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论文编号：	2037
作者编号：	032920
上传时间：	2010/4/8 15:48:57
中文题目：	企业、企业投融资及其互动机制
英文题目：	The Firm; Firm Investment and Financing;
指导老师：	齐寅峰
中文关键字：	企业；企业投融资；投融资互动机制
英文关键字：	The Firm; Firm Investment and Financing;
中文摘要：	本文系国家自然科学基金重点项目“我国企业投融资运作与管理研究”之专题“投融资环境变迁对企业投融资相互关系的作用机理研究”的阶段性成果，旨在探讨企业投融资及其相互关系。鉴于企业理论对于研究企业其他行为的重要性和基础性，本文采取了如下研究进路：企业的本质→企业投资和融资活动→企业投融资互动机制。如果将t-1时期的企业投资活动集和融资活动集分别记为{It-1}、{Ft-1}，将t时期的投资活动集和融资活动集分别记为{It}、{Ft}，则由于企业发展过程中的路径依赖，{{It},{Ft}}和{{It-1},{Ft-1}}之间将存在互动关系，由此，对{It}和{Ft}的探讨就不能不追溯到{It-1}和{Ft-1}。这种追溯将一直继续下去，直到企业不存在{It-1}和{Ft-1}，而这意味着：企业刚刚设立。将刚刚设立的企业称为新设企业(New Firm)，将新设企业的投融资称为初始投融资，将初始投资活动集和初始融资活动集分别记为{I0}、{F0}；将已经具有比较长的存续时间的企业称为现有企业(Existing Firm)，将其新一轮投融资称为再投融资，将再投资活动集和再融资活动集分别记为{I1}、{F1}。在此逻辑下，要研究企业投融资相互关系，必须首先研究新设企业的初始投融资及其互动机制，即{I0}和{F0}之间的互动，记为{I0}×{F0}；然后研究现有企业的再投融资及其互动机制，这种互动将包括：{I1}×{F1}；{I1}×{F0}；{F1}×{F0}；{F1}×{I0}。如果能够完成这种分析，那么对企业投融资相互关系的揭示将是相对完整的。这导致了本文的研究逻辑：首先对企业的本质进行重新考察；接着考察企业初始投融资及其互动机制；最后考察企业再投融资及其互动机制。 本文共分六章。第一章为导论，交代本文的写作背景、基本概念、结构安排、基本内容和主要创新。第二章为企业理论综述和基于企业本质的企业投融资理论的文献综述。第三章阐述我们对企业本质的不同理解，以及这种企业观点对企业投融资的意义。第四章探讨企业初始投融资及其互动机制。第五章探讨企业再投融资及其互动机制。第六章为本文的主要结论及发展方向。 本文的主要理论贡献和创新体现在如下方面。 一、在契约理论上，本文根据霍菲尔德的而非Grossman-Hart-Moore的权利概念体系来理解契约承载的内容，将权利/权力的获取奠定在义务/责任的承担上，将契约所承载的权利义务追溯到背后的经济活动。同时，本文将契约的生成机制推广到谈判机制、自发机制和强制机制共同作用的混合机制，在规则系统中重新解释契约的不完全性，但本文强调契约的完全程度而非不完全程度，强调自由裁量权的普遍存在而非“剩余权利”的0-1配置。 二、在企业理论上，本文将经济活动划分为生产和交易两种活动，二者的组合可产生三种经济状态：只有生产活动的纯生产经济、只有交易活动的纯交易经济、既有生产又有交易的生产-交易经济，然后分别在交易成本为零和交易成本大于零条件下探讨三种经济形态中的企业存在的条件与企业的本质，认为交易成本为零条件下也存在企业，企业的本质与契约和交易成本无关，只与生产和交易活动有关，企业是为交易而生产或者为交易而交易的联合体。在抽象意义上，企业的本质可视为一个联合投入的价值过程的载体。 三、在企业初始投资经营预算上，本文深入企业内部寻找决定因素，将投资成本、经营支出与管理结构、资产配置相结合，认为管理结构决定内部资产配置，内部长期资产配置决定了投资成本，而短期资产配置决定了经营支出。给定基层工作数量和基层资产配置，如果管理层的资产配置与基层资产配置满足一定关系，那么企业家剩余最大化将意味着可能存在某个最优的管理幅度，此时存在相应的最优的投资成本和经营支出。 四、在企业初始融资上，本文将融资契约安排与组织形态选择相结合，认为融资各方对权益结构、债务责任、股份等额化的选择决定了个人独资制、有限合伙制、一般合伙制、有限责任公司、股份有限公司等不同的组织形态。我们区分了管理结构和治理结构，认为二者具有相对独立性。我们还分货币出资和非货币出资两种情形，分别探讨了企业投资资产对融资方式选择的不同影响。 五、在企业再投资经营的预算上，本文根据管理结构与资产配置的决定作用将U型结构、M型结构、矩阵型结构的选择内生化，认为给定相关条件，U型结构、M型结构、矩阵型结构所需要的投资成本和经营支出将依次增加。同时，引进新事业所导致的投资扩张，将对旧事业的管理结构和资产配置也产生影响。企业家根据剩余最大化选择管理结构和资产配置，这决定了再投资成本和再经营支出。 六、本文认为引进新事业所导致的融资行为，不仅受到新事业投资的资产特性的影响，而且受到旧事业的存量资产、组织形态和治理结构的影响。
英文摘要：	This paper is a staggered achievement of subject Study on Function Mechanism of Investment and Financing Environment’s Change to the Interrelationship of Firm Investment and Financing, which is one special topic of the important project Study on Operation and Management of Firm Investment and Financing of China, sponsored by National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC). The purpose of this paper is to explain the interrelationship of firm investment and financing. For the importance and foundation of the theory of the firm, we adopt such research technology route as follows: the nature of the firm→the activities of firm investment and financing→the interaction mechanism between investment and financing. Mark respectively the set of investment activities and financing activities at period t-1 as {It-1}, {Ft-1}, and {It}、{Ft} at period t. Then, for the path dependence in the development of the firm, we have to trace back to the {{It-1},{Ft-1}} if we want to explain {{It},{Ft}}, until there doesn’t exit {{It-1},{Ft-1}}, which means that the firm is just founded. We divide the firm into two types: new firm and existing firm. The new firm’s investment and financing are called initial investment and initial financing, marked respectively as {I0}、{F0}, and the existing firm, re-investment and re-financing, marked as {I1}、{F1}. The interaction between initial investment and initial financing can be marked as {I0}×{F0}, but the interactions between re-investment and re-financing