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论文编号：	2062
作者编号：	043081
上传时间：	2010/4/14 16:05:25
中文题目：	基于控股股东机会主义的控制权转移研究
英文题目：	Control Transfer Controlling Shareholder
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	控制权转移 控股股东 机会主义 上市公司
英文关键字：	Control Transfer Controlling Shareholder Opportunism Listed
中文摘要：	随着经济改革深化与证券市场发展，我国控制权市场逐渐活跃，自1997年起，出现了上市公司控制权转移热潮。上市公司发生控制权转移的原因是什么？基于特定原因发生的控制权转移又将给上市公司带来何种后果呢？与已有文献不同，本文基于控股股东机会主义视角研究我国上市公司控制权转移原因与后果。 本文以我国证券市场1997年－2001年发生控制权转移的294家上市公司为样本，研究发现： 1．我国上市公司控制权转移中，存在原（新）控股股东坐庄炒作、原控股股东控制权私人收益损失最小化、新控股股东进入证券市场圈钱、新控股股东投机等机会主义动因。这些机会主义动因对上市公司控制权转移起到推动作用。具体证据为： 发生控制权转移的上市公司具有股票易于坐庄炒作的特点，上市公司控制权转移前一年股价越低，流通市值规模越小，控制权转移发生概率越高。发生控制权转移的上市公司具有股权制衡度高的特点，上市公司控制权转移前股权制衡度越高，控制权转移发生概率越高。新控股股东通过控制权转移进入证券市场，控制权转移前新控股股东中有96％为非上市公司，89％也非上市公司的控股股东；新控股股东取得上市公司控制权后积极开展“保配”盈余管理行动，有58.5%的上市公司在控制权转移当年达到配股监管要求的盈利水平，有56.1%的上市公司在次年达到配股监管要求的盈利水平。上市公司控制权转移后出现明显的控制权再次转移现象（31.97%）；与未发生再次控制权转移的上市公司相比，发生再次控制权转移的上市公司控制权私人收益水平更低。 2．我国上市公司控制权转移中存在严重的内幕交易行为；原（新）控股股东与内幕交易行为有关，原（新）控股股东在控制权转移中付出越多，内幕交易行为越严重。由于控股股东可以利用控制权转移中内幕交易进行补偿，使得上市公司控制权转移易于发生。具体证据为： 控制权转移信息披露前夕上市公司累计非正常报酬率已达6.9%，控制权转移信息披露公告效应为6.4%，控制权转移信息披露前累计非正常报酬率占披露期间最高累计非正常报酬率的比重为93%。原（新）控股股东与内幕交易行为有关，原（新）控股股东在控制权转移中付出越多，内幕交易行为越严重。原控股股东控股比例越高，内幕交易越严重；现金方式交易时，控制权转移中内幕交易行为比非现金方式交易时更加严重。 3．控制权转移虽然在短期内（控制权转移当年及随后一年）改善了上市公司业绩，但在更长时间期间（控制权转移后二到三年），却降低了业绩；上市公司业绩短暂改善是通过业绩增长实现的，而上市公司的盈利能力始终没有改善。新控股股东投机性行为有损于控制权转移之后上市公司业绩的真正改善。 上述研究发现证明了我国上市公司控制权转移中存在控股股东机会主义动因或行为，这些机会主义动因或行为推动了上市公司控制权转移的发生，其中，部分机会主义行为对控制权转移之后上市公司业绩改善造成负面影响。本文的研究结论有助于深刻理解特殊制度背景中我国控制权市场的功能，对证券市场监管层的监管行为、投资者的投资策略以及其他利益相关者的决策均有启示意义。
英文摘要：	With the deepening of economic reform and development of securities market, Chinese market for corporate control becomes more active than ever before. Since 1997, appeared an upsurge of control transfer in Chinese listed companies. What factors motivate the control transfer in Chinese listed companies? And what are the economic consequences of control transfer? Being different from existing literatures, I systematically analyze the reasons and economic consequences of control transfer in Chinese listed companies from the point view of the controlling shareholders’ opportunism. By investigating 294 listed companies which had changed their controlling shareholders from 1997 to 2001, I have found that: 1. In control transfer, there are controlling shareholders’ opportunism, such as motivations of market manipulation, minimizing the losses of private benefits, motivations of financing, and speculations, which have driven the control transfer in Chinese listed companies. The empirical evidences are as follows: The company which changes controlling shareholder was prone to market manipulation, the probability of control transfer was negatively related to the stock price or market value 1 year before control transfer. The probability of control transfer was positively related to the stock holding restriction of listed companies. 96% of new controlling shareholders were not listed companies, 89% had never controlled listed company before control transfer. By acquiring a listed company, the new controlling shareholder gained the way access to securities market. After control transfers, 58.5% of listed companies satisfied the requirement of sequent issues in the transferring year, 56.1% satisfied in the next year. And 31.97% of listed companies re-changed their controlling shareholders. Comparing to the listed companies without re-changed, the re-changed ones had lower level of private benefits. 2. There are severe insider trading during control transferring, both the existing and new controlling shareholders are related to insider trading. The more the controlling shareholder pays, the more severe the insider trading is. The insider trading promotes the control transfer in Chinese listed companies. The empirical evidences are as follows: In the eve of announcement on control transfer, the CAR(Cumulative Abnormal Return) amounted to 6.9%. The Announcement Effect of the information was 6.4%. The ratio of the CAR before announcement to the climax of CAR during the period was 93%. There were evidences which show that the controlling shareholders were related to insider trading. The extent of insider trading was correlative with the existing controlling shareholder’s stock holding. When the payment was in cash, the insider trading would be more severe than that of non-cash. 3. Control transfer has improved listed companies’ performance transitorily (in the transferring year and the next year), but deteriorated the performance in the long run (2 to 3 years after control transfer). The improvement of performance is the result of increase, but the companies’ profitability has never changed. The re-change of controlling shareholder is harmful to the improvement of performance after control transfer. These findings prove the controlling shareholders’ opportunism in the control transfer, and some opportunism is harmful to the improvement of performance of listed companies after control transfer. All the findings are helpful for understanding on the function of Chinese market for corporate control, also have some implications for supervision and regulation behaviors of authorities, investment strategy of investors, and decision making of other stakeholders.
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