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论文编号：	2094
作者编号：	043098
上传时间：	2010/4/20 9:48:25
中文题目：	网上交易治理机制研究
英文题目：	Reputation, Third-Party Intermediaries
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	网上交易 治理机制 私人秩序 声誉 第三方中介
英文关键字：	Online Trade; Governance Mechanism; Private Order;
中文摘要：	随着信息技术的飞速发展，因特网的普及，电子商务浪潮席卷全球各地，网上购物这一新的购物形式也正融入人们的生活。相比网下交易，网上C2C交易的第一个优势是因特网减少了信息收集成本和信息传播成本，买家和卖家容易配对，从而减少了交易成本。其次，网上C2C交易中存在着网络外部性：一个卖家是否在网站上销售商品取决于其他卖家和买家的决策，买家是否在这个市场上购物又取决于这个网站上卖家的数目以及卖家登录商品的种类和数量，这样就形成了一个正反馈机制。第三，网络使市场范围扩大，消费者就能从网上搜寻到更便宜的商品，卖家也能面向全国甚至全世界来销售商品，这就意味着交易者可以从网上C2C交易中得到更多的剩余。 网上交易面临的最大缺陷是交易过程中的信息不对称。在交易发生前，买方和卖方无法了解对方过去的交易历史。即使买方和卖方就交易达成一致，买方也会担心将货款支付给卖家后，卖方不发货或发送与描述不一致的货物，卖方也担心发送货物后收不到货款。网上交易的这种逆向选择和道德风险问题严重阻碍了网上交易的发展。 与电子商务相关的法律也不完善，除非发生欺诈行为，司法部门一般很少介入网上交易引发的各种争端。即使司法部门可以介入，由于交易条款很难得到证实，法律的执行成本也相当高。 针对网上交易的上述问题，C2C交易网站以及其他中介建立了信用评价系统、第三方托管（escrow）、第三方支付、在线争议解决、商盟等交易机制来减轻交易中的囚徒困境问题。网上C2C交易的迅速发展，欺诈出现的概率非常小，说明这些交易机制可以很好地保证交易方的合作行为，保障了交易的顺利进行。 本文主要探讨在法律制度不完善或法律不能很好发挥作用情况下，交易方以及追求利润最大化的私人第三方中介如何通过各种交易机制来保证交易的顺利进行，这些交易机制又如何使各种治理机制发挥作用。 本文共分八章，其中第一章是文献综述部分，第八章是结论部分，第二章至第七章为本文的主体部分，其中第二章到第五章重点分析声誉机制，即卖家的个人声誉和商盟的集体声誉在网上交易中所起的作用。 第二章是本文的核心，该章首先通过一个重复博弈模型分析了在公共秩序缺失的情况下，建立在信用评价系统上的卖家个人声誉机制的作用。然后定性地分析了其他交易机制，如在线争议解决机构、第三方托管、商盟等制度的作用。以下各章将对这些交易机制的作用以及其与信用评价系统之间的关系做进一步的分析。 第三章则通过博弈模型进一步分析网上交易中卖家商盟制度的作用。商盟可以利用其集体声誉作为抵押向买家承诺商盟成员不会欺骗买家，如果商盟成员有欺骗行为，商盟会对成员进行惩罚。在一定的条件下，商盟做出的承诺是可置信的。商盟可以弥补信用评价系统的缺陷，商盟的集体声誉起到了补充卖家个人声誉的作用。 第四章从淘宝网上搜集交易数据来验证卖方的个人声誉和商盟的集体声誉对卖家交易的影响。 第五章分析了搜寻成本对网上交易市场价格行为的影响。网上交易虽然扩大了市场范围，使消费者可以获得更多的消费者剩余，但由于网上卖家数目和商品数目众多，买家搜寻卖家和商品需要耗费一定的搜寻成本。该章在搜寻理论的框架内考察在卖家声誉具有差异的情况下，搜寻成本对价格水平和价格离散程度，进而对网上交易市场效率的影响。 前面的分析假设交易条款是法庭和其他第三方无法证实的，因此只能依靠非正式契约来执行。但是，网上交易中，私人第三方执行中介可以花费一定的成本证实交易条款，因此就必须考虑非正式契约与正式契约之间的关系。第六章运用随机匹配博弈和非正式契约理论分析私人第三方中介在契约执行中所起的作用，以及其与信用评价系统之间的相互关系。 在网上交易中，交易机制不是一成不变的。随着网上交易市场用户和商品数量的增加，交易主体不断地设计出各种交易机制，并对已有的机制进行改进。第七章首先分析市场范围扩大与治理机制演进之间的关系，然后从网上交易发展、市场范围扩大的动态角度来分析交易网站以及其他第三方中介如何设计交易机制来减少交易成本，减轻囚徒困境问题。 第八章对论文进行总结，指出了论文的不足和进一步的研究方向，并对中国网上交易的发展提出了相应的对策建议。 本文首要的结论是：在法律等公共秩序不完善或缺失的情况下，自发的私人秩序和有组织的私人秩序可以起到了替代公共秩序的作用；相比传统的信息传递方式，网络技术提高了信息传递的效率，扩大了私人秩序的适用范围。其他主要的结论有： 1. 在法律以及社会信用体系这两种公共秩序缺失的情况下，交易者的个人声誉可以很好地发挥作用：卖方的个人声誉对其交易有正面的影响。但这种效应是边际递减的，卖家的信用评价超过一个临界点后，卖家声誉的提高对其交易没有影响。 2. 第三方执行中介的介入使得契约变得更加正式。当契约成本较低时，正式契约的引入替代了非正式契约；当契约成本较高时，正式契约补充了非正式契约；当契约成本很高时，正式契约的引入不影响交易方对非正式契约的选择。 3. 商盟可以其集体声誉作为抵押向买家承诺商盟成员不会欺骗买家。在一定的条件下，商盟做出的承诺是可置信的。商盟可以弥补信用评价系统的缺陷，商盟的集体声誉起到了补充个人声誉的作用。相比不属于任何商盟的卖家，加入商盟的卖家在单位时间内可以卖出更多的商品，这说明加入商盟的卖家更容易得到买家的信任。 4. 网上交易市场存在较大的搜寻成本，这削弱了声誉机制的作用，导致不同声誉水平的卖家同时存在于网上交易市场，即使他们销售的商品一样。较高的搜寻成本还导致买家同某些特定的卖家进行重复交易。因此，网上交易的效率取决于交易网站提供的浏览和搜索服务。 5. 各种治理机制之间既存在着替代关系，又存在着补充关系。随着市场规模的扩大，正式契约的平均交易成本逐渐下降，正式契约将逐渐替代社区规范、第三方中介等非正式治理机制。但是，正式契约的交易成本不仅受市场规模影响，还取决于商品的特性。对质量特征很难验证的商品来说，就商品的属性签订一个正式契约需要耗费较高的契约成本。使用非正式的治理机制带来的交易成本可能更低。这样，社区规范、私人第三方中介、正式契约等治理机制之间就能共存。
英文摘要：	C2C e-commerce develops rapidly in China. Compared to offline transaction, online shopping has lower information collecting cost and information dissemination cost, and buyers and sellers are matched more easily. All of these mean that transaction cost is reduced in online shopping. Internet extends the market, which makes consumers gain more surplus from shopping. Until now, most countries don’t impose tax on online shopping, so goods in internet are cheaper than offline. However, online shopping has inherent defects. The biggest problem with internet shopping may be moral hazards of sellers and buyers. If sellers deliver goods to buyers first, sellers would risk default. If buyers pay deals first, they would worry that sellers may not deliver goods. This two-sided prisoner’s dilemma impedes the development of online shopping. Furthermore, the law related to online shopping is developing and not perfect. Unless fraud, judicatories don’t interfere in disputes happened in online transaction. Even if judicatories did intervene, the enforcement cost is very high. C2C website and other third parties established feedback system, escrow, online dispute resolution and other supporting mechanisms to solve the prisoner’s dilemma. On eBay and Taobao, the frequency of auction fraud, non-delivery, and credit/debit card fraud and other fraud is very low, which indicate that feedback system and other mechanisms function well. This