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| 论文编号: | 2386 | |
| 作者编号: | 2120082154 | |
| 上传时间: | 2010/6/9 17:03:43 | |
| 中文题目: | 控制权对债务期限结构及公司价值的影响——中国国有上市公司的实证分析 | |
| 英文题目: | Control Right’s Effect on Debt Maturity Structure and Company Value: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Listed Companies | |
| 指导老师: | 张晓农 | |
| 中文关键字: | 国有上市公司;控制权和现金流权的偏离;债务期限结构;公司价值 | |
| 英文关键字: | State-owned Listed Company;Divergence between Control Right and Cash Flow Right;Debt Maturity Structure;Company Value | |
| 中文摘要: | 在具有“新兴”和“转轨”双重特点的中国证券市场上,作为主力军的中国国有上市公司掌握着国家的经济命脉,发挥着至关重要的作用,但是其本身的运作与管理存在着“一股独大”、政府干预、内部人控制等严重问题。自La Porta、Lopez-de-Silanes和Shleifer(1999)首次提出“最终控制人”的概念,学者开始从控制权、现金流权及其偏离的角度,结合中国国有上市公司的特点,研究中国国有上市公司终极控制人牺牲外部投资者(中小股东和债权人)的利益来追求自身利益最大化的问题。 债务期限结构作为融资决策的重要方面,是研究融资决策、解决上市公司终极控制人和债权人矛盾的关键问题。同时,在2005年4月,我国资本市场又拉开了股权分置改革的序幕,这对上市公司的资本结构、投资运营、公司治理以及公司价值都造成了较大的影响。 因此,本文在回顾总结国内外相关研究成果的基础上,从控制权与现金流权偏离的角度,研究中国国有上市公司的债务期限结构和公司价值,并且对比股权分置改革前后的变化,总结出改善融资决策和提升公司价值的建议。 本文采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,通过对476家中国国有上市公司2001年-2008年相关财务数据的研究发现,中国国有上市公司控制权与现金流权偏离程度较高,且控股股东持股比例高;资产负债率平均维持在50%左右,且长期债务融资比较少。 在研究控制权与现金流权的偏离对债务期限结构和公司价值的影响时,选取相关指标,实证分析得出结论:股权分置改革前,第一大股东持股比例、控制权和现金流权的偏离、控制链条数与债务期限结构显著负相关,且终极控制人行政归属为地方的,具有较高的长期债务水平。两权偏离与公司价值负相关,债务期限结构与公司价值正相关。股权分置改革后,第一大股东持股比例与债务期限结构负相关,两权偏离程度与债务期限结构、公司价值负相关,但是均不能通过显著性检验。最后,本文根据研究结论提出建议。 本文的创新之处在于从控制权角度研究控制权与现金流权的偏离对公司债务期限结构以及公司价值的影响,并且对比股权分置改革前后的变化。 | |
| 英文摘要: | As the largest part of the Chinese listed companies, the state-owned listed companies are very important to national economy in the Chinese new and transitional securities market. At the same time, there are many problems in the operation and management of the Chinese state-owned listed companies, such as: the shareholder solely dominating, the administrative intervention, insider controlling, and so on. Since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer(1999) put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders, scholars started to research the problem that ultimate controlling shareholders of Chinese state-owned listed companies pursued private benefit ignoring the profit of outside investors, minority shareholders and creditors from the point of view of divergence between control right and cash flow right. Debt maturity structure, which is important to debt financing decision, is the key to study financing decision and solve the contradiction between ultimate controlling shareholders and creditor. At the same time, the reform of dual-class shares system started in April, 2005, which has lots of effect on Chinese listed companies’ capital structure, investment, operation, corporate governance and company value. The thesis reviews the related research achievments, investigates debt maturity structure and company value from the point of view of divergence between control right and cash flow right, compares the difference between befor and after the reform of dual-class shares system, and makes some suggestions on improve debt financing decision and company value. The thesis analyzes 476 Chinese state-owned listed companies from 2001 to 2008 with the method of normative and empirical research and finds that the degree of divergence between control right and cash flow right is high, and so is the share ratio of controlling shareholders. Asset-liability ratio maintains about 50%, and the level of long-term debt financing is low. Then the thesis chooses relevant index to examine the divergence between control right and cash flow right effect on debt maturity structure and company value. It shows that before the reform of dual-class shares system, the share ratio of the largest shareholder, the degree of divergence between control right and cash flow right, and number of control lines are negative to debt maturity structure. The listed company whose ultimate controlling shareholder belongs to local government has more long-trem debt. The degree of divergence between control right and cash flow right is negative to company value, but the debt maturity structure is positive. After the reform of dual-class shares system, the share ratio of the largest shareholder is still negative to debt maturity structure, and the degree of divergence between control right and cash flow right is still negative to debt maturity structure and company value, but all of them can not through the test of significance. At last the thesis makes some suggestions. The innovations of the thesis are discussing debt maturity structure and company value from the point of view of divergence between control right and cash flow right, and compareing the difference between befor and after the reform of dual-class shares system. | |
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