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论文编号：	2328
作者编号：	1120060685
上传时间：	2010/6/8 21:41:14
中文题目：	控股股东行为对财务报告透明度的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Controlling Shareholder’s Behavior on Financial Reporting Transparency
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	控股股东行为；财务报告透明度；控股股东动机；地区市场化程度；最终控股股东性质
英文关键字：	controlling shareholders’ behaviors; financial reporting transparency; incentives of controlling shareholders; the degree of regional marketization; the nature of the ultimate shareholder
中文摘要：	中国的投资者利益保护的法律体系不完善，较弱的法律实施力度和市场监管，控股股东“一股独大”和股权分置的现状，造成了控股股东与中小股东之间存在着广泛的利益冲突，控股股东侵占中小股东利益的现象也普遍存在，上市公司财务报告透明度也因而处于较低的水平。本文在对透明度相关文献梳理和分析的基础上，从财务报告盈余的反馈价值、财务报告中立性、忠实表达和坏消息的及时性四种角度对财务报告透明度进行了界定和度量。在此基础上，以信息不对称理论、契约理论与委托代理理论、信号传递理论、财务报告质量评价理论为基础，结合中国的制度背景，对控股股东行为对上市公司财务报告透明度的影响进行了系统的理论分析，继而在控股股东和中小股东之间代理问题的框架内，采用2004-2006年期间的中国A股市场上的上市公司为样本，以本文构建的财务报告透明度度量指标为因变量，以总资产标准化后的其他应收款的年度增加额、总资产标准化后的其他应付款的年度增加额以及两者的差额分别作为控股股东的掏空行为、扶持行为以及净掏空或净扶持行为的代理变量，从控股股东动机、地区市场化程度和最终控股股东的性质三种角度系统考察了控股股东行为对上市公司财务报告透明度的影响。 本文的主要研究结论如下： 对控股股东动机、控股股东行为与财务报告透明度的经验检验结果显示，控股股东的避亏动机、再融资动机和高管更换动机能够显著降低上市公司的财务报告透明度，而且这三种动机并没有对控股股东行为产生明显的影响；控股股东的扭亏动机显著降低了控股股东的掏空行为和扶持行为，从而显著提高了上市公司的财务报告透明度；加强市场监管能够显著提高上市公司的财务报告透明度。 对地区市场化程度、控股股东行为与财务报告透明度的实证研究结果显示，在市场化进程较差、政府与市场关系不好与中介组织发育和法律环境较差的地区，公司更愿意提供高透明度的财务报告，符合投资者利益保护的“替代假说”；较高的地区市场化程度能够对控股股东的掏空行为有明显的抑制作用。 对最终控股股东性质、控股股东行为与财务报告透明度的经验检验结果表明，控股股东的掏空行为能够显著降低上市公司的财务报告透明度；控股股东的扶持行为对财务报告透明度没有产生明显的正向影响；政府最终控制的上市公司遭遇了更多的政府干预，更多地侵占了中小股东的利益，明显降低了上市公司的财务报告透明度；最终控股股东所有权与上市公司财务报告透明度之间呈先降后升的U型关系；其他非控股股东的制衡与债务契约的存在能够对上市公司财务报告透明度起到正向影响；规模大的上市公司有更低的财务报告透明度；上市公司财务报告盈余与上市公司财务报告透明度呈显著的负相关关系。 本文首次考察了控股股东行为对上市公司财务报告透明度的影响。对上市公司财务报告透明度的度量方法，也以财务报表中的数据为核心，未使用资本市场上的数据，这对于研究资本市场弱势有效情况下的财务报告透明度提供了很好的研究工具，也为研究非上市公司的财务报告透明度提供了有益的帮助。对控股股东行为的度量，采用的是相关账户的年度增加额，而非现有文献中常用的相关账户的余额，这有利于从动态的角度而非静态的角度考察控股股东行为对上市公司财务报告透明度的影响。将控股股东动机、地区市场化程度和最终控股股东性质纳入控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题的框架内予以分别考察，可以为国有企业改革、优化股权结构、抑制控股股东攫取控制权私人收益的动机和行为、完善投资者利益的法律保护体系、提高法律实施力度、促进会计准则与国际会计准则的协调、制订高质量的会计准则、加强市场监管和改善地区市场化程度提供理论基础和经验证据。
英文摘要：	China's poor legal system protecting investors, bad quality of law enforcement, weak market supervision, the dominating ownership structure and the split share structure contribute to a wide range of conflicts of interests between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Controlling shareholder misappropriating the interests of minority shareholders often occurs. Consequently, the transparency of financial reports of listed companies in China is quite low. In this paper, I first sort out and analyze the literatures regarding the financial reporting transparency. After that, feedback value of financial reports, financial reporting neutrality, faithful representation and the timeliness of bad news are used to measure financial reporting transparency. Secondly, this paper accomplishes the theoretical analysis of the impact of controlling shareholders’ behaviors on financial reporting transparency of listed companies based on asymmetric information theory, contract theory and principal-agent theory, signaling theory, the theory of financial reporting quality evaluation, combined with China's institutional background. Thirdly, based on sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies over the three-year period between 2004 and 2006, this dissertation examines the effects of controlling shareholders’ behaviors on financial reporting transparency of listed companies from three aspects of the incentives of controlling shareholders, the degree of regional marketization, and the nature of ultimate shareholder. In this paper, the change in other receivables divided by total assets is used to measure tunnelling by controlling shareholder. Propping by controlling shareholder is measured by using the change in other payables scaled by total assets. The net tunnelling is calculated by using the difference between tunnelling and propping. Through theoretical analyses and empirical tests, this paper reaches the conclusions as follows: For the relation between the incentives of controlling shareholder, the behaviors of controlling shareholder and the financial reporting transparency of the listed companies, the test results show that the incentives for avoiding loss, refinancing