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论文编号：	2038
作者编号：	022417
上传时间：	2010/4/8 16:27:53
中文题目：	风险企业的治理机制研究
英文题目：	The venture-backed company; Enterprise governance
指导老师：	陈清泰
中文关键字：	风险企业；企业治理；机制效率；成长治理；权变治理模式
英文关键字：	The venture-backed company; Enterprise governance
中文摘要：	中国经济正经历着发展方式由粗放型向集约型的战略转变，发展风险投资以促进科学技术成果转化已成为当务之急，然而风险企业治理机制不健全已经成为影响我国风险投资事业发展的“瓶颈”之一。全面研究和借鉴国外风险投资的风险企业治理机制，对于我国风险投资事业的稳健发展具有重要现实意义。文献回顾的结果表明，风险企业治理机制的研究需要结合中小企业特性的理论创新，在此基础上根据风险企业高成长性的特点，在微观层面对风险企业治理机制做出制度经济学的研究。因此，本研究集中于以下问题：风险企业作为一种高成长型中小企业，其基于特殊治理特征的治理机制作为制度安排的内容和规律是什么？ 论文从治理理论与机制作为一种制度安排的研究为切入点，探求风险企业治理机制内容与规律，并在对国外治理机制研究的基础上对国内治理机制进行研究。本论文对风险企业治理机制的研究，基于风险投资机构（风险投资家）的视角进行，即研究风险投资家如何利用治理机制防范企业家的“道德风险”，并研究风险投资家如何利用自身的人力资本实现对企业控制权的动态分配以增加风险企业价值。研究目的在于为我国风险投资机构参与风险企业治理提供切实的指导。研究方法主要是理论研究法、实证研究法和比较研究法。 人力资本对以“股东中心主义”为特征的传统公司治理逻辑提出了挑战。由于治理问题存在的普遍性、人力资本所有者与物质资本所有者的二位一体性、两权分离的模糊性以及“委托—代理”关系的相互性，治理的概念应由公司治理拓展为企业治理。企业治理概念可以归纳为以追求企业价值最大化为目标、以企业控制权根据人力资本和物质资本状况进行最优分配为核心，配置责、权、利为手段的制度安排。 经济机制是一种制度安排，这种制度安排所规定的约束经济活动中当事人特定行为模式和关系的规则，决定和反映了经济系统内部的有机制约关系及其运行机理。机制研究应当根据制度经济学，从产权配置、团队人力资本结构和交易成本等多角度展开。有效的机制设计应当满足参与约束和“激励相容”约束，同时满足上述两个约束的机制称为“自我实施”（可实施）机制。 风险企业的治理应当是企业治理的概念，本论文主要研究基于风险投资机构视角的风险企业治理机制，核心是通过一种制度安排促进风险投资家与企业家之间物质资本、人力资本更好地结合，防止企业家对风险投资家利益的背离，以实现企业价值最大化。风险投资家作为风险投资基金出资人的代理人，需要“激励相容”的治理机制，替代产权机制而提高风险企业治理机制的效率。具体的治理机制涉及有限合伙制及其治理机制、固定期限封闭式基金的治理机制、风险投资基金出资人治理的信息机制、风险投资出资人治理的绩效标准和投资协议的契约治理机制。 风险企业治理机制包括防范企业家“道德风险”的治理机制和以风险投资家人力资本为基础增加风险企业价值的治理机制，上述两种机制作用的发挥建立在风险投资项目选择机制的治理相容性基础上。风险投资项目的选择机制应当在宏观、中观与微观三个层面充分考虑项目与治理的相容性。在宏观、中观和微观层面，需要分别考虑风险投资家人力资本与项目的相容性、项目与风险投资家治理资源约束的相容性、企业家特征与选择机制的治理相容性。 防范企业家“道德风险”的治理机制主要包括风险企业董事会的治理机制、风险投资网络的治理机制、可中断分期投资策略的治理机制、可转换优先股的治理机制和针对经理层的治理机制。遏制企业家“道德风险”的治理机制总体上有这样的特征或规律：风险投资家试图利用投资协议构造一个完全信息的动态博弈机制，通过适当的支付函数，将风险转移给企业家，使得企业家对背叛行为产生正确的预期，且使双方均合作的状态成为精练纳什均衡，进而遏制企业家的“道德风险”。机制对企业家行为的规定满足了“激励相容”约束。 以风险投资家人力资本为基础增加风险企业价值的治理机制主要包括增值服务的治理机制和基于风险投资家对IPO影响的治理机制。 风险投资增值服务的最主要内容可以归纳为：“充当创业团队的参谋”、“提供融资支持”、“参与风险企业的战略制定与审查”、“监控风险企业的绩效”以及“雇佣和更换高层管理者”。根据风险企业的具体情况，风险投资家应当对上述事项的权力进行动态的分配。尽管存在投资回报量化方法差异、接受调查者知觉偏差和研究方法不同等问题，现有研究总体上表明增值服务在多数情况下确实增加了风险企业价值。为了提高增值服务治理机制的效率，风险投资家和企业家之间首先应当建立相互信任的关系，保持沟通渠道的畅通、沟通方式的坦诚和非正式性；其次，风险企业提供增值服务应当和风险企业的发展阶段结合起来，针对风险企业不同发展阶段的主要需求；再次，提供增值服务应当和风险企业所面临的不确定性程度相结合。 风险投资家在IPO过程中对风险企业人力资本等的投入能够增加风险企业价值。风险投资家因在IPO方面的人力资本而享有的控制权，具体反应在契约中“要求登记权”的治理机制。 上述众多针对企业家“道德风险”治理机制，可以通过企业家的效用函数和完全信息静态博弈的“囚徒两难”为工具得到整合，并使之具有一定的结构性。 不同的人力资本结合方式影响了控制权的分配方式，进而形成治理模式的差别。根据风险投资家以人力资本增进风险企业价值的治理机制分析，治理模式可以分为美国模式和英国模式。美国模式下，具体治理机制的选择主要由风险投资机构承担风险的主观偏好决定。在英国模式下，风险投资项目的选择机制对积极的治理机制产生了替代作用。 美国模式无法实现风险和治理机制的匹配，英国模式过于苛刻的选择条件不仅会提高投资成本而且减少投资机会，风险投资实践需要治理模式的创新。风险企业的治理方式应当根据具体的商业风险和代理风险权变地选取，在控制风险和节约交易成本之间做出平衡。根据代理风险和商业风险的约束，风险投资家可以权变地选取主导型、辅助型和放权型三种治理方式。 主导型治理机制基于风险投资家与企业家之间的等级契约关系，风险投资家利用契约所约定的权力针对企业家的效用决定因素实施治理机制。代理风险较小而商业风险较大的组合源于企业家人力资本的不完备性，风险投资家应当增加对风险企业的人力资本投入，针对风险企业的职能缺陷对风险企业的控制权重新分配，风险企业商业风险和代理风险均较小的情况下应当根据节约交易成本的原则，采取放权型治理机制。 风险投资家和企业家的人力资本与物质资本整合效应导致风险企业的高成长性，企业成长过程必然涉及到股权、控制权问题和退出的治理机制。作为对高风险、高不确定性环境的响应，风险企业具有极高的失败率，对风险企业失败原因的分析表明，相应的治理机制是董事会的治理机制和增值服务的治理机制。高成长、风险转换复合约束下，风险企业内部治理呈现出演进性。 根据调查，我国风险企业治理机制存在结构性的缺陷。具体表现在风险投资机构无法将企业家机会主义行为造成的风险有效转移给企业家，国外许多“激励相容”、“自我实施”的治理机制难以实现，与效率密切相关的制度因素导致机制低效。我国风险企业的治理机制缺陷源于国家创新体系的制度失效，完善风险企业治理机制，一方面要完善风险投资机构对风险企业治理机制，另一方面需要加强出资人对风险投资机构的治理，同时还要不断完善风险投资赖以存在的外部环境。 本研究理论层面除对以往研究进行综合外，基于人力资本理论将治理概念由公司治理拓展为企业治理，提出基于风险投资家人力资本增加风险企业价值的治理机制并研究其独特规律；根据整合的针对企业家“道德风险”的治理机制、风险投资实践中运用基于风险投资家人力资本增加风险企业价值的治理机制的不合理现状，提出依风险企业代理风险和商业风险而权变的治理模式。通过对我国风险企业治理机制实证，剖析我国风险企业治理机制问题的根源并提出建议，具有一定的实践意义。
