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论文编号：	2105
作者编号：	2005002
上传时间：	2010/4/20 11:37:20
中文题目：	上市公司大股东控制权私有收益研究
英文题目：	Listed company Controlling Shareholder Private benefit of controlling
指导老师：	陈国欣
中文关键字：	上市公司 大股东 控制权私有收益 制度约束 行为动机
英文关键字：	Listed company Controlling Shareholder Private benefit of controlling
中文摘要：	随着公司治理研究的深入，大股东在上市公司治理中的作用日益受到关注，公司治理的核心己经转变为如何处理大股东与中小股东之间的“代理关系”。“控制权私有收益”正是这个问题的核心。 文章首先回顾和梳理控制权收益的相关理论，包括其概念，学派，误区以及研究的意义，最终给出本研究中控制权收益的概念界定。进而结合中国市场环境下特殊的控制权转移争夺特征，从股权结构、内部人控制等多个角度分析了影响控制权转移的主要因素。通过对数十家典型的上市公司攫取控制权私有收益行为进行案例分析，为国内外关于控制权私有收益的理论研究在现实中找到例证，为企业管理和公司治理活动提出新的微观操作层面上的改革依据。在分析中总结出我国上市公司大股东侵害公司和其他股东利益的各种途径，其中最为直接的是资金占用，到关联交易转移资产，再到利用内幕信息进行二级市场套利。大股东还往往利用其他一些辅助手段来达到攫取控制权私有收益的目的，包括股权融资偏好和粉饰业绩。这些现实的行为己经严重侵害到了投资者的利益，影响到了我国证券市场的发展。 文章随后分析了产生规模巨大的控制权私有收益的现实原因，外在制度根源和内在行为动机正是两个最为重要的因素。从制度根源上讲，国有控股主体产权虚置，证券市场分割，上市公司治理结构不完善，中小股东的权益受到制 约，加之监管机制较为薄弱；投资者的投资理念和行为也不成熟；财务、审计等专业中介机构以及上市公司独立董事都不独立，从而导致了大股东肆意攫取控制权私有收益。而从内在动机上讲，上市公司国有大股东为了解救存续企业而侵占上市公司股权融资资金，并且由于地方政府等与上市公司的利益纽带，形成隐性制度，更加难以解决；而民营大股东更多地趋向于融资动机和私人利益诉求。正是两种不同的人格化特征导致了不同的内在动机。 最后作者提出了相关的政策建议，包括完善股权分置问题的逐步解决、证券监管机制的完善、中介机构和独立董事制度的规范、媒体和舆论对大股东不法行为披露的鼓励，以及法律救济制度的强化。
英文摘要：	As the research in the field of Corporate Governance deepens, the role of controlling shareholder has attracted more attention, the core issue in corporate governance has been shifted to the question that how to deal with the agent problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Private Benefits of Control (PBC) is the key of this problem. This paper firstly reviews related theories about private benefit of controlling, including concept definition, different schools of research, misunderstandings and future meanings. Based on unique competition of controlling power in Chinese market, this paper analyzes key factors which affect controlling power transition from different perspectives such as share structure and internal control. Finds out sufficient evidence for national research about PBC study, offers new micro-operational reform clue by studying tens of cases happened among listed companies. There are many evidences to prove that the controlling shareholders do expropriations. The most common and direct means is to occupy funds of the listed companies, including directly occupying, borrowing contract, connected transactions and asking guarantee from listed company. Furthermore, they also use means of connected transaction to transfer resources and insider dealing. In addition, they prefer to equity financing and glossing over performance to help expropriating behaviors. They have done great harm to the development of China's capital market. Later author analyzes real root cause of huge scale of private benefit snatch, one is institutional constrain, the other is behavioral motivation. In terms of institutional constrain, unclear role of investors in state-owned companies, detached security market, undesired corporate governance structure, weak supervision mechanism and immature professional financial service make PBC more and more popular. In terms of behavioral motivation, due to the historical reason and reform manner, stated-owned controlling shareholders need funds to save the enterprises left by reform which gradually forms an invisible institution. The non-state-owned controlling shareholders need funds for financing and private benefits. It is the different mankind characters that make the different incentives. The last is the suggestions, including whole-reforming strategy of state-owned companies, broadening the financing channels of nonstate-owned companies, gradually solving stock seperations problem, perfecting the supervision mechanism, making agents and institution on independent directors more formal, encouraging the medias to reveal the wrong controlling shraholders did and giving them more space, and last but not the least, the strengthening of the law and its enforcement.
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