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论文编号：	2068
作者编号：	011905
上传时间：	2010/4/14 15:42:20
中文题目：	国有商业银行治理机制变革与
英文题目：	State-owned Commercial Bank,
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	国有商业银行 治理机制变革 信贷风险行为
英文关键字：	State-owned Commercial Bank, Governance mechanism reform
中文摘要：	国有商业银行经理层的信贷风险行为，在1994-2004年间经历了一个冒险—避险—再冒险的递推演进历程，具体在信贷规模的行为选择上，经历了一个超贷—惜贷—再度超贷的变化，而这种演化现象本质上是经理层能动适应国家主导的治理机制阶段性变革的结果。国有商业银行经理层信贷风险行为的阶段性演化，不仅导致国有商业银行信贷风险经过了累积—释放—再蓄积的发展轨迹，也不同程度加剧了我国宏观经济的阶段性波动。要从根本上防止国有商业银行信贷风险的再度累积，必须重视经理层的主观能动作用，并协调配套地推进内外部治理机制变革，创造风险共担、激励兼容的内外部治理环境，引导经理层负责任地选择风险适度的信贷行为。 本文的结构安排为八章。第一章为绪论部分，首先提出了本文要解决的问题，即国有商业银行治理机制与经理层信贷风险行为之间存在怎样的互动关系？进而提出了研究思路与研究方法，概括了本文的创新与局限。 第二章为文献综述部分，首先回顾了国内外关于商业银行治理机制与经理层信贷风险行为关系的研究成果，指出在我国研究国有商业银行治理机制与经理层信贷风险行为，直接套用发达国家商业银行的分析框架，静态不变地看待二者十余年间的互动关系，是不够科学的。随后，指出在我国研究上述问题，应突出两个特色，即一是力求以演化的观点来分析二者之间的互动关系，以及二者互动对国有商业银行信贷风险水平的决定作用，二是必须关注经理层与国家股东的能动适应性，也就是要注意主体认知在制度变革与行为演化关系间的中介作用。基于此，本章后半部分从制度演化与心理认知的角度，分别梳理了经济学、心理学以及管理学关于制度、认知在主体风险行为发生和演化方面作用机制的研究脉络，强调从事本文提出的研究对象时，应充分借鉴新制度经济学、行为金融学和认知心理学的最新成果。 第三章为本文核心章节，属于规范研究部分。在这一章，笔者借鉴新制度经济学与认知心理学的最新研究成果，构建了一个基于主观博弈范式下的制度—行为—绩效协同演化的分析模型，提出了国有商业银行治理机制—经理层信 摘要 贷风险行为—信贷风险水平协同演化的分析假说体系。本文认为，第一，从静态的角度来说，基于经理层的认知能力与主观博弈过程，在不同的转轨阶段，不同的公司治理机制状态，导致经理层选择冒险程度不同的信贷投放行为；第二，从比较静态的角度而言，公司治理机制的阶段性变革，导致了经理层信贷行为冒险程度的改变；第三，经理层信贷风险行为所导致的信贷风险，及其在国家股东与经理层之间的责任分担方式，决定了国家股东与经理层彼此在信贷资源配置方面的福利状况，基于各自认知反馈过程，导致了治理机制改革的阶段性推进，以致从发展趋势来看，最终将收敛于治理成本适中的内外双强的治理模式。 第四章为本文实证分析的前半部分，在借鉴实验经济学与行为金融学研究成果的基础上，委托南开大学商学院泽尔腾实验室完成了一个关于国有商业银行治理机制变革与经理层信贷风险行为演化互动关系的实验。实验结果高度拟和了本文第三章提出的假说。实验结果证实，第一，不同的治理机制导致经理层选择冒险程度不同的信贷投放行为；第二，治理机制的变化，导致经理层信贷投放行为冒险程度的改变；第三，国家股东基于认知能力和主观博弈过程，对不同模式治理机制，及其所导致经理层不同的信贷风险行为和股东回报结果，做出满意、弃权或不满意的表示，能够能动地影响治理机制的变化。 第五、六、七章是本文实证分析的后半部分，分阶段历史地考察了内外双弱、内强外弱、内外双强治理机制状态下，国有商业银行经理层信贷行为选择所经历的高冒险程度下的超贷—高避险程度下的惜贷—高冒险程度下的再度超贷的发展轨迹。 在第五章，1994-1997年内外双弱治理机制下的超贷行为分析一章中，我们深入揭示出：第一，内外双弱的治理机制是转轨初期行政化治理模式的自然延续，由于缺乏对经理层信贷投放结果的问责约束，加之国家股东对经理层实行的是固定工资合约制，而且外部治理机制处于严重缺失状态，基于经理层的主观认知能力及其主观博弈过程，谋求信贷投放的控制权收益以最大化自身效用，就成为经理层的理性选择，结果导致国有商业银行的信贷规模尽可能最大化，甚至超出国有商业银行的经济可行性边界，违背利润最大化原则。第二，超贷行为，一方面使得国家股东依靠国有商业银行向国有企业源源不断地输送资金，支撑了投资拉动型经济增长模式，并且通过办理政策性贷款，以信贷风险的方式承接国有企业转嫁而来的转轨成本，在这一点上国家股东是认可和满意的； 摘要 但是另一方面，超贷行为所导致的信贷风险的大量累积，特别是风险损失最终转嫁给国家股东独立承担的事实，使得国家股东产生了改变内外双弱治理模式的动机，在以后的改革取向上，必然在内部治理方面要加重对经理层的问责力度。 在第六章，1998-2001年内强外弱治理机制下的惜贷行为分析一章中，我们进一步揭示出：第一，1997年下半年亚洲金融危机的外部冲击，以及国家股东硬化国有商业银行经理层预算约束，进而控制信贷风险累积的动机不断增强，最终促使国家股东单边推进国有商业银行内部治理改革，由于仍以固定工资合约为主要的激励方式，加之实行严厉的风险问责约束，结果造成内部治理出现约束有余、激励不足的问题，在外部治理建设严重滞后的情况下，造成信贷风险客观上由经理层单方面承担的态势，经理层基于主观认知能力及其主观博弈过程，维持国有商业银行的业务运营，尽可能减少新增贷款投放所产生的信贷风险以及国家股东的问责压力，就成为其最佳的理性选择。第二，随着国家股东问责压力的加大，国有商业银行经理层围绕信贷风险控制，纷纷推行了一系列信贷改革，逐级上收信贷审批权、逐级实施信贷风险终身责任追索制，有效降低了信贷风险，在这个方面，符合国家股东控制信贷风险的意图；但是另一方面，由于信贷投放上的消极取向，不仅使国有商业银行存差不断扩大，资金运作效率下降，而且使得经济低迷期国家推进经济增长的资金投入明显不足，大量中小企业得不到国有商业银行信贷资金支持，这一点又是国家股东不愿意看到的。外部治理建设的脱节，使得国家股东在有效硬化国有商业银行经理层预算约束的同时，未能给国有商业银行信贷投放创造有效的制度保障，企图将信贷风险责任交由经理层单方面承担的治理机制变革，也导致了经理层在信贷投放上的消极抵制，从而使得国家股东逐步意识到只有协调推进内外部治理改革，才是继续推进改革的正确方向。 在第七章，2002-2004年内外双强治理机制下的再度超贷行为分析一章中，我们进一步揭示出，第一，国有商业银行的信贷风险改革，有效降低了信贷风险水平，国家首次推行的不良资产剥离，进一步厘清了信贷风险成因上政策性负担与经理层主观故意之间的区别，但是与之伴生的是国有商业银行低效的资金运作，导致国有商业银行经营效率的严重损失和国家信贷资金投入的明显不足。为此，国家股东正式启动对国有商业银行的全面综合化改革，明确国有商业银行的金融企业性质以及股改上市目标及具体改革步骤，在内部治理方面： 摘要 引进战略投资者，改进股权结构，提高决策科学化水平，深化薪酬激励改革，探索建立可变工资合约，加大经营绩效与经理层收入水平的挂钩力度，合理控制信贷风险问责压力等等。在外部治理方面：引入加入WTO的外生变量，加速银行服务市场、经理人市场、资本市场的建设步伐，将银行监管与货币政策职能分离，提高监管独立性，颁布信息披露办法，建立信息披露制度，完善司法体系，保障金融债权等等。正是伴随着国家股东对国有商业银行协调配套的治理改革深化，基于经理层的主观认知能力及其主观博弈过程，扩大信贷投放，降低信贷风险水平，尽快实现改制上市，成为经理层的理性选择。第二，在内外部治理机制配套建设刚刚起步的背景下，伴随国家对国有商业银行不良资产二次剥离的实施，国有商业银行经理层再度超贷行为普遍发生，短期内有效降低了不良贷款率、明显改善了经营业绩，但是与再度超贷行为伴生的除了宏观经济的再度过热，还有新增信贷风险的快速蓄积，这种现象必须引起高度的关注。为此，继续协调配套推进国有商业银行的治理机制改革，在内部治理方面，以股权多元化为核心，全面推进薪酬激励机制改革，完善内部审计体系，提高决策的科学性。在外部治理方面，以扩大市场化改革为基调，依托全面市场体系建设，健全法制建设，加强金融债权保护，合理约束经理层的信贷经营行为，引导国有商业银行经理层选择风险适中的信贷行为，有效控制信贷风险，平滑信贷规模波动，降低对宏观经济波动的干扰，是继续深化改革的可行方向。 第八章总结与政策建议部分，指出在国有商业银行股份制改造和构建新的公司治理机制过程中必须重视“国家董事”有效代理问题，以及内外部治理机制的协调推进问题。最后在内部治理机制、司法环境建设和宏观政策等方面提出建议和构想。
