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论文编号：	2053
作者编号：	043079
上传时间：	2010/4/12 16:15:20
中文题目：	研究盈余质量对会计业绩的报酬契约有用性的影响
英文题目：	Earnings Quality; Compensation contracts
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	盈余质量 报酬契约 业绩评价 盈余质量鉴别 股权特征
英文关键字：	Earnings Quality; Compensation contracts; Performance Evaluation;
中文摘要：	本文研究盈余质量对会计业绩的报酬契约有用性的影响，在理论分析中明确了管理者报酬契约的盈余质量鉴别的内涵和意义，将这一研究纳入我国上市公司股权特征引发的不同代理冲突的框架下。文章的实证研究部分以我国上市公司为研究对象，考察根据盈余质量特征调整管理者现金报酬契约中会计业绩权重的盈余质量鉴别机制是否存在，并进一步检验股权特征对盈余质量鉴别力度的影响。 文章在文献回顾和理论分析的基础上，明确研究的主要观点：董事会（或其他监管者）根据盈余质量特征调整会计业绩度量的权重是对管理者报酬契约进行会计信息质量鉴别的结果，指出会计盈余可靠性、及时性、稳健性和持续性质量特征是有利于科学评价管理者业绩的关键盈余质量。报酬契约中的会计信息鉴别体现了内部治理对高质量会计信息的需求，这一研究领域属于会计信息的治理有用性的范畴。 文章指出在我国上市公司股权特征的现状下，管理者报酬契约中会计信息鉴别的实现受到上市公司的股权特征的推进或制约，其作用机理是上市公司股权特征对治理效率的影响和对盈余质量的需求。为了深化理论分析，提出大股东影响报酬契约中盈余质量鉴别的“信息优势假说”和“剩余索取权激励不足假说”。 论文的实证研究部分将管理者报酬的会计信息质量鉴别具体化为根据会计盈余质量特征调整现金报酬契约中会计业绩度量的权重，即盈余质量对会计业绩的现金报酬契约有用性所产生的影响，考察了我国上市公司管理者现金报酬契约中是否存在会计盈余的可靠性、及时性、稳健性和持续性的质量鉴别；以及鉴别力度是否受到企业终极控制人性质、股权集中度、大股东对董事会的控制力和股权制衡等股权特征的影响，并分析了盈余综合质量对会计业绩的报酬契约有用性的影响。这部分研究得出的实证结论主要有： 1．从整体情况看，会计盈余可靠性、及时性、稳健性和持续性程度能够影响会计信息在管理者报酬契约中作用的发挥，以等权赋分法和因子分析法计算出的盈余综合质量，也对报酬-业绩相关性产生了正向的边际影响。在一定程度上说明董事会在根据会计业绩指标考核管理者并制定现金报酬水平时，对盈余质量进行了合理鉴别，会计报告解脱受托人责任的目标达成程度确实受到会计信息质量的影响。 2．管理者报酬契约中盈余质量鉴别受到上市公司最终控制人身份的影响，影响的方向又因盈余质量指标的特性不同而有所差异。（1）相对于非国有上市公司，国有终极控制上市公司从整体上讲，更加重视对管理者报酬契约中会计盈余稳健性和持续性的鉴别，忽视盈余及时性的作用。（2）国有终极控制的上市公司，因直接控股的单位性质的差异，相应的研究结果又有差别。相对于国家机构直接控制的上市公司，国有企业控制的上市公司对盈余可靠性、持续性更加重视，说明政府、国有投资公司等国家机构作为控股股东，缺乏监督经理人的剩余索取权激励。 3．随着第一大股东的持股比例的提高，盈余及时性对管理者报酬-会计业绩敏感性的正向影响程度减弱，盈余持续性对管理者报酬-会计业绩敏感性的正向影响程度增强。大股东持股比例位于倾向“协同战略”持股区间时，报酬契约中对盈余可靠性的鉴别力度增强。 4．大股东对董事会派出人员的中间机制增强了董事会在报酬契约中盈余质量鉴别的效力，体现在对盈余可靠性、稳健性和持续性的重视。说明大股东对董事会派出人员的中间机制很大程度上体现了“大股东监督的信息优势说”。 5．上市公司的股权制衡力量，在管理者报酬契约的盈余质量鉴别方面，发挥了一定的“治理协同效应”。 文章的创新之处主要体现在以下几个方面： 本文从会计信息质量影响报酬契约治理机制的角度，考察治理的效率问题，研究视角较为新颖。提出了基于业绩评价的会计信息质量特征，并指出对报酬契约进行会计信息质量鉴别的内涵和意义。 利用我国上市公司的数据分析了不同维度的盈余质量特征和盈余综合质量对报酬-会计业绩相关性的影响，说明高质量的会计信息有利于财务报告目标的实现。 结合我国上市公司的治理特征，提出了股权特征影响管理者报酬契约会计信息质量鉴别的分析框架、以及“大股东信息优势假说”和“大股东剩余索取权激励不足假说”，并证明了相关研究假设，在实证研究结论中有所突破。 通过理论分析和实证检验，作者对会计信息质量和会计目标的关系，会计信息质量和公司治理的关系提出了自己的观点，深化了对会计报告目标理论的认识。指出会计目标能否真正实现向“决策有用观”的转变，受到资本市场效率、企业股权特征的深刻影响，并提出了关于增加控股股东的信息披露责任、加强上市公司报酬信息披露等方面的政策建议。
英文摘要：	This dissertation studies the influence of earnings quality on the usefulness of accounting performance in compensation contracts and clarifies the meaning and importance of earnings quality identifying in compensation contracts. In both theoretical analysis and empirical test, the ownership characteristics in listed companies are taken into consideration. I employ the data of listed companies to test whether earnings quality identifying exists and how it is affected by ownership characteristics. After reviewing related literature and theoretical analysis, the basic argument of this dissertation is put forward: adjusting the structure of compensation contracts on the earnings quality is a process of accounting identifying in compensation contracts. We ensure the reliability, timeliness, conservatism and persistence of earnings are the core earnings quality for performance measure. Earnings quality affecting the usefulness of accounting information in compensation contracts reflects the demand of accounting information with high quality for corporate governance. This research field belongs to accounting governance role. Since most of Chinese listed companies have relatively concentrated ownership, large shareholders affect earnings quality identifying in compensation contracts. The influential mechanism is large shareholders’ effect on governance efficiency and need for earnings quality. To deepen the understanding of the theoretical analysis and empirical design, we put awards two hypothesis on large shareholders affecting earnings quality identifying——“information advantage ” vs “insufficient incentive form claim to firm’s residue”. Empirical tests of this dissertation study whether the earnings quality affects the pay-performance sensitivity, and whether the ownership characteristics have interacting effect on these influences. Earnings quality is concretized by earnings reliability, timeliness, conservatism and persistence. We pay more attention on these ownership characteristics: characteristic of the ultimate controller, the ownership proportion of large shareholders, the control of the largest shareholder on the boards and second largest shareholder’s strength. We also analyze how the comprehensive quality of earnings influences the usefulness of accounting performance in compensation contracts. Essential conclusions from the empirical tests are as follows: 1．