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论文编号：	2065
作者编号：	1120050770
上传时间：	2009/12/17 19:31:23
中文题目：	任免机制对我国独立董事监督作用影响分析
英文题目：	A Study on Analyzing the Influence of the Selecting and Replacing Mechanisms of the Independent Directors in China on Their Monitoring Roles
指导老师：	唐方方；李维安
中文关键字：	任免机制　独立董事　监督　独立性
英文关键字：	selecting mechanisms independent directors monitoring independence
中文摘要：	实践表明，独立董事为公司决策提供专业意见的职能是有效的。然而，目前，我国上市公司中，独立董事的提名、罢免和继任过程都受到公司大股东或总经理的控制，现存任免机制与独立董事的监督职能之间存在着“利益冲突”，这导致独立董事监督的声誉激励基础失效，进而导致独立董事的监督作用弱化。因此，独立董事制度的进一步改革很大程度上需要从独立董事的任免机制改革入手。 深入研究任免机制对我国独立董事监督作用的影响机理是提出改革方案和建议的前提和基础。现实中，很多独立董事与公司大股东之间存在着隐性的私人关系。这种关系不能通过公司公开数据识别，还会导致独立董事监督作用弱化，这也是致使利用公开数据进行公司绩效与董事会名义独立性指标进行相关分析不能得出一致结论的重要原因之一。实验方法能够控制一些实践中不可控的因素，并且可以检验政策实施的预期效果。因此，本研究选择实验方法，在控制声誉和其他次要影响因素条件下，通过组别关系这一变量识别实质独立或形式独立的情形，对任免机制（包括提名方式、罢免方式和竞聘机制）如何影响我国独立董事监督作用这一问题进行检验和分析。 本文通过理论分析和实验检验发现，排除其他因素影响，实质独立通过利他偏好激励保证独立董事实施有效监督；首次提名方式、组别、罢免方式和竞聘机制对独立董事的监督作用影响也都是重要的。大股东独享对独立董事的提名权和罢免权以及形式独立都会显著地挤出独立董事基于利他惩罚偏好的积极监督行为。中小股东独占提名权只能减弱并不能完全消除形式独立对监督作用产生的负面影响。解任方式是一个更强的影响因素，当小股东同时拥有对独立董事的提名权和解任权时，即使独立董事与内部人组别关系存在，这时组别关系的消极作用可以被降到最低。内部人独占对独立董事的提名权时，竞争机制不能促进独立董事积极监督，相反会带来危害。此外，虽然从平均水平来看，任免机制对男性与女性监督作用的影响不存在性别差异。但是，如果独立董事任免相关机制设计不当，女性实施消极监督的比例会更高。而在任免机制及其他辅助机制设计合理的情况下，女性独立董事中实施有效监督的比例显著高于男性。 这些发现对独立董事机制改革的意义在于，进一步提高中小股东提名权的改革固然重要，但是罢免方式的设计应该是任免机制改革的重点。竞聘机制与外部机制需在独立董事的提名与解任（罢免）机制改革基础上实施才能起到积极作用。改进提名委员会的独立性是提高我国上市公司董事会实质独立性的重要途径之一，此外，可以通过任免机制设计减弱形式独立对监督产生的消极影响。最后，董事会中增加女性董事和独立董事的政策建议也应该以先行改革任免机制为前提。 本论文分为七个部分。第一部分是导论部分。第二部分在文献回顾和相关理论研究基础上，归纳独立董事监督的理论基础，并建立本研究的独立董事监督博弈模型。第三部分对任免机制如何影响我国独立董事的监督作用进行理论分析和模型构建。第四部分和第五部分通过2个实验对理论分析部分提出的假设进行检验。第六部分检验了任免机制对独立董事监督作用的影响是否存在性别差异。第七部分概括了本文的结论，并对如何改进我国独立董事任免机制提出了具体可行的建议和对策。 本文的理论价值和创新之处概括如下： 第一，本文认为，社会偏好理论也是独立董事监督的理论基础，利他惩罚偏好是实质独立条件下我国独立董事监督的内在激励，组别因素是形式独立削弱监督作用的深层原因。本论文在Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)第三方惩罚博弈模型基础上提出独立董事监督博弈模型，较好地刻画了我国上市公司内部人、中小股东和独立董事的关系。第二，在社会偏好理论、社会同一性理论、前景理论和竞争理论基础上，阐述了任免机制通过利他、互惠、组别、损失规避及竞争因素对我国独立董事监督作用产生影响的深层机理，同时通过社会偏好模型对博弈均衡解进行推导和求解，并创新性地构建了一个以外部机制作为外生变量，任免机制作为监督的主要影响因素，独立性作为基础影响因素的三层次理论模型，扩展了任免机制对监督作用影响的微观理论基础文献。第三，鉴于实证方法无法完美的识别实质独立与形式独立，亦无法比较现行机制与未施行机制的影响效果，因此，采用实验方法对任免机制如何影响我国独立董事监督作用这一问题进行研究是本论文方法上的创新。
英文摘要：	Independent directors are proven to be effective in providing experts advices to board in practice. For the present, in Chinese listed companies, since the process of nominatating, replacing and reselecting independents directors are controlled by large shareholders or CEO, there are benefit conflicts between the present selecting mechanisms of independent directors and outside independent directors’ fuction of moniting insiders in companies, which leads to the ineffectiveness of their monitoring role. Thus, the further reform of independent directors institutions largely depends on the reform of selecting and replacingmechanism of independent directors. Finding the influence of each factors relating to selecting mechanisms on the monitoring role of independent directors is first and foremost to reform proposals and suggestions. In reality, because of the present selection system, there are some private relationships unseen by the public between many independent directors and large shareholders or CEOs, for instance, friends, acquentance or parteners in the same clubs, which cannot be identified by archival data and might defunction outside directors’ monitoring roles and thus also an important reason that there are not consistent empirical findings on the relationship between board independence index and firm performance index. Experimental methods can exclude the influence of some uncontrolled factors in reality and concern the main interesting variables to researchers so that we can test the future effect brought by the change of policies. Thus, this study used this method and created conditions controlling the influence of other factors such as reputations under which independence in appearance and independence in essence can be identified clearly by the setting of group identity and examined the influence of selecting and replacing mechanisms on independent directors’ monitoring roles. Findings in this study indicate that altruistic