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论文编号：	2402
作者编号：	2120071936
上传时间：	2010/6/9 22:44:55
中文题目：	并购公告前内幕交易程度及其影响因素的实证研究
英文题目：	Pre-announcement Insider Trading Extent and Its Factors——An Empirical Research Based on M&A Events
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	内幕交易;经营复杂程度;股权集中度;并购相对规模
英文关键字：	Insider Trading;Operational Complexity;Ownership Concentration;Relative Size of M&A
中文摘要：	并购重组事件中的内幕交易，损害了并购本身带来的价值以及中小股东的利益。想要对内幕交易进行有效治理，需要做到全面的预防与监控。因此，本文着重于研究并购事件前目标企业的特征和行为动机，为提前预防内幕交易，加强监管提供可以辨别的指标。 本文采用2004-2007年公布的并购事件作为样本，通过事件研究法，对并购公告前内幕交易程度进行了实证研究。研究发现我国并购事件首次公告前存在股价异动，并且累计平均超额收益率在公告前13天即显著不为0，证实了内幕交易的存在。在此结论之上，本文以目标公司作为研究对象，分别研究了其经营复杂程度和股权集中度，以及并购相对规模大小对内幕交易程度的影响，并结合犯罪经济学理论，分析了高管人员行为动机对内幕交易程度的影响。研究发现：第一，目标公司经营程度越复杂，并购公告前内幕交易程度越高。这说明，经营复杂程度较高的公司，管理层的道德风险会加大，内幕交易的程度会有所增加。第二，目标公司股权集中度越高，并购公告前内幕交易程度越高。这说明较高的股权集中度造成的一股独大现象使得管理层受大股东控制，内部人有更大机会通过二级市场获利，攫取小股东利益。第三，并购相对规模越小，内幕交易的程度越大。这说明了，如果目标公司规模相对渺小，收购公司在和目标公司谈判中，因为拥有更多的谈判能力，使得目标公司的管理层因为无法获得满意的收购溢价而倾向于通过内幕交易获得补偿。第四，目标公司的政府层级越高，内幕交易的程度相对越小。这说明，在较高政府层级的上市公司中，管理者会考虑自己未来的晋升机会，以及社会声誉受损等因素，其从事内幕交易的行为动机会大大降低。
英文摘要：	Insider trading within M&A events undermines the merge value and interests of small shareholders. In order to effectively control insider trading, a comprehensive prevention and control system needs to be applied. Therefore, the paper focuses on the characteristics and motivations of target companies before the M&A events and tries to provide identifiable indicators to prevent insider trading and strengthen supervision. Based on the M&A events from 2004 to 2007, this paper investigates the insider trading activities before the announcement of M&A, and proves that the cumulative average abnormal return on the 13th day before the announcement day of M&A events is significantly different from 0. The result confirms statistically that insider trading activities before the announcement of M&A do exist in China’s stock market. This paper also discusses the factors that affect the extent of insider trading from the view of operational complexity, ownership concentration and the relative size of M&A of target companies. Besides, economic theory of crime is also considered in this research to analyze the motivation of senior management in target companies, which also affects the extent of insider trading. Finally, we found that, firstly, the more complex the operation, the more serious insider trading. This shows that as the complexity of operation increases, management’s moral hazard increase, thus the extent of insider trading increase. Second, the higher the degree of ownership concentration, the higher the extent of insider trading is. This shows that high ownership concentration due to the dominance phenomenon makes the management controlled by major shareholders, inducing the fact that insiders have more opportunities to grab the interests of minority shareholders. Third, the smaller the M&A relative size, the greater the extent of insider trading is. This shows that, if the target company has a relatively small size, it will be weak in the negotiation with bigger buyer and lose the acquisition premium, thus tend to seek the chance to be compensated through insider trading. Fourth, the higher government level the target company has, the smaller the extent of insider trading is. This shows that if a public company has higher governmental level, the senior managers will consider their future career prospects and social factors such as reputation. Therefore the motivation of doing insider trading will be greatly reduced.
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