英文摘要：	This dissertation believes that the Credit Risk-Taking Behavior of the State-owned Commercial Banks’(SOCBs) top managers’ went through a risk taking – risk avoidance – risk retaking period, and in terms of the credit scale, it experienced a over credit – less credit – over credit course. Essentially, this kind of evolution is the result of the managers’ adaptation to the governance mechanism reform led by the government. The periodic credit behavior of the SOCBs’ managers not only resulted to the accumulation – release – re-accumulation of SOCBs’ credit risk, but also enlarged the fluctuation of China’s macro economy. To prevent another round of credit risk deposition, it’s necessary to attach importance to bank managers’ behavior, assort the transformation process of SOCBs’ outside mechanism with inner governance, and lead the managers choose the moderate credit behavior. This dissertation consists of 8 chapters. Chapter 1 as the preface raises the issue of the article: what are the interrelations among SOCBs’ governance mechanism and SOCB managers’ Credit Risk Behavior? Then the author puts forward the view points and methods, and summarizes the innovation and limitation of this thesis. Chapter 2 is the literature review. Firstly, the author reviews the study concerning the relationship between SOCBs’ governance mechanism and managers’ behavior at credit risk. The author points out it’s not very scientific to study SOCBs’ governance mechanism and SOCB managers’ behavior at credit risk from the stable aspect by directly applying the analytical tools from developed countries. Then the author indicates that to study such issues in China, it’s necessary to notice the following 2 characteristics: The first is the analysis should base on an evolutionary perspective. The second is that it’s important to pay attention to the managers’ response and adaptation to the government as the stockholder, which means to notice the intermediate effects of people’s cognition in the transformation of the system and behavior. Consequently, in the next half the author studies the mechanism that how the system and cognition influence the risk behavior, and emphasizes that in such studies, the latest theories of New Institutional Economics, Behavioral Finance, and Cognitive Psychology should be used for reference sufficiently. Chapter 3 is the core part, and it is the normative research of this dissertation. In this chapter, using the latest studies of New Institutional Economics, Cognitive 摘要 Psychology and Game Theory, the author constructs a evolutionary model of “mechanism – behavior – performance”, and brings out the analytical system of “SOCBs’ governance mechanism – managers’ Credit Risk Behavior – SOCBs’ credit risk”. This study believes that, firstly, in the static state, based on managers’ cognition and game phase, at different transformation period and different corporate governance level, the SOCB managers choose different levels of risky credit behaviors; secondly, from a relatively stable aspect, the transformation of corporate governance results the changes of the managers’ risky credit behavior; thirdly, the credit risk resulted from managers’ risky behavior, and its allocation between the managers and the government as the stockholder decides the distribution of the welfare from the credit resource. The two parties’ cognitions and reactions drive the changes of governance mechanism, and in the long run, will lead to an inner-strong and outer-strong governance pattern. Chapter 4 is the first half of the practical analysis. Based on the studies of Experimental Economics and Behavioral Finance, the author requested the Selten Lab of Nankai University to conduct an evolutionary experiment about the interrelationship between SOCBs’ governance mechanism and SOCBs’ managers’ behavior on credit risk. The results are highly in line with the hypothesis raised in chapter 