英文摘要：	Venture capital industry is critical when we take it into consideration that the growth of Chinese economy is transforming to technology-driving type. However, the mechanism of governance has been one of the bottlenecks. It’s supposed to be meaningful both to research and practice for us to learn from foreign experiences. The literature review shows the need of theoretical breakthrough upon governance mechanism based on small and medium-sized enterprises’ characters. The research should be centered on such a question what the content and rules of governance mechanisms in venture-backed company featured by high growth are? The dissertation starts with the research on governance theory and mechanism as institution arrangement to find out the content and rules. Chinese governance mechanisms in the venture-backed companies are discussed based on the former research. The research is carried out in the way of academic study，empirical study and comparative study. The theory of human capital challenged the logic of shareholder-centered governance. There have been trends to focus the governance research upon the relationship between the human capital and physical capital. The concept of corporate governance should be expanded to enterprise governance because of the universality of governance problems, fuzz of separation between ownership and control, mutuality of agency, and identity of human capital owner and physical capital owner. Focusing upon allocating control rights according to the human capital and the physical capital, enterprise governance is an institution arrangement aiming at maximizing the venture’s value by the setting of responsibilities, power and profit. Economic mechanism is institution arrangement. It sets the rules of the concerned parties’ action and defines the internal relationships in economic systems. Research on mechanism should be conducted in the academic fields of the Institution Economics. Necessary is the theories of contracts, property rights and transaction costs. Mechanisms should meet the requirements of incentive compatibility and participation constraints to be self-enforcing. With the concept of enterprise governance, this research is centered on the protection of venture capitalists by way of institution arrangement to better integration of human capital and physical capital, preventing entrepreneur from moral hazard at the same time. Of course, the goal is to maximize the venture-backed company’s value. As the agent of fund providers, venture capitalist is without the property rights incentive. The situation calls for certain governance mechanisms to substitute the mechanism of property rights to keep efficiency. The governance mechanisms include mechanism of limited partnership, the mechanism of close end fund with time limit, the mechanism of information, performance target set by the principle, the agreements between venture capitalist and fund provider. Generally speaking, there are two groups of governance mechanisms in this research. One are the mechanisms preventing entrepreneur from opportunism. The other are the mechanisms to enhance the value of the venture-backed company with venture capitalist’s human capital. Both of them are based on the governance compatibility of the screening. The compatibility has a lot to do with the venture capitalist’s human capital, resources and specific entrepreneur’ s characters. The mechanism of board of directors, the mechanism of venture capital network, the mechanism of convertible preferred stock and the mechanism to management are among the governance mechanisms to control moral hazard. These mechanisms try to transfer the risk from venture capitalist to entrepreneur and are incentive compatible. The mechanisms to enhance the value of the venture-backed company with venture capitalist’s human capital