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论文编号：	2042
作者编号：	022457
上传时间：	2010/4/8 16:05:24
中文题目：	中国上市公司现金股利政策研究
英文题目：	A Study on Cash Dividend Policy of China’s Listed Companies
指导老师：	齐寅峰
中文关键字：	现金股利 股权结构 股权分置
英文关键字：	Cash Dividends Ownership Structure
中文摘要：	本文以实证研究为主，结合一定的理论研究，从理论逻辑论证和实证数据分析两个方面，基于股权结构的视角，对我国上市公司现金股利政策进行系统深入分析。采用了比较静态的思想，构建了一个分析我国上市公司在股权分置结构下进行现金股利分配的决策模型。描述性统计采用1994-2004年沪深A股上市公司数据，实证研究样本选用2000-2004年的沪深A股上市公司数据。按照股权集中度、股东性质和流通股或非流通股主导三种标准对样本公司的股权结构进行分组，采用相关性分析、非参数检验、线性回归法和逻辑回归法进行实证分析。 本文共分六章。第一章是引言；第二章是对国外股利政策理论和国内股利政策实证研究回顾及评述，并对基于股权结构的国内外股利政策理论进行文献回顾；第三章对国内外现金股利支付状况进行比较分析，分析我国特殊股权结构对股利政策的作用机制，并构建一个分析我国上市公司股权分置结构下进行现金股利分配的决策模型；第四、五章是通过实证研究对不同股权结构下现金股利支付状况进行实证分析，探究不同股权结构下现金股利政策影响因素；第六章是总结全文的研究结论及局限性，并提出政策建议。 本文得到的主要理论研究结论包括： 1．股权分置体制下，当非流通股股东无法获得控制权私人净收益时，发放现金股利使得每股流通股价值下降的绝对值大于每股非流通股价值下降的绝对值，因而公司会放弃一些对于流通股股东而言净现值大于零的项目，发放现金股利。而当非流通股股东能获得控制权私人净收益时，公司会降低发放现金股利的可能性，将资金留在企业内部，获得非流通股独享的私人收益。 2．股权分置体制下，不同控股结构的公司现金股利政策存在明显差异。股权分置是大股东利用现金股利进行隧道挖掘的原动力。现金股利是隧道挖掘手段，不能起到保护中小投资者的作用。 本文得到的主要实证研究结论包括： 1．目前中国派现公司的比例超过美国的派现公司比例。另外，从现金股利占公司利润的股利支付率看，我国的现金股利支付率水平也要略高于主要国际市场的平均水平。但我国的流通股现金股利收益率却远远低于主要国际市场的平均水平。 2．我国上市公司现金股利支付缺乏连续性。 3．第一大股东的持股比例与每股现金股利并不存在U型的关系，这也进一步证明了公司的股利决策和整个股权结构有关。 4．影响不同股权结构公司现金股利政策制定因素有相同的，也有不同的，差异性本身就表明了股权结构对公司制定股利政策的影响。 5．每股收益是不同股权结构公司每股现金股利数量和流通股现金股利收益率的重要考虑指标，净资产收益率是不同股权结构公司现金股利支付率和非流通股现金股利收益率的重要考虑指标。 6．股权结构变量对现金股利政策的制定有显著性影响，说明股权集中度、股权性质差异、股权分置制度安排对公司股利政策影响重大。 代表股权集中度的三个变量中前五大股东持股比例平方和对现金股利决策影响最大。前五大股东持股比例平方和越大，越可能出现非理性派现；该变量对每股现金股利数量和股利支付率、股利收益率均有显著性影响，但在不同股权结构下符号有所不同。第一大股东控制力对部分股权结构公司的现金股利支付率和非流通股收益率有显著性影响。变量第一大股东与第二至第五大股东持股比例之和的差越大，越不倾向于支付现金股利；在相对控股和终极控制人为非国有的股权结构公司中，对流通股现金股利收益率有正向影响。 第一层面的股权性质对现金股利支付政策的影响中，以流通股比例较为突出。大体上说，流通股比例越高，公司越不倾向于发放现金股利，对每股现金股利数量、股利支付率、流通股和非流通股收益率都有负向影响。 第一大股东终极控制人的性质（国有还是非国有）对各种股权结构下的现金股利决策都没有显著性影响。第一大股东终极控制人的性质（中央政府所有还是地方政府所有）对部分股权结构下的现金股利收益率有显著性影响。 7．每股运营现金流和每股股权自由现金流对现金股利政策有非常显著性的影响。上市公司注重每股运营现金流和每股股权自由现金流的变动，表明这些公司把短期的现金约束作为发放现金股利考虑的重要因素。
英文摘要：	The dissertation mainly uses empirical study, together with some theoretical analysis. From the two aspects of theoretical logical and empirical analysis, based on the angle of the ownership structure, the dissertation studies cash dividend policy of China’s listed companies. When constructing the cash dividend distribution model of China’s listed companies under dual-class equity structure, the dissertation takes the compare static idea. Descriptive statistics take the data of listed companies of A share from 1994 to 2004, and empirical study takes the data of listed companies of A share from 2000 to 2004. According to the standard of degree of ownership concentration, properties of shareholders and tradable ability of share, the dissertation divides the sample companies into different groups. The dissertation applies the correlation analysis, Mann-Whitney nonparametric tests, linear regression and logistic regression methods. The dissertation is composed of six chapters. Chapter 1 is an overall introduction. Chapter 2 is about literature review; it backdates the dividend theories skeleton especially from the angle of ownership structure. Chapter 3 describes the actualities of cash dividend distribution in comparison with major global stock markets, explores the effect mechanism that the ownership structure has on cash dividend policy and builds cash dividend models in the framework of dual-class equity structure. Chapter 4 and 5 compare the dividend payout ration under different ownership structure, and clearly analyze the different indexes that influence the cash dividend policy. Chapter 6 concludes the whole dissertation, presents some shortcoming and puts up