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论文编号：	2882
作者编号：	1120070705
上传时间：	2010/12/15 9:59:38
中文题目：	审计人员谈判咨询、客户知识与审计谈判判断
英文题目：	Auditor Negotiation Consulting,Client Negotiation Knowledge and Audit Negotiation Judgment
指导老师：	张继勋
中文关键字：	审计谈判 审计人员谈判咨询 客户谈判知识 谈判判断
英文关键字：	Audit negotiation；Auditor negotiation consulting；Client negotiation knowledge；Negotiation judgment
中文摘要：	审计谈判是影响审计质量和资本市场会计信息质量的重要因素，审计谈判研究无论对促进和改善审计谈判结果还是对丰富和发展审计谈判理论都具有重要意义。本文以心理学领域的信息加工理论和学习理论为基础，采用实验的研究方法检验了审计人员谈判咨询和客户谈判知识两个因素对审计人员谈判判断的影响。 本文共分六章。第一章为绪论；第二章为文献回顾，分别回顾心理学和审计领域中的谈判研究，在对总体审计谈判研究和审计中咨询、知识相关研究文献评述的基础上提出了本文的研究问题；第三章运用信息加工理论、学习理论以及咨询、知识与谈判力的关系等分析了审计人员谈判咨询、客户谈判知识对审计人员谈判判断的影响，提出了研究假设；第四章介绍了本研究的实验设计方案；第五章对实验所得数据进行了统计分析，检验了研究假设；第六章是本文的结论，总结了全文的研究结论、局限性及未来的研究方向。 本文的主要结论包括： 1．理论分析表明，在审计谈判过程中，谈判经验丰富的合伙人或经理对谈判的审计人员提供咨询支持，会提高审计人员的谈判力，进而影响审计人员的谈判判断；同时，审计谈判是审计人员和客户双方讨价还价的博弈过程，根据根据知识和专长等理论，作为谈判另一方的客户拥有谈判知识的水平会影响审计人员的谈判判断。 2．实验结果表明，审计谈判中，在审计人员能够获得来自于其所在的会计师事务所内部经验丰富的人员的谈判咨询支持情况下，审计人员确定的最终要求客户记录的存货减值补提金额比较高、立场改变金额比较小、确定最小可接受的存货减值补提金额比较高，即谈判的最终结果有利于审计人员。 3．实验结果表明，审计谈判中，在谈判另一方客户财务主管拥有较多谈判经验或知识多的情况下，审计人员确定的最终要求客户记录的存货减值补提金额比较低、立场改变金额比较大、确定的最小可接受的存货减值补提金额比较低，即谈判的最终结果不利于审计人员。 4．实验结果表明，审计谈判中，在审计人员面对的是谈判知识较多客户财务主管的情况下，如果审计人员能够获得来自于其所在的会计师事务所内部经验丰富的人员的谈判咨询支持，使得审计人员的谈判力得以提高，审计人员确定的最终要求客户记录的存货减值补提金额比较高、立场改变金额比较小，确定的最小可接受的存货减值补提金额较高。 5．实验结果表明，审计人员在谈判中更倾向于使用较合作的谈判策略，这可能与审计人员要与客户保持良好的合作关系密切相关。
英文摘要：	Audite negotiations is an important factor whice influence audit quality and the quality of accounting information in the capital market,therefore audit negotiation research is important not only to improve audit quality but also to develop audit negotiation theory. This paper draw on information processing theory and learning theory in psychology ，and using experimental research methods examined the effect of auditor negotiation consulting and client’s negotiation knowledge on auditor’s negotiation judgment. The dissertation is deveded into six chapters.Chapter one gives an overall introduction；Chapter two is literature review of the negotiation research in psychology and auditing，and based on the comments on overall study of the audit negotiation and the relevant research literatures about consulting, knowledge in audit raised research questions of this paper. Chapter three draws on information processing theory, learning theory and the relationship between the consulting,the knowledge and bargaining power to develop the hypotheses about the effect of the auditor negotiation consulting and clent’s negotiation knowledge on auditor’s negotiation judgment； Chapter four describes the experimental design of this study；Chapter five analyses the data derived from experiment and test the research hypothesis；Chapter six concludes the conclusion of the dissertation ,summarizes the the conclusions of the study, limitations and future research directions. The major conclusions of the dissertation are as follows： 1. Theoretical analysis shows that the experienced partner or manager provide advice to support the auditor in the audit negotiation process, which will increase the bargaining power of the auditor, thereby affecting the negotiation judgments of the auditor ; at the same time, the audit negotiation is the process which the auditors and their clients both bargaining game process,according to the theories of the knowledge and experitse,as the other of bargaining negotiations,clients whose the level of negotiation knowledge will affict the auditor judgments. 2．Experimental results indicated when the auditors who can acquire negotiation consulting in the audit negotiation process, the auditors determine to require clients to record the final inventor writeup is relatively high,the relatively small change in the position and the relatively high the minimum acceptable amount of inventor writeup,that is the negotiation final outcome to be more favorable to the auditor. 3．Experimental results indicated when the other of the negotiation,client who have more negotiation experience or knowledge in the audit negotiation process, the auditors determine to require clients to record the final inventor writeup is relatively low, the relatively large amount change in the position and the relatively low the minimum acceptable amount of inventor writeup,that is the negotiation final outcome is unfavorable to the auditor. 4．The experimental results show when that auditor face financial officer whose negotiation knowledge is greater or more and the auditors can be supported from experienced staffs in his accounting firm which makes auditors’ bargaining power increased in the audit negotiation, the auditors determine to require clients to record the final inventor writeup is relatively high，the relatively small change in the position and the minimum acceptable amount of inventor writeup is higher. 5. The experimental results indicated that auditor is more inclined to use more cooperative negotiation strategy,which may be closely related with the auditor’s intention to maintain good cooperative relationship.and the auditor perceived that the client has a higher satisfaction for the final outcome and has a higher intention to keep the client in the next year.
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