3. First, different governance mechanism makes the managers choose different levels of credit behavior. Second, the transformation of governance leads to the changes in the managers’ risky credit behavior. Third, based on the cognition and gaming process, the reaction of the government as the stockholder (agree, disclaim, or disagree) can influence the transformation of governance mechanism actively. Chapter 5, chapter 6 and chapter 7 are the next half of the practical research. These 3 chapters focus on the SOCBs’ managers’ credit behavior under the conditions of “inner-weak, outer-weak”, “inner-strong, outer-strong”, and “inner-strong, outer-strong”, and the author reviews SOCBs’ managers’ over credit – less credit – over credit course behavior in the history. In chapter 5 of the analysis of the “over-credit” in the “inner-weak, outer-weak” situation from 1994 - 1997, the author indicates that: firstly, the “inner-weak, outer-weak” governance mechanism is the natural continuity of the administrative governance mode. Due to the managers’ fixed wages contract, the lack of the interpellation restriction and loose outer governance mechanism, based on the managers’ subjective cognition and gaming process, the managers’ rational choice 摘要 was to obtain the credit right to maximize their own benefits. The results were the maximization of state’s credit volume, and even exceeded the country’s economic feasibility edge, and breach the principal of profitability. Secondly, over crediting, on one hand, enabled the government as the stockholder to feed the State Owned Enterprises with money, which supported the investment-driven economic growth, and through political loan, the government as the stockholder took over the State Owned Enterprises’ transformation costs, which was recognized and satisfied by the government as the stockholder; on the other hand, over credit resulted too much accumulation of credit risk, and the government would take the final losses. This stimulated the government to take efforts to change the “inner-weak, outer-weak” situation, and in the later reforms, inevitability, the SOCBs’ managers would face a tougher interpellation system. In chapter 6, the analysis of the “less credit” stage under the “inner – strong, outer weak” governance mechanism from 1998 to 2001, the author indications that: firstly, because of the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the government as the stockholder conducted the unilateral enforcement of SOCB managers’ budget constrain. Since the motivation method to the SOCBs’ managers are still fixed wages and the strict risk interpellation system was put into practice, there was a problem of too much constrain and less motivation. Under this situation, based on the SOCB managers’ objective cognition and gaming process, their rational choice was to reduce new loans and related credit risk as much as possible while maintain the daily business operation. Secondly, along with the increasing pressure of the state’s interpellation system, the SOCB managers conducted several reforms to control credit risk, such as centralized the examine and approval rights of credit loans, and established the system to ask the people who were reliable for the credit risk to hold the response for life-long time. On one hand, these methods effectively reduced the credit risk, which is in line with the government’s purpose to control credit risk. On the other hand, the negative attitude to the credits resulted to not only the enlargement gap of the banks’ deposit and loans, which reduced banks’ money operation efficiency, but also the obvious shortage of currency for the economic growth. These are that the government did not want to see. When the government as the stockholder enforced the budget constrain, the lack of outer governance mechanism did not provide effective mechanism to support banks credit behavior. Then