Earnings reliability，timeliness, conservatism and persistence have negative effect on the pay-accounting performance sensitivity from a whole view, so does the comprehensive earnings quality. It shows that the board takes earnings quality into account when they assess the managerial performance and the higher accounting information quality is, the better the objectives of accounting report realize. 2．The identifying of earnings quality in compensation contracts is affected by ultimate controller, according to different dimensions of quality. （1）Compared to firms without the ultimate state-control，companies under the ultimate state-control pay more attention on the identifying of earnings conservatism and persistence in CEO compensation contracts, less on earnings timeliness.（2）Companies under the direct control from government agencies pay less attention on earnings reliability and persistence than ones under the direct control from state-owned operating firms. 3．While the percentage of the largest shareholder’s ownership increasing, the influence of earnings timeliness on the pay-accounting performance sensitivity weakens, and the influence of earnings persistence on the pay-accounting performance sensitivity strengthens. While the percentage of the largest shareholder’s ownership lying in the scope with “alignment effect”, the identifying of earnings reliability is prone to happen. 4．When the control strength of the largest shareholder in the board of directors is enhanced, the effect of earnings reliability, timeliness, and persistence on PPS will be relatively strengthened. This means there is the “governance alignment effect” in supervising CEO between the largest shareholder and the public firms. 5．From the view of earnings quality identifying in management pay of listed companies, ownership balancing mechanism shows “governance alignment effect” to some extent. The main contributions of this dissertation lie in: First, this dissertation provides a new research point to measure governance efficiency, which connects earnings quality with compensation contract and puts forward the accounting information quality based on performance measure and clarifies the meaning and importance of identifying earnings quality in designing compensation contracts. Second, by analyzing the influences of different dimensions of earnings quality on PPS empirically with the listed companies’ data in China, I provide evidence that the realization of accounting objective needs high accounting information quality. Third, connecting with the ownership characteristics and agency conflicts of our country’s listed companies, I construct, at the first time in the general sense, the theoretical analysis framework for influences of ownership characteristics on earnings quality identifying in compensation contracts and two main hypothesis of large shareholders affecting earnings quality identifying——“information advantage ” vs “insufficient incentive form claim to firm’s residue”. Based on the proposed analysis framework, our empirical tests are performed in different respects, such as characteristic of the ultimate controller, the ownership proportion of large shareholders, the control of the largest shareholder on the boards and ownership balancing mechanism. Forth, by the theoretical analysis and empirical tests, I draw out some arguments on relationship between accounting objective and accounting information quality, accounting information quality and corporate governance. I show that the transition of financial report’s objective to “decision-making availability” is affected by capital market’s efficiency and firms’ ownership characteristics. And put forward some political advices of enhancing the liability of company’s controller to expose information and reinforce the exposure of compensation information of listed companies.
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