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论文编号：	2008
作者编号：	2003006
上传时间：	2010/4/6 16:42:41
中文题目：	代理问题、投资者保护与公司价值——基于中国证券市场的理论分析和经验证据
英文题目：	Agency problem
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	代理问题 所有权 控制权 投资者保护 公司价值
英文关键字：	Agency problem, Ownership rights, Control rights,
中文摘要：	公司治理关注的焦点是现代公司由于所有权与控制权发生分离而导致的企业利益相关者之间的利益冲突，这种利益冲突可能会损害到公司的价值，影响公司的长远发展，从而需要一系列的治理机制来约束企业各方，尤其是公司的内部人，维护企业各方的正当权益不受侵害并以此促进公司价值的最大化。 我国证券市场自诞生十余年以来已经有了较为长足的发展，但是由于其新兴加转轨的性质，制度发育尚不成熟，证券市场还承担着原国有企业融资及转换经营机制的重任，这使得我国证券市场积聚了大量的矛盾和问题需要予以化解。突出表现在公司治理仍处于很低的水平，大股东“掏空”上市公司的丑闻屡屡曝光于新闻媒体，内部人违规受到监管机构的处罚也是比比皆是。究其根源，就在于由于缺乏有效的治理机制，股权高度集中所导致的大股东的权力得不到制约，大股东与公司其他利益相关者之间的利益冲突相当严重。如果不能建立有效的治理机制来从根本上对大股东的权力加以制约，那么这种利益冲突势必会损害公司的价值，甚至危及到我国证券市场的长期健康持续发展。 正是基于此，在前人研究的基础上，本文希望探讨与上市公司公司治理有关的两大问题：控制性股东和小股东之间的利益冲突是否降低了公司价值，什么类型的公司由利益冲突所导致的代理问题较为严重？法律对于投资者权益的保护等外部治理机制是否能有效地弱化这种代理问题，从而提高公司价值？ 本文融合了代理理论、企业合约理论和产权理论的相关研究成果，提出了一个分析我国证券市场上市公司代理问题的理论框架，并在此基础上利用上市公司2002年至2004年的样本数据，实证研究了上市公司的代理问题、代理问题的具体表现形式及其对公司价值的影响，法律对于投资者的保护等外部治理机制是否能够弱化代理冲突，提高公司价值。 本文得出了如下主要结论： 第一、国有、集体和民营这三种不同所有制形态最终控制人所控制上市公司其公司价值并没有显著不同。国有控制公司随着政府控制层级的提高，公司价值增加；第一大股东持股比例与托宾Q值呈正U形关系；资产负债比率与托宾Q值负相关。金字塔控制结构下民营最终控制人的所有权比例与公司价值正相关；而控制权与所有权的分离与公司价值负相关。第一大股东持股比例与托宾Q值呈倒U形关系；资产负债比率与托宾Q值正相关。 第二、就全体样本公司而言，市场化进程越快的地区、政府干预程度越小的地区和法治水平越高的地区，其所属上市公司价值越高；公司在海外上市同样有助于提高公司价值。国有样本公司海外上市与公司价值之间没有显著的关系；证券监管机构对国有上市公司的监管存在严重的滞后性和无效性。市场化进程和政府干预程度与民营上市公司价值之间的关系不显著；证券监管机构对民营上市公司的处罚这种机制似乎能发挥一定的作用，但其作用仍然非常有限。 第三、就全体样本公司而言，上市公司对外担保行为是代理问题的一种具体表现形式，对外担保越多的公司，其公司价值越低；民营上市公司对外担保相对金额要高于国有上市公司；法治水平高的地区，其所属上市公司对外担保相对金额小。国有上市公司对外担保行为所造成的代理冲突并不十分严重；不同类型的国有最终控制人其对外担保相对金额没有显著差异；发行H股或N股对减少国有上市公司对外担保行为作用不明显；受到过证券监管机构处罚的公司与未受到过证券监管机构处罚的国有上市公司其对外担保行为也没有十分显著的差异。民营上市公司对外担保行为则加剧了代理冲突，从而损害了公司价值。 本文提出了如下的政策性建议：第一、加强证券市场的法治建设，切实保障投资者权益；第二、鼓励我国上市公司在A股市场和海外发达市场同时上市；第三、产权改革应有序、平稳、渐进的实施；第四、进一步推进经济和政治体制改革，打破垄断，完善市场竞争。
英文摘要：	With the rise of public corporations, the separation of ownership and control causes severe agency conflicts, there should be some mechanisms to restrict the misappropriate behavior of insiders of public corporations on the behalf of all stakeholders, that is what corporate governance focus on. The security market of China has developed over ten years, but there are still a lot of problems as it is a new and transitional market. Such as the lack of law and its enforcement, the function of funding and transforming mechanisms of old state-owned enterprises, but the most serious problem is the low level of corporate governance. Controlling shareholders have a lot of means to misappropriate assets of public corporations, which is called “tunneling”. The rights of Minority shareholders can not be well protected. They are no strong will to invest funds to public corporations which have low level corporate governance. All these reduce the value of public corporations. Based on above discussions and the research of other scholars, in this thesis, we want to know how the conflicts of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders reduce the value of public corporations. Can investor protection by law and competition restrict the misappropriate behavior by controlling shareholders; enhance the value of public corporations? First, we established a theory framework for researching the agency problem of China’s listed corporations by integrating the agency theory, the firm theory and the property right theory. Then using the data form year 2002 to year 2004 of China’s listed corporations, we research how agency problems and investor protections affect corporate value by positive research method and get the conclusions as follows: (1)There are no significant differences of corporate value for public corporations controlled by different kinds of ultimate controllers; The value of state-owned corporations controlled by central and province government is higher than corporations controlled by county and city government, the proportion of shares hold by the largest shareholders has U shape with corporate value for state-owned corporations, and liabilities/assets has negative correlations with corporate value for state-owned corporations. As private listed corporations under pyramidal structure control, the ownership rights has positive correlations with corporate value, while the separation of ownership and control has negative correlations with corporate value; The proportion of shares hold by the largest shareholders has adverse U shape with corporate value for private listed corporations, and liabilities/assets has positive correlations with corporate value. (2)The corporations which located at more marketable areas, less government intervening areas and stronger judiciary areas have higher corporate value. Issuing H or N shares also enhance corporate value, but it is not very useful for state-owned corporations. The regulation of securities regulatory authorities has no effect for state-owned corporations and has little effect for private listed corporations. At last, the degree of contest and government intervention seems no significant effect for corporate value of private listed corporations. (3)Guarantee is an important method for misappropriation of controlling shareholders. The more guarantee, the lower corporate value. The corporations located at stronger judiciary areas have lower guarantee. The agency conflict through guarantee at state-owned corporations is not serious, but it is serious at private listed corporations. Issuing H or N shares and the regulation of securities regulatory authorities seems no significant effect for reducing guarantee of state-owned corporations. We also present some suggestions: (1) Investor protection should be strengthened by law; (2)The corporations can issuing A share and H or N shares simultaneously; (3)The reform of property rights should be smooth and gradual; (4)We should open more market, break monopoly and stimulate competition.
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