the government as the stockholder realized that improving SOCBs’ outer governance mechanism in line with 摘要 SOCBs’ inner governance mechanism is the right way to drive the reform. In chapter 7, the analysis of another time of “over credit” stage under the “inner – strong, outer strong” governance mechanism from 2002 to 2004, the author indicates that: first, the reform of credit risk in SOCBs effectively reduced the level of credit risk. The government conducted the divestiture of SOCBs’ non - performing assets for the first time, and clarified the 2 different causes of the credit risk: one is the political burden and the other is the managers’ deliberate mistakes. But this action was followed by the low efficiency of SOCBs’ money operation, which leads to the severe loss of SOCBs’ operating efficiency, and the lack of the country’s credit investment. Thereby, the government as the stockholder started the overall integrated reforms of the SOCBs, and clarified SOCBs’ nature as the financial enterprise, the goals and schedules of stock transformation and going listed. For the inner mechanism, they introduced the strategic investors, improved stock structure, enhanced the scientific decision making capability, conducted the compensation and motivating reform, tried to establish flexible wage contract, increased the correlation between corporate performance and the managers’ income, confined the credit risk interpellation system to a reasonable level, etc. For the outer governance mechanism, there were following actions: introducing the influence power of WTO, accelerating the establishment of banking service, managers’ labor market and capital market, separating the function of bank regulation and currency policy to improve the independence of regulatory bodies, publishing the procedures of publishing information to establish the system of publishing information, improving the justice system to ensure creditor’s rights. Along with the government as the stockholder improved the related governance mechanism, based on their cognition and gaming stage, the managers of SOCBs rationally choose to increase credit volume, reduce the credit risk and realize the Initial Public Offering (IPO) as soon as possible. Second, at the stage when the inner and outer mechanism was just carried out, the government started the second time of divestiture of SOCBs’ non - performing assets and the managers of SOCBs started another round of “over credit”. In the short run, this behavior quickly reduced the Non-performing Loan's Rate and obviously operating performance. But the over-heating of the macro economy and the accumulated credit risk of the new loan came along with the over credit behavior, which must be paid more attention. Therefore, the SOCB should continue to conduct the reform of the governance mechanism. For the inner mechanism, based on stock diversification, they should 摘要 make further steps on the reform of motivation mechanism, and improve the internal audit system, enhance the capability of making scientific decisions. For the outer mechanism, based on the principal of market economy, they should establish the overall market system, improve the justice system, enhance the protections for the creditors, restrict the SOCB managers’ credit behavior to a reasonable level, and lead them to choose the middle level risk behavior to control the credit risk, and smooth the fluctuation of credit volume. That is the possible direction where the further reform would go. In chapter 8，we conclude the whole thesis, discribe the new tendency, and bring some new questions. During the processing of corporate governance reform, we should pay more attention on national directors supervision, and coordination between the internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism. At last, we give some advices.
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