preference, nominating right, group identity replacing right and competition mechanisms are all important in affecting the level of monitoring by indepent directors. Only having nominating powers does not work well for small shareholders to improve the monitoring roles of independent directors. The power to remove independent directors is a factor which can exert stronger influence on the level of monitoring. If small shareholders have both nominating and removing rights, even if independent directors and the insiders belong to the same group, this can minimize the negative influence of group identity. Furthermore, if the insiders have the right to nominate independent directors, competition among candidates cannot cause them to increase the level of monitoring the insiders who are the nominators and can lead to detrimental effect. On average, there are no gender differences in monitoring roles of independent directors. However, under improper selecting and replacing mechanisms of independent directors, there will be more female directors who do not monitor well and vice versa. The significances of these findings are as follows. Inspite of the importance of nominating reform, the design of replacing mechanisms should be the most important in the reform of appointment mechanisms. The reform and development of external systems such as market can function well on the base of the appointment rules reform. Beside, increasine the independence of nominating committee is among the methods which can improve board independence in essence. Recruiting more female directors to board should be encouraged after the reform of selecting and replacing mechanisms. There are seven sections in this paper. The first section is the introduction part. The next section is a literature review of related studies and some related theories. In the third part, based on theories on popular theoretical concerns on social preferences and economic incentives, psychologies and related research in terms of biological evolution, I designed a logical model on the relationship between the dependent variable such as the level of monitoring and the causal variables such as who has the nominating power, group identity, who has the power to remove independent directors and etc., and proposed several related hypothesises. In Section 4 and Section 5, the parameters on the design of Experiment 1 and 2, the experimental methods and procedure were reported, and then the findings were analized and the hypothesises were tested. The sixth part studied whether the mechanisms on norminating and removing independent directors affected male and female directors in terms of monitoring differently. The final part of this study concludes and some specific and feasible suggestions and policies on how to revise the present mechanisms on selecting and replacing independent directors were proposed in the end. The innovations of this study are summarized below: Firstly, social preference theories are the basis in theory for independent directors to monitor. Independence in essence made independent directors in China to monitor out of altruistic punishment if other mechanisms such as reputation do not work well. Based on third party punishment game by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), independent directors monitoring game model was proposed, which vividly captured the relationship among the insiders, small shareholders and independent directors in the listed companies in china. Secondly, social preference theory, social identity theory, prospect theory and competition theory are innovatively used to analyze the research question. Equilibrium is deducted by Models including social preferences. A three-tier theoretical model about how selecting and replacing mechanisms affected independent directors’ monitoring roles is proposed. These extend present related literature. Thirdly, considering the limitation of empirical methods by using archival data, experimental method was used to study the influence of appointment mechanisms on the monitoring roles of independent directors.
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