include the mechanism of value-added services and the mechanism of IPO. These mechanisms are called governance mechanism because of venture capitalist’s human capital leading to the dynamic allocation of control rights. The principal of value-added services are acting as entrepreneur’s sounding board, helping finding financing resources, forming and reviewing strategy, monitoring the venture-backed companies’ performance and hiring and firing the executives. According to specific situation, venture capitalist will take part in the dynamic allocation of the corresponding power. Despite many differences, existing researches support the hypothesis that the so-called value-added services add value really. How can it be improved the efficiency of the mechanisms to enhance the value of the venture-backed company with venture capitalist’s human capital? First, venture capitalists should build good relation with entrepreneur and keep frank and informal communications through efficient channels. Second, the content of value-added services should differ according to the stage of the venture. Third, the services should take into account the uncertainties facing the venture. The venture capitalists’ contributions to IPO make the venture capitalists to demand the rights of registry. The seemingly chaotic mechanisms of preventing the entrepreneur from moral hazard could be structured by the function of entrepreneur’s utility that is decided by achievement motivation, authority, financial rewards and independence. The general character of the mechanisms is to transfer the eventual risk to entrepreneur. Different model of human capital integration leads to different control rights allocation. The result is different governance models. They include American model and British model. The governance mechanisms are decided by the venture capital institution’s will of risk bearing in the American model. The screening mechanism substitutive for governance mechanisms is utilized to explain the British model. The American model can’t match the risk with mechanisms. However, the British model will raise the cost of investment and reducing the opportunities of investment. Contingent governance model, which includes controlling, complementary and laissez faire items adapt to different commercial risk and agent risk, is suggested to improve governance efficiency and save the costs of governance. Because of the integration of human capital and physical capital, the venture-backed company is featured by high growth. The process is accompanied by governance evolution. That could be explained by organizational theory. The growth caused problems, such as ownership, control rights and control over exit, call for certain mechanisms of governance. The mechanism of board of directors and the mechanism of value-added services play a role. According to the investigation, governance of Chinese VC is making progress. However, there still are structural problems. The venture capital institution has difficulty to transfer the risk to entrepreneur. Chinese VC industry should put emphasis on both perfecting the mechanisms and improving the environment. Except for the comprehension to the former researches, this dissertation expends the concept of corporate governance to that of enterprise governance on theoretical level. With the new concept, the mechanisms based on venture capitalists’ human capital are researched. The contingent model was suggested according to the integrated mechanisms and unreasonable practice. To the reality, the governance mechanisms in China are researched.
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