dissertation explores how traders and third-party intermediaries establish private order to support online trade under dysfunctional public order. This dissertation has seven parts. Introduction provides backgrounds, methods, structure and contributions. Chapter 1 reviews the related literature. Chapter 2 establishes a repeated game model to describe how reputation mechanism based on feedback system functions. Chapter 3 analyzes the function of seller coalition on online auction sites. Seller coalition can use its collective reputation as hostage to undertake credible commitment to buyers: sellers belonging to a coalition will not cheat buyers. Therefore, coalition system increases punishment buyers can enforce and enhance the role that reputation mechanism plays. Chapter 4 examines the impact of sellers’ individual reputation and coalition’s collective reputation on sellers’ sale in China’s online market, using data of an online prepaid game card listed on Taobao.com. Chapter 5 constructs models to explain how search cost brought by inefficient search tools results in inability of sellers with a good reputation to drive sellers with a bad reputation out of internet auction market. Chapter 6 constructs a model to analyze the influence of formal contract on informal contract when formal contract is available, and then uses this model to analyze the effect of the introduction of enforcement intermediaries on informal contract. Chapter 7 analyzes the relationship between the extension of market and the evolution of governance mechanisms, and then discusses how agents create and establish transaction mechanism to mitigate prisoner’s dilemma. Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation, presents the direction of further study, and provides some suggestions for the development of China’s C2C online trade. The conclusion of this dissertation is as follow: Firstly, under Dysfunctional Public Order, spontaneous private order and organized private orders can substitute legal system and social credit system in online trade. Secondly, seller coalition can use its collective reputation as hostage to undertake credible commitment to buyers: sellers belonging to a coalition will not cheat buyers; if a seller cheats buyers, coalition will punish him. Coalition system increase punishment buyers can enforce and enhance the role that reputation mechanism plays. Under certain condition, commitment undertaken by coalition is credible. Thirdly, sellers’ good reputation (proxy by feedback score) has a positive impact on their sale in a given time. However, marginal effect is severely decreasing. Beyond some critical value, sellers’ feedback scores have no additional impact on sellers’ sale. A sellers’ affiliation with coalitions can increase its average sale in a given time. Fourthly, high search cost exists in online market, which impairs the role of reputation mechanism and results in the coexistence of sellers with different levels of reputation. Some buyers make repeated transactions with sellers with a good reputation for saving search cost. Therefore, the efficiency of online trade depends on the browsing and searching tools shopping website provides. Fifthly, the introduction of enforcement intermediaries make contract more formal in online trade. When contracting cost is low, formal contract can substitute informal contract; when contracting cost is intermediate, formal contract can complement informal contract; when contracting cost is very high, formal contract has no effect on informal contract. Finally, each governance mechanism functions as not only substitutes, but also complements. Following the extension of market, the average transaction cost of formal contract decreases, so formal contract would substitute informal governance mechanisms, such as community norm, third-party intermediaries. However, the average transaction cost of formal contract is also influenced by characteristics of commodity. If characteristics are hard to be verified by third parties, it is more costly to sign a formal contract than use informal mechanisms Therefore, community norm, private third-party intermediaries and formal mechanism can coexist.
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