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论文编号:2620 
作者编号:2120082068 
上传时间:2010/6/15 10:30:45 
中文题目:基于代理成本理论的企业社会责任信息披露动因研究  
英文题目:Motives of Corporate Social Responsibility Informaiton Disclosure Based on Agency Cost Thory  
指导老师:李姝 
中文关键字:企业社会责任 信息披露 代理成本 实证研究 
英文关键字: Corporate Social Responsibility Information Disclosure Agency Cost Empirical Study 
中文摘要: 随着构建社会主义和谐社会这一重大战略思想慢慢深入人心,社会各界对企业要承担的社会责任也开始关注起来。我国要构建和谐社会以及实现自然、经济和社会的可持续发展都离不开企业的参与。然而从当前企业披露社会责任信息的现状来看,不管是内容还是结构安排都差强人意,难以满足利益相关者的信息需求,不同企业一般披露动机也不同,从而可能会影响社会责任信息的披露水平和可靠性。所以,本文从代理成本角度出发,分析了企业社会责任信息披露动因,以期为规范企业社会责任信息披露提供一点建设性意见。 本文运用理论研究和实证分析相结合的方法研究了企业社会责任信息的披露动因。在相关理论基础部分,以企业契约理论为联系点,陈述了社会责任的相关理论和代理成本的相关理论,并且系统的分析了各理论视角的相关性;在研究设计及实证研究部分,首先结合相关理论提出了本文的研究假设,然后构建了企业社会责任信息披露指数以及选取了代理成本的替代变量,其次在描述性统计分析中,分析了我国企业社会责任信息的披露现状,最后利用多元回归分析方法,探索研究了企业为缓解代理冲突而加大披露社会责任信息的动机的可能性,从而能够挖掘企业披露社会责任信息更深层面的动因。 本文研究结果表明:我国发布社会责任报告的企业还比较少,企业社会责任信息的总体披露水平比较低,但呈逐年发展并不断提高的趋势;不同行业之间,企业的社会责任信息披露水平存在显著差异;代理成本大的公司,管理者披露社会责任信息的动机更强烈,代理成本具体可分为激励成本、监督成本和剩余损失,实证分析结果显示,这三者对社会责任信息的披露水平都有显著的影响,验证了本文的研究假设。依据理论分析以及实证结果,笔者最后提出了一些政策性建议以及本文研究局限性和未来研究方向。本文的主要贡献体现为:在代理成本的衡量上,依据代理成本的定义加入了多个公司治理结构变量作为代理成本的衡量指标,比较全面地反映了公司代理成本的大小;以代理理论为基础,实证的检验了代理成本对社会责任信息披露水平的影响,间接地证明了企业追求股东利益最大化与履行社会责任是互相促进而不是相互矛盾的。 
英文摘要: As the important strategic thinking of building a harmonious society gradually prevail among the people, all sections of society begin to pay attention to the social responsibility of enterprises. To build a harmonious society in China and achieve sustainable development of natural is closely related to the participation of enterprises. However, through the current disclosure level of social responsibility, we can find that the content and structure are not enough to meet the needs of stakeholders. The motivation of disclosure may affect disclosure level of social responsibility and reliability. Based on the agency cost theory, this paper studies the motivation of reporting corporate social responsibility information. I hope to offer a few constructive comments to regulate the disclosure of corporate social responsibility. This paper analyzes the motivation of the corporate social responsibility information’s disclosure, using the combination of the theoretical and empirical analysis as research methods. At the part of theoretic analysis, this paper states the related theory of social responsibility and related theory of agency cost, bonded with the enterprise contract theory, then systematically analyzes the relevance of these theories; at the part of research design and empirical analysis, firstly this paper proposes the hypothesis on the basis of theoretical analysis; secondly, designs corporate social disclosure index and selects the alternative variable of agency cost; thirdly, through descriptive statistics, analyzes the present disclosure situation of the corporate social responsibility information; finally, using multiple regression, this paper explores the possibility of the corporations which report social information motivated on relieving the conflict of interests, hopefully to find fundamental motivation of the corporate social responsibility information disclosure. Major results of this paper show that: the corporations that disclose social responsibility report are still few, and the overall disclosure level is still low, but the level improves from year to year; the disclosure level has extraordinary discrepancy between different industries. The more agency cost that corporations have, the more strong motivation that the managers disclose social responsibility. The agency cost involves incentive cost、monitoring cost and residual loss, the empirical results show that the agency cost has obvious influence on disclosure level of social responsibility, and the results test this paper’s hypothesis. Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical results, the author proposes some policy proposals、limitations of this paper and the future research path. The main contribution of this paper is: as far as agency cost is concerned, this paper adds in some corporate governance variables to measure agency cost, and this reflect the agency cost totally. Based on the agency theories, the empirical research tests the influence of agency cost on social responsibility disclosure, and tests that enterprises pursue maximization of shareholders’ interests and perform social responsibility promote each other.  
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