with some policy suggestion. The major theoretical conclusions of the dissertation are as follows: Firstly, under dual-class equity structure system, when non-tradable shareholder can not acquire private benefit of control, cash dividend distribution make the decline of absolute value of tradable share much more than non-tradable share’s. The company will forfeit some projects whose NPV is positive for tradable share and distribute cash dividend. When non-tradable shareholder has tunneling to acquire private benefit of control, the company will decline the likelihood of cash dividend distribution and keep the earnings in the company. Secondly, under dual-class equity structure system, the cash dividend policy has distinct variance among different ownership structure companies. Dual-class equity structure system is the prime motive of controlling shareholder tunneling by cash dividend. Cash dividend may be used as a way to tunnel while it cannot protect investor. The major empirical conclusions of the dissertation are as follows: Firstly, the conclusion shows that both the proportion of payer of China’s listed companies is higher than that of U.S. and the payout ratio is also higher than the average level of global market. However, the dividend yield ratio is much lower than the average level of global market. Secondly, cash dividend distribution of China’s listed companies lacks of persistence. Thirdly, the relationship of cash dividend per share and the first large shareholder’s proportion can not be described as “U” shape, which further proves that cash dividend policy is related to the whole ownership structure. Fourthly, there are common factors that influence the cash dividend policy among different ownership structures, but there are different factors. The variance itself proves that ownership structure has effect on the cash dividend decision. Fifthly, earning per share is the important factor that influences the dividend per share and the dividend yield of tradable share under different ownership structures. Return of equity is the important factor that influences the dividend payout ratio and the dividend yield of non-tradable share under different ownership structures. Sixthly, the results provide strong evidence to support that the indexes of ownership structure have effect on cash dividend decision. So the ownership concentration, properties of shareholders and dual-class equity structure have close relation with the cash dividend decision making. Among the three indexes of ownership concentration, the H5 (the sum of the square of the five largest shareholders proportion) has the strongest effect on cash dividend decision. The higher H5 is, the stronger desire the company has for irrational dividend payment. The controlling power of the first large shareholder has the effect on the dividend payout ratio and the dividend yield of non-tradable share. If the proportion of the tradable share is higher, then the pressure to pay cash dividends on the companies will be weaker; the companies will decrease the dividends. There is no significant difference in cash dividend decision among listed companies ultimately controlled by the state or non-state. Seventhly, operating cash flow per share and free cash flow to equity per share both have significant influence on cash dividend policy. Listed companies pay attention to the change of operating cash flow per share and free cash flow to equity per share, which show the companies regard the short-term cash constrains as important factors when distributing cash dividend.
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