeholder governance adapt to transitional economic condition is established. At present, the mode of corporate governance is transiting from administrative governance to economic governance in China. The existing evaluation system can not clearly reflect the status of stakeholder governance. In this paper, I established a more comprehensive evaluation system of stakeholder governance based on stakeholder governance mechanism. Secondly, this paper deepens the theoretical study of mechanism of stakeholders’ checks and balances. Stakeholder governance not only highlights protection for the rights of stakeholders, but also is concerned about the trade-off relationships among stakeholders. The mechanism of stakeholders’ checks and balances is improved by use of the study of corporate governance theories. And this will lay the foundation for the further study of governance model and governance mechanisms adapt to Chinese listed companies. Lastly, in the design of empirical research, this paper proposes the impact factors that influence the level of stakeholder governance from the perspectives of corporate governance and test them. The previous empirical study focuses on the relationship between the level of stakeholder governance and the companies’ financial performance. In this paper, the empirical research on stakeholder governance is made from the perspectives of characteristics of boards of directors and ownership structure to obtain the corresponding results based on the previous study. And the indicators of ownership structure include the degree of ownership concentration, the degree of blockholders counterbalance and so on. The characteristics of boards of directors include the proportion of independent directors, the situation of setting up Strategy Committee and so on. The paper takes Chinese listed companies as the research object. The situation of stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies is studied based on the related literature review and theoretical analysis, using theory induction and normative analysis, descriptive statistics and empirical test methods, as well as the method of content analysis. The framework of this paper is as follows: Chapter Ⅰ is the introduction. This chapter introduces the background and significance of the paper, the definitions of related concepts, research methods, technical routes, content arrangement, research objectives and the innovations. Chapter Ⅱ is the literature review. This chapter includes the implications of stakeholders, the emergence and development of stakeholder governance, the relationship between stakeholder governance and corporate governance. It provides a theoretical basis for the construction of evaluation system for stakeholder governance and design of empirical research. Chapter Ⅲ analyses the environment of stakeholder governance for Chinese listed companies, including economic environment, legal environment and regulatory environment. The analysis of the stakeholder environment helps establish of the evaluation system of stakeholder governance suitable for the transitional economic condition in China. Chapter IV is the research on the evaluation of stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies, mainly including the mechanisms and models of stakeholder governance, stakeholder evaluation system and the descriptive statistical analysis of stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies. Chapter V is the empirical research on stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies. This chapter empirically tests the relationship between the level of stakeholder governance and financial performance. At the same time, the impacts on the level of stakeholder governance are analyzed from the perspectives of corporate governance including ownership structure and the characteristics of boards of directors. The last chapter is the conclusions and prospects of the research. Based on the summary of the above chapters, conclusions and suggestions that help improve stakeholder governance are made. The research prospects and the deficiencies of the research are proposed as well. Through evaluation and empirical research on stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies, the main conclusions are as following: Firstly, overall, the stakeholder governance index of Chinese listed companies is low. The stakeholder governance mechanisms of listed companies are relatively weak and need to be improved. Secondly, stakeholder governance index has a significantly positive impact on corporate financial performance, indicating that good stakeholder governance mechanisms help listed companies improve the financial performance and be good for long-term sustainable development of the companies. Thirdly, it can be seen from the empirical results of the relationship between the level of stakeholder and characteristics of boards of directors that setting up Strategy Committee has a significantly positive impact on stakeholder governance index. It shows that the setting up the Strategy Committee will help the companies take full account of the interests of stakeholders when the strategies are developed. And the Strategy Committee would supervise listed companies to fulfill social responsibility and enhance stakeholder governance. Lastly, it can be seen from the empirical results of the relationship between the level of stakeholder and ownership structure that the average of stakeholder governance index of the state-holding listed companies are significantly higher than the private holding listed companies. There is significantly “inverted U-shaped” relationship between stakeholder governance index and the degree of ownership concentration, indicating that moderate concentration of equity is good for stakeholder governance. The regression result between the degree of blockholders counterbalance and stakeholder governance index shows that the stronger degree that the outside blockholders counterbalance controlling shareholders, the more it can prevent the controlling shareholders to damage the interests of stakeholders and the higher the level of stakeholder governance is. According to the above conclusions, the following suggestions are proposed: Firstly, as to the low level of stakeholder governance of Chinese listed companies, suggestions are proposed in the paper that the listed companies should strengthen and improve the mechanism of stakeholder by increasing the participation of stakeholders, focusing on environmental protection and so on. Secondly, as to the empirical results that setting up Strategy Committee is significantly positively associated with stakeholder governance index, the listed companies should set up board committees, such as Strategy Committee and so on, to supervise whether the companies’ strategies and decision-making have taken into account issues such as stakeholder interests. At the same time, the listed companies can achieve self-governance mechanisms by strengthening the power of boards of direcors to ensure the harmonious development with stakeholders and ultimately improve the companies’ financial performance. Thirdly, as to the empirical result related to ownership structure, suggestions are proposed that the listed companies with larger proportion of controlling shareholders should adjust the ownership structure in order to realize an appropriate concentration of equity and the effective checks and balances to the controlling shareholders. This will help improve the level of stakeholder governance. Lastly, as to transitional economic condition, the laws and regulations related to stakeholder governance should be improved and enforceable laws and regulations should be formulated to lead companies to strengthen stakeholder governance.
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