联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	2126
作者编号：	1120060684
上传时间：	2009/12/14 13:21:37
中文题目：	管理层盈余预告背景、消息性质与披露方式选择——基于我国A股上市公司2004-2007年数据的实证检验
英文题目：	The Antecedents, the Nature of News and the Choosing of Disclosure Manner of Management Earnings Forecast: An Empirical Study Based on the Data of 2004-2007 of the A Listed Company in China
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	管理层盈余预告；盈余预告背景；消息性质；披露选择
英文关键字：	Management earnings forecast; The antecedents of earnings forecast; The nature of forecast news; Disclosure choosing
中文摘要：	作为信息披露重要内容之一，管理层盈余预告信息在一定程度上影响了投资者投资决策，从而受到了监管机构、管理层及投资者的广泛关注；同时，管理层发布盈余预告信息时，总是处在一定背景环境下以及面临发布消息的不同性质，这些背景环境及消息性质可能影响了管理层的披露方式选择。本文针对在激励、约束及监督盈余预告背景下以及不同性质消息下，管理层在盈余预告精确性、及时性及态度倾向上可能会作出的披露方式选择问题进行了相应的理论及实证研究。 本文的创新点及研究发现如下： 第一，提出了一个管理层盈余预告分析框架 在系统分析了信息披露与资本市场关系、信息的决策有用观、代理问题及我国相关制度背景的基础上，基于盈余预告背景视角并结合消息性质，提出了一个管理层盈余预告披露方式选择分析框架； 第二，对管理层盈余预告背景及相关变量进行了界定 本文分别对管理层盈余预告背景、预告消息性质及管理层盈余预告披露方式进行了界定。 第三，实证研究了盈余预告背景对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择影响 1.在激励预告背景对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择影响的检验中发现：随着高管持股比例、持股价值以及总经理持股比例、持股价值的提高，管理层选择了更精确、及时的盈余预告披露特征，并且，预告偏差也相对降低。这一结果表明，在激励预告背景下，管理层能提供相对更精确、及时及相对保守或稳健的盈余预告信息，从而提高了盈余预告信息对投资者的有用性； 2.在约束预告背景对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择影响的检验中发现：随着公司诉讼风险、财务风险增大，管理层盈余预告的精确性、及时性均降低，并且态度倾向相对乐观；随着证券分析师跟踪程度的提高，管理层盈余预告的精确性、及时性也均降低，但其态度倾向相对保守；随着机构投资者持股比例的提高，管理层盈余预告的精确性、及时性均显著提高，我们并没有发现机构投资者对盈余预告态度倾向的显著影响； 3.在监督预告背景对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择影响的检验中发现：随着董事会规模增大、会议频率提高，管理层盈余预告精确性、及时性降低；随着独立董事比例提高，管理层盈余预告精确性提高，态度倾向也相对保守或稳健；控股股东持股比例与管理层盈余预告形式具体性呈“U”型关系，而与盈余预告误差、及时性及态度倾向(预告偏差、预告偏向)则呈倒“U”型关系；同时，随着股权集中度提高，管理层盈余预告精确性随之降低，且态度倾向相对乐观，但是及时性却随之提高； 第四，实证研究了盈余预告消息性质对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择影响 在检验消息性质对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择的影响中发现：管理层对坏消息性质的盈余预告比对好消息的盈余预告选择了更不精确的预告方式；同时，对坏消息性质的盈余预告比对好消息性质的盈余预告态度倾向更乐观。 第五，进一步实证检验了不同性质消息下盈余预告背景对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择的影响 检验结果发现：在不同性质消息下，随着盈余预告背景的变化，管理层在大部分情形下作出了自利的盈余预告方式选择。相比而言，激励预告背景、约束预告背景中的机构投资者持股以及监督预告背景中的独立董事、控股股东整体上还是能促进管理层对坏消息性质的盈余预告比好消息性质的盈余预告作出更有利于提高投资者信息有用性的选择；而在其他一些背景下，其选择则相对对投资者不利。 另外，本文结合分析框架实证检验的结果，基于优化盈余预告背景的视角，提出了一系列对管理层盈余预告披露方式选择的改善对策。 本文的研究为监管机构对管理层盈余预告监管政策的制定、管理层对盈余预告的发布策略选择以及投资者利用盈余预告进行投资决策提供了理论参考和实践证据。 限于替代变量、数据样本期间制度变化影响等原因，本文的研究还存在一定局限性，另外，本文提出了一些未来进一步的研究方向，如多背景因素作用下的影响以及管理层盈余预告披露方式选择、盈余预告背景对投资者投资决策的影响等。
英文摘要：	As one of the most important disclosure items, the management earnings forecast affects the investors decision at a certain extent. So it broadly catch the attention of supervision institutions, managers and investors. At the same time, the managers are always under some antecedents and faced with different nature of news when they forecast earnings. These antecedents and news nature may affect the disclosure manner choice of the managers. This paper theoretically and empirically study the problem that which disclosure characteristic among accurancy, timelyness and attitude incline that the managers will chose when they are under different incentive, restricted and supervisory antecedents and faced with different nature of news. The innovation of this study and the finds of the empirical test are as follows: Firstly, we suggest an analysis frame about the disclosure manners selection of management earnings forecast 1.After systematically analyzing the relation between information disclosure and capital market, the decision usefulness perspective of information, agency problem and corresponding institutional background in China, we suggest an analysis frame about the disclosure manners selection of management earnings forecast from the view of earnings forecast antecedents and the nature of news. Secondly, we have defined the variables about management earnings forecast antecedents. We have defined the variables of management earnings forecast antecedents, the nature of forecast news and the manners of earnings forecast. Thirdly, we empirically test the affection of earnings forecast antecedents to forecast manners selection. 