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论文编号：	2635
作者编号：	2120082211
上传时间：	2010/6/17 17:33:05
中文题目：	政府干预高管薪酬契约与公司绩效
英文题目：	Government Intervention、Executive Compensation Contract and Corporate Performance
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	政府干预;货币薪酬;在职消费;公司绩效
英文关键字：	Government intervention;Monetary reward;Perquisite consumption; Corporate performance
中文摘要：	在我国经济转型的特殊制度背景下，薄弱的法律环境使得政府干预成为我国国家作为第三方介入高管薪酬契约实施的重要机制。政府干预一方面有助于抑制契约双方的各种机会主义行为，保证高管薪酬契约的实施；另一方面，由于政府干预机制本身存在刚性和滞后等特性，强化后的政府干预效应可能会进一步外溢，进而形成一系列的隐性薪酬契约。其中，在职消费是隐性薪酬契约的主要实现形式。而目前，学术界有关高管薪酬契约实施机制的研究主要仍集中于私人实施机制领域，关于政府干预对高管薪酬契约构成及其效率的实证研究相对较少。 基于上述现实的存在，本文选取沪深两市2003-2006年期间总计1819个样本为研究对象，选取樊纲、王小鲁等编制“中国各地区市场化进程相对指数”中“减少政府对企业的干预”指数，来量化全国31个省市的政府干预程度，将高管薪酬契约中显性薪酬与隐性薪酬关系作为切入点，从政府干预对高管在职消费与货币薪酬的关系的影响和政府干预下高管薪酬契约效率两个方面，对政府干预影响高管薪酬契约的传导机制和相应结果进行了专门研究。为了进一步考察政府干预效应在不同股权性质下的可能差异，我们按照股权性质是否为国有控股，将全样本划分为国有样本和非国有样本进行对比分析。 基于上述研究，本文发现：一是在国有控股上市公司，在职消费与货币薪酬显著负相关，为替代关系；在非国有控股上市公司，二者显著正相关，为互补关系。二是在国有控股上市公司，政府干预会正向强化在职消费与货币薪酬的替代关系；而在非国有控股上市公司，政府干预对二者的互补关系的影响并不显著。三是在国有控股上市公司，货币薪酬与公司绩效正相关，但并不显著，在职消费与公司绩效显著负向相关；且政府干预既会削弱货币薪酬与公司绩效正向关系，也会削弱在职消费与公司绩效的负向关系。
英文摘要：	In the particular context of China’s economic transformation, our weak legal environment enables government intervention as one important mechanism of our country, which uses them to ensure the implementation of executive compensation contract. On the one hand, government intervention mechanism plays an important role in restraining the implementation of various opportunisms,which is helpful to ensure the implementation of executive compensation contract. On the other hand, based on its inherent rigidity, reinforced government intervention may also cause some spillover effects, thus forms a series of implicit compensation contracts, thereinto， perquisite consumption is one of the most important realization ways. Meanwhile，at present, studies on the implementation mechanisms of executive compensation contract mainly focus on the private implementation mechanism in academic circles, studies on the influence of government intervention on the composition and efficiency of executive compensation contract are still relatively weak. Based on the reality above, using 1819 samples of China listed companies during the period 2003-2006, the essay chooses “Reduction of Government Intervention on Enterprises” in the “Marketization Index for China’s Provinces”, which is compiled by Fan Gang et al., to quantify the government intervention of different districts in our country, and we take the relationship between monetary reward and perquisite consumption as the breakthrough point, through exploring the influence of government intervention on the composition and efficiency of executive compensation contract, we specialize on the transmission mechanism and corresponding results of government intervention effects. In order to explore the differences between different ownership property further, according to the different ownership property, we divide the complete samples into two parts, which are stated-owned samples and non-state-owned samples, and contrast tests are made between them. Based on the study above, the essay finds: First, significant negative correlation is observed between perquisite consumption and monetary compensation in the state holding listed companies, there exists substitution relation between them; and significant positive correlation is observed between perquisite consumption and monetary compensation in non-state holding listed companies, there exists complementary relation between them. Second, in the state holding listed companies, reinforced government intervention may strengthen the relationship between monetary compensation and perquisite consumption; in non-state holding listed companies, the influence of government intervention on the relationship between them is not significant. Third, in the state holding listed companies, monetary compensation is positively correlated with corporate performance,but the relationship between them is not significant, perquisite consumption is marked negative correlated with corporate performance; and government intervention may not only weaken the positive relationship between monetary compensation and corporate performance, but also it may weaken the negative relationship between perquisite consumption and corporate performance.
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