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论文编号：	2650
作者编号：	2120082216
上传时间：	2010/6/21 14:41:12
中文题目：	家族上市公司家族董事与代理成本关系研究
英文题目：	The Research about the relationship between family Directors of listed family companies and agency costs
指导老师：	李亚
中文关键字：	家族企业，代理成本，利他主义，家族董事
英文关键字：	Family Firms，Agency Cost，Altruism，Family Dirtors
中文摘要：	从詹森和麦克林提出分散的社会股东和拥有控制权的职业经理人之间的委托代理问题以来，委托代理问题一直用于解释大型公众企业的代理问题，在与家族企业这种特殊的企业形式结合时，往往忽视了家族企业的特点。事实上，我国由于本国的家文化观念和本国的现实，我国的家族企业往往面临着家族内部的代理问题，即家族经理人与企业主之间的代理问题。家族内部治理又涉及“利他主义”、家长权威、业主权威等对于代理关系的不确定影响，但长期以来家族内部的代理问题都得不到重视。本文重点基于利他主义角度研究家族结构对于企业代理成本的影响以此为基础研究家族董事与代理成本的关系。 本文以家族企业与非家族企业的差异为前提，构建利他主义与代理问题的分析框架，并研究不同的家族结构的代理问题。将理论分析与中国家族企业的具体实践相结合，以家族上市公司为分析对象，分析家族董事、家族结构对企业代理成本造成的影响，实证检验家族董事、家族结构和企业代理成本之间的关系，并附于案例来验证。 本文主要的创新性工作体现在以下四个方面:第一，深入分析家族内部委托代理问题。长期以来，主流代理理论忽略了家族内部存在的代理问题，本文在前人研究的基础上结合利他主义的研究成果，分析家族企业所有者与其子女（继承人）之间、家族董事与其他家族成员间之间的利他主义、对代理成本的影响，补充和完善了家族企业代理问题分析框架。第二，初步探讨了家族结构对企业代理成本的影响。本文通过实证检验发现，有第二代家族董事的企业的代理成本更低，且第二代家族董事的任职时间越长，企业的代理成本越低。第三，检验了家族影响与家族企业代理成本之间的关系。家族影响是家族企业区别于其他组织形式的重要特征，但如何对其量化一直是难点问题。本文尝试通过设置家族董事与第二代家族董事两个方面的变量，来揭示家族影响与企业代理成本之间的相关关系，并选用了2008年家族上市公司的财务数据和公司治理数据进行了实证检验。
英文摘要：	After Johnson and McLean introduce the principal-agent theory which between the dispersed shareholders and the professional managers who have control position . The agency problems have been used to explain the agency problem which exist in the large public enterprises.When it come to the family business ,they often ignore the characteristics of family businesses. In fact, for our own cultural values and the reality of our family business, there are agency problems within the family, that the agency problem between family managers and business owners .Governance within the family concerning the uncertain effects of "altruism", parental authority, the effect of founder for the agency relationship, but the agency problems within the family got very little attention for a long time. This article focuses on the study of the effect of family directors and agency costs which basic on the study of the effect of family structure for the enterprise agency cost from the perspective of altruism. The paper was based on the differences between family businesses and non-family businesses,build the analytical framework of altruism and agency problems and general analysis different agency problems of different family structures, combine the theoretical analysis with the concrete practice of Chinese family business,analysis the impact of family directors on agency costs in the listed family business ,empirical test the relationship between family directors and agency costs,and combined with the analysis of two cases. The innovative work in this paper is in the following four aspects: first, in-depth analysis the agent problems within the family. Over the years, mainstream agency theory ignores the agency problems that exist within the family, this paper based on research results of previous studies in altruism , analysis the impact of the altruism between family business owners and their children (heirs), the family directors and other family members on agency costs, supplement and perfect the Family Business Analysis Framework. Second, a preliminary study of the relationship between the family structure and the agency cost. This paper empirically tests revealed that the family enterprises which have second-generation directors have lower agency costs, and the second generation directors working longer, the lower agency costs . Third, test relations between the impact of family and the agency costs. The family impact of family business is an important feature different from other organizational forms , but how to quantify it has been a difficult problem. This article attempts to set the family directors and the second generation directors as the family variables, to reveal relationship between the impact of family and agency costs and use the 2008 financial data of listed family businesses and corporate governance data,to do empirical test.
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