1.In the test of the affection for the incentive antecedents to the disclosure manner choice of management earnings forecast, we find: With the increase of proportion and value the managers hold, the managers will choose more accurate and more timely forecast characteristic, and forecast bias also relativly low. This result shows that the managers will give more accurate, more timely and more conservative forecast information under incentive antecedents. So the usefulness of earnings forecast is improved for the investors. 2. In the test of the affection for the restricted antecedents to the disclosure manner choice of management earnings forecast, we find: With the increase of litigation risk and financial risk, the accurancy and timelyness of management earnings forecast are both decrease, and the attitude inclines to relatively optimistic; With the degree of ananlyst following increases, the accurancy and timelyness of management earnings forecast are also both decrease, but the attitude incline to relatively conservative; With the stock proportion the institute investors hold increases, the accurancy and timelyness of management earnings forecast are both significantly increase. We find no significant affection for institute investors to earnings forecast attitude incline. 3. In the test of the affection for the supervisory antecedents to the disclosure manner choice of management earnings forecast, we find: With the enlargement of directorate scale and increase of directorate meeting frequency, the accurancy and timelyness of management earnings forecast are both decrease, but with the proportion of independent director increases, the accurancy of management earnings forecast increases and attitude inclines to more conservative; The relation for the stock proportion by control share holders to the precision of management earnings forecast is “U” shape, but as to forecast error, timelyness and attitude incline(including forecast bias and lean) is inverse “U” shape; And at the same time, with the increase of share centralization, the accurancy of management earnings forecast decreases and the attitude inclines to relatively optimistic, but the timelyness increases with it. Fourthly, we empirically test the affection of earnings forecast news nature to forecast manners selection. In the test of the affection for the character of forecast news to the disclosure manner choice of management earnings forecast, we find: Relative to good news earnings forecast, the managers will choose more inaccurate forecast manner for bad news earnings forecast; and relative to good news earnings forecast, the attitude incline to more optimistic for bad news earnings forecast. Fifthly, further more, we empirical test of the affection for forecast antecedents to the disclosure characteristic choice of management earnings forecast under different forecast news nature. In the test, we find that the managers largely choose self-profitable forecast manner with the change of forecast antecedents under different forecast news nature. Relatively, incentive antecedents, institute investors of restricted antecedents, independent director and control share holders of supervisory antecedents could mainly promote the managers choose the forecast manners for bad news forecast as to good news forecast that is in favor of increasing the usefulness of information for investors. But for other antecedents factors, the choice of managers is not in favor of investors. In addition, we suggest some policies to improve the disclosure characteristic choice of management earnings forecast according to the analysis frame and the result of empirical test from the view of optimization for forecast antecedents. This study may provide theoretical reference and practical evidence for setting supervisory regulation by supervisory institutions, choosing issuance strategy by managers and making investment decision by investors. Limiting to substitute variables and data etc., this study may have some shortcomings. Further more, we give some directions for future study. For example, the co-affection under multi-antecedents, and the affection of the disclosure choosing by managers and forecast antecedents for investors’ decision.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)