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论文编号：	2237
作者编号：	041887
上传时间：	2010/5/26 11:15:00
中文题目：	上市公司的盈余管理行为与经济后果--基于配股权的研究
英文题目：	Earnings Management, Listed Company, Right Issues, Economic Consequence
指导老师：	陈国欣
中文关键字：	盈余管理 上市公司 配股 经济后果
英文关键字：	Earnings Management, Listed Company, Right Issues, Economic Consequence
中文摘要：	上市公司披露的会计信息，反映着公司的财务状况、经营成果和现金流量状况。以往的研究结论表明会计盈余信息具有一定的经济后果。投资者、债权人、政府等利益相关者都需要利用会计盈余信息做出相应的经济决策。如果上市公司提供的会计盈余信息是真实可靠且符合相关披露准则的，则有助于证券市场的资源配置功能得到充分发挥。然而无论是在国外，还是在国内，证券市场都存在较为严重的盈余管理行为。由于信息的不对称，外部会计盈余信息的使用者往往被管理过的会计盈余所误导，进而影响了资本市场的正常运转，破坏了证券市场资源配置功能及其它功能的发挥，损害了广大投资者，尤其是中小投资者的利益，最终也会使上市公司蒙受巨大损失。 尽管中国证券市场的盈余管理现象极为普遍，国内学术界对这一热点问题的研究起步却相对较晚，直至20世纪90年代中后期才逐渐给予关注。而且研究成果主要集中于盈余管理的存在性检验、盈余管理的手段、盈余管理的程度等几个方面。在此研究背景下，论文以有着强烈盈余管理动机的配股上市公司为研究对象，采用实证研究的分析方法，对中国A股上市公司在配股中的盈余管理程度、盈余管理的影响因素、盈余管理的经济后果等问题进行了深入的分析，从而为政府监管部门规范和治理上市公司的盈余管理行为提供了政策依据。 论文通过实证研究发现：(1)我国A股上市公司仍然存在很强的盈余管理动机，但盈余管理程度较以往有所降低；(2)操控性应计利润（上市公司的盈余管理程度）与资本结构、财务状况显著负相关；(3)上市公司的长期业绩在配股后出现明显下滑，而且盈余管理激进组的下滑幅度要明显大于盈余管理保守组；(4)尽管从长期（一年以上）来看，证券市场能对上市公司的盈余管理行为进行区别，但是投资者在短期内（一年以内）并不能识别配股公司的盈余管理行为，反而被盈余管理行为所误导。
英文摘要：	The disclosure of accounting information reflects company’s financial performance. Several recent studies illustrated that accounting earnings information had economic consequences. Based on accounting earnings, stakeholders, such as investors, creditors and government, make decisions. The functions by security market, such as allocating resources, can be fully played if the earnings reported by the listed companies are credible and relevant. Because of information asymmetry, earnings managed by the top managers can mislead external information users. Such results damage the function of security market and harm investor’s benefits, especially small shareholders. It will finally cause big loss to listed companies. Although the extensive existence of earnings management in China’s security markets, domestic scholars become interested in this popular topic since the mid of 90s in 20th century, which is a bit later comparing to foreign scholars. Recent research mainly focuses on several aspects, such as the existence of earnings management, the method of earnings management and the extent of earnings management. Under such background, this thesis uses the right-issues listed companies as the object, because such companies have strong incentives to manage earnings. By empirical research methods, this thesis analyses the extent, influential factors and the economic consequence of earnings management. Finally, the thesis provides some advices to bring earnings management under control. This thesis finds several results through empirical research: (1)Chinese listed companies still has strong incentives to manage earnings but it is less severe than before; (2)Discretionary accruals have negative relationships with capital structure and financial performance; (3)The long-run performance of listed companies decreases significantly after right issues. Additionally, the aggressive sample companies (the level of whose earnings management is above the median level) drop more quickly than conservative sample companies (the level of whose earnings management is under the median level); (4)Although investors can see through company’s earnings management in the long-run (more than one year), investors are misled by earnings management in short period(less than one year).
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