or CEO turnover can significantly reduce the transparency of financial reports of listed companies, and this three kinds of incentives have not a significant impact on the behaviors of controlling shareholder. Incentive for turning a profit significantly improves the transparency of financial reports of listed companies through significantly reducing the tunneling and propping by controlling shareholder. We also find that strengthening the supervision of the capital market can significantly enhance the financial reporting transparency of listed companies. For the relation between the degree of regional marketization, the behaviors of controlling shareholder and financial reporting transparency, the empirical evidences show that the high-quality accounting system can substitute for weak investor protection laws. The companies in provinces with lower degree of marketization, poor relation of government and market or poor development of intermediary organizations and weak legal environment have incentives to provide more transparent financial reports to mitigate the negative effect of the weak investor protection laws. The findings of this paper support the conjecture purposed by La Porta et al (1998), and consistent with ‘substitution hypothesis’ on investors protection. We also find that tunnelling and propping by controlling shareholders can be restrained in the province with higher degree of marketization. For the relationship between the natures of ultimate controlling shareholder, the behaviors of controlling shareholder and financial reporting transparency, the empirical results indicate that tunneling can significantly decrease financial reporting transparency of listed companies. Propping has not significantly positive impact on financial reporting transparency. For state-owned listed company, its financial reporting transparency is lower. The more government intervention is, the lower financial reporting transparency of the listed company is. The relation between cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling shareholder and financial reporting transparency has a change of descend firstly then ascend and shows a ‘U-shaped’ curve. We also find that the check-and-balance ability of the second to the fifth largest shareholders and creditors’ constrains can positively affect financial reporting transparency. Large listed companies have lower financial reporting transparency. The relationship between earnings and financial reporting transparency is significantly negative. This paper examines the effect of the behaviors of controlling shareholder on financial reporting transparency of listed companies for the first time. Through using the data from financial reports instead of using capital markets data to measure financial reporting transparency of listed companies, this paper provides the effective research tool for studying the financial reporting transparency in weak capital markets and the financial reporting transparency of the non-listed companies. Using the change in related accounts, rather than the balance of related accounts commonly used in the existing literature, as proxy for the behavior of the controlling shareholder, this paper investigated the effect of controlling shareholders’ behavior on financial reporting transparency of listed companies from a dynamic rather than static perspective. In terms of the research framework of agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, the effects of the incentives of controlling shareholders, the degree of regional marketization and the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder on controlling shareholders’ bebaviors and financial reporting transparency of listed companies are tested respectively, which provides an important theoretical basis and empirical evidences for the state-owned enterprise reform, optimizing the ownership, curbing the incentives and behaviors for seizing private benefits of control, improving the legal system protecting investors, enhancing law enforcement, the acceleration of international accounting harmonization, adopting high-quality accounting standards, strengthening market supervision and improving the degree of regional marketization.
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