include four mechanisms: {I1}×{F1}, {I1}×{F0}, {F1}×{F0}, {F1}×{I0}. If we can complete this analysis, the study of interrelationship of firm investment and financing will be relatively systematic. There are six chapters in this paper. Chapter 1 is introduction. Chapter 2 surveys the theory of the firm and the investment and financial theory. Chapter 3 demonstrates our opinion on the nature of the firm, and the meaning of it to the firm investment and financing. Chapter 4 explain {I0}×{F0}. Chapter 5 analyze {I1}×{F1},{I1}×{F0},{F1}×{F0},{F1}×{I0}. Chapter 6 is our main conclusions and some possible extensions. We illustrate the main theoretic contributions of this paper as follows. 1. We discuss the contractual arrangement according to Hohfeld’s concept system of rights, not Grossman-Hart-Moore’s. We extend the production mechanism of contract from negotiation mechanism to the mix of negotiation, spontaneity and coercion mechanism. We explain the contract incompleteness in the rule system. But we emphasize the extent of contract completeness, not incompleteness; emphasize the general existing of discretion right, not the one-zero allocation of residual rights. 2. We divide the economic activities into two types: production and transaction, the combination of which can leads to 3 types of economy forms: pure production economy; pure transaction economy; production-transaction economy. We discuss the existence and nature of the firm in three types of economy forms under the conditions of zero and positive transaction cost. It shows that the firm can exist in production-exchange economy under zero transaction cost condition, so the transaction cost and contracts are irrelevant to the existence and nature of the firm. In the sense of abstract, the nature of the firm can be regarded as vehicle of a joint-input value process. 3. We prove that the design of managerial structure and assets allocation determine the long-term assets and short-term assets allocation, the former of which determines the investment cost, the latter of which determines the operation expenditure. Given some condition of first-line and managerial level, the maximization of entrepreneur’s surplus will leads to some optimal management span, which determines the optimal investment cost and operation expenditure. 4. We prove that, during the process of firm financing, four factors determine the choice among different organizational forms: equity structure; debt liability undertaken by the entrepreneur; debt liability undertaken by the equity investors; share equalization. We demonstrate the relative independent of managerial structure and governance structure. We also discuss the effect of the investment asset’s characteristics on the choice among financing methods. 5. We internalize the choice among the U-form, M-form, and matrix structure according to the determinant of managerial structure and asset allocation. The investment cost and operation expenditure of U-form, M-form, matrix structure will increase accordingly. At the same time, the investment expansion induced by the new business will affect the managerial structure and assets allocation of the old business. The entrepreneur will choose the managerial structure and assets allocation according to the principle of maximizing entrepreneur’s surplus, which determines the re-investment cost, re-operation expenditure, and financing amount planed again. 6. We prove that the financing behaviour induced by the new business is not only affected by the new investment asset characteristics, but also by the existing asset characteristics, organizational form